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Abstract
In broadest terms, this thesis is concerned to answer the question of whether
the view that arithmetic is analytic can be maintained consistently. Lest there
be much suspense, I will conclude that it can. Those who disagree claim that
accounts which defend the analyticity of arithmetic are either unable to give a
satisfactory account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incomplete-
ness theorems, or, if steps are taken to mitigate incompleteness, then the view
loses the ability to account for the applicability of mathematics in the sciences.
I will show that this criticism is not successful against every view whereby
arithmetic is analytic by showing that the brand of “conventionalism” about
mathematics that Rudolf Carnap advocated in the 1930s, especially in Logical
Syntax of Language, does not suffer from these difficulties. There, Carnap de-
velops an account of logic and mathematics that ensures the analyticity of both.
It is based on his famous “Principle of Tolerance”, and so the major focus of
this thesis will to defend this principle from certain criticisms that have arisen
in the 80 years since the book was published. I claim that these criticisms all
share certain misunderstandings of the principle, and, because my diagnosis of
the critiques is that they misunderstand Carnap, the defense I will give is of a
primarily historical and exegetical nature.
Again speaking broadly, the defense will be split into two parts: one primar-
ily historical and the other argumentative. The historical section concerns the
development of Carnap’s views on logic and mathematics, from their beginnings
in Frege’s lectures up through the publication of Logical Syntax. Though this
material is well-trod ground, it is necessary background for the second part. In
part two we shift gears, and leave aside the historical development of Carnap’s
views to examine a certain family of critiques of it. We focus on the version due
to Kurt Go¨del, but also explore four others found in the literature. In the final
chapter, I develop a reading of Carnap’s Principle – the ‘wide’ reading. It is one
whereby there are no antecedent constraints on the construction of linguistic
frameworks. I argue that this reading of the principle resolves the purported
problems. Though this thesis is not a vindication of Carnap’s view of logic and
mathematics tout court, it does show that the view has more plausibility than
is commonly thought.
For my parents, to whom I owe everything.
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Analytic philosophy is ethically neutral formally ; its professors do not indoctrinate
their students with dogmas as to life, religion, race, or society. But analytic philosophy
is the exercise of intelligence in a special field, and if the way of intelligence becomes
part of the habitual nature of men, no doctrines and no institutions are safe from
critical reappraisals. [. . . ] Analytic philosophy has thus a double function: it provides
quiet green pastures for intellectual analysis, wherein its practitioners can find refuge
from a troubled world and cultivate their intellectual games with chess-like indifference
to its course; and it is also a keen, shining sword helping to dispel irrational beliefs
and to make evident the structure of ideas. It is at once the pastime of a recluse and
a terribly serious adventure: it aims to make as clear as possible what it is we really
know.
— Ernest Nagel, “Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic
Philosophy in Europe, Part 1”
The scientific world conception is characterized not so much by theses of its own, but
rather by its basic attitude, its points of view and direction of research. The goal
ahead is unified science. [. . . ] From this aim follows the emphasis on collective efforts,
and also the emphasis on what can be grasped intersubjectively; from this springs the
search for a neutral system of formulae, for a symbolism freed from the slag of historical
languages; and also the search for a total system of concepts. Neatness and clarity are
striven for, and dark distances and unfathomable depths rejected. In science there are
no ‘depths’; there is surface everywhere [. . . ].
– Otto Neurath et. al., “Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung:
Der Wiener Kreis”
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The fundamental question this thesis aims to address is that of the status of
arithmetic. Put bluntly, it will be our purpose to discover whether arithmetic is
analytic or synthetic; and, lest the suspense become unbearable, we say up front
that it will be our aim to defend the claim that it is analytic. This thought has
been current in analytic philosophy for at least the last hundred-odd years, and
one might be forgiven for thinking that the question has been settled once and
for all with the publication of Gottlob Frege’s Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik
(The Foundations of Arithmetic) in 1884, or at least with the “rediscovery” of
Frege by mainstream analytic philosophy in the 1950s. However, in the light of
certain difficulties that arose in the study of the foundations of mathematics,
namely of the paradoxes of set theory and of the First and Second Incomplete-
ness Theorems of Kurt Go¨del, there has been a steady, if quiet, undercurrent
of dissent from this orthodox view. However, for reasons that I will make plain
below, I believe the time is right to address these dissenters, and put at least
one of their arguments, along with a few of its variants, to bed for good.
The argument that I will address can be summarized easily. Essentially, the
dissenters claim that the orthodox view is either unable to give a satisfactory
account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incompleteness of any
mathematical theory rich enough to be of use in this endeavor, or if steps are
taken to mitigate this incompleteness, then the orthodox view loses the ability
to account for the applicability of the mathematical portion of our language
in the natural sciences, or indeed in any synthetic discourse. The dissenters’
argument falls short of showing that mathematics must therefore be taken to
be synthetic – though some of them think this as well.1 Our aim will be
to show that this is not successful against every view whereby arithmetic is
analytic, and in particular we will show that the brand of “conventionalism”
about mathematics that Rudolf Carnap advocated in the 1930s, especially in
his book Logische Syntax der Sprache (Logical Syntax of Language), does not
suffer from the difficulties which may plague other orthodox views. Over the
course of this defense it will become clear, however, that the sense in which
1Most famously Go¨del argued for exactly this conclusion in his 1951 Gibbs Lectures
([Go¨del, 1995c]). More recently Kolman has argued in a similar fashion in his [Kolman, 2006],
though his ultimate aim is different from Go¨del’s.
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Carnap’s conventionalism is ‘orthodox’ is loose. I will say more about this
below, and much more as this thesis progresses. Now, though, I think it worth
pausing briefly to make a few remarks on scholarship in the history of analytical
philosophy, in particular scholarship on the Vienna Circle, since my approach
to the problem that concerns us here – of the status of mathematics – will be
of a primarily historical and exegetical nature.
The history of the Vienna Circle, and the logical positivist movement with
which it was associated, is largely known as a cautionary tale in contemporary
philosophy. The Circle are seen as akin to the legendary Icarus – a movement
that flew too high on the wings of their rhetoric, and whose wings were sub-
sequently melted by the very logical tools they proclaimed as the saviors of
philosophy. John Passmore put matters succinctly while summing up in his
influential essay “Logical Positivism”, and said “Logical positivism, then, is
dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes”.2 Building on this
theme, in the introduction to his book Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth
Century, Scott Soames says,
One movement – logical positivism – is widely regarded to have
been refuted by its own proponents. As chronicled in volume 1, the
logical positivists articulated their basic conception, formulated in
terms clear and precise enough to be tested, and then found counter–
arguments that in the end undermined it. Events like these, which
constitute real progress, are unfortunately far too rare in the history
of philosophy. For that reason, the rise and fall of logical positivism
is viewed by many philosophers today as a proud chapter in the
analytic tradition.3
Indeed, as Passmore and Soames suggest, if any view in philosophy can be
decisively said to be dead, then logical positivism is it.4 As George Reisch
notes in indirect agreement with Soames,
Nostalgia, of course, carries little philosophical weight. Most con-
temporary philosophers, however much they may appreciate logical
empiricism as their profession’s founding movement, agree that in
the 1950s and ’60s logical empiricism was revealed to be a catalog of
mistakes, misjudgments, and oversimplifications about science and
epistemology.5
However, as Michael Friedman notes in his paper “The Re-evaluation of Logical
Positivism”, in the years since Logical Positivism was an active philosophical
2[Passmore, 1967].
3[Soames, 2003], p xiii.
4For our purposes here it is not necessary to put a precise date on the death of logical
positivism. Suffice it to say that it is sometime between the publication of Quine’s essay “On
What There Is”, which in some sense reinvigorated and legitimized the study of metaphysics,
and Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which is thought to have picked
apart the positivists’ view of scientific practice. Of course, this picture has been substantially
debated in the literature. See [Reisch, 1991] as a paradigm example.
5[Reisch, 2005], p 1.
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movement, it has become increasingly possible to consider its positions at a dis-
passionate distance.6 As more philosophers and historians of philosophy look
at the movement in the light of later philosophical developments, a new under-
standing of logical positivism has emerged. It is one in which, contrary to their
depiction in the philosophical folklore, they are not dogmatic foundationalists,
or radical empiricists. In keeping with this new understanding, it will be the
purpose of this thesis to examine a particular critique of the conventionalism
about logic and mathematics of Rudolf Carnap that was initially made by the
famous logician Kurt Go¨del, but was later followed by the philosopher of science
Hillary Putnam, and also by Gabriella Crocco. Finally, this thesis will show
that critiques of this kind fail because they do not adequately appreciate the
role of Carnap’s famous ‘Principle of Tolerance’ in his philosophical position.
Though the version of the argument that is the main focus of this thesis,
namely the one due to Go¨del, has only been known since 1995, versions of it have
lurked in many philosophers’ thinking about logical positivism almost since the
very beginning of the movement. For example, a certain version of it is found in
Karl Popper’s book The Logic of Scientific Discovery, originally published in a
shortened form under the title Logik der Forschung, and another can be found
in Eino Kalia’s work.7 These early criticisms are so well known that they have
led the philosophical community over the past 50 or so years to think of them
as decisive. Again, Soames’ comments above are a paradigmatic example of
the kind of blanket dismissal that the positivist’s ideas now receive. Partly, no
doubt, this is due to some poor, or even mistaken, formulations of their views
that they published in the early days. No less importantly, as I alluded above,
the Circle’s strident rhetoric often ran ahead of their actual argumentation.
Indeed, Carnap in particular is known in part for his overbold phrasing and
optimism in characterizing the Circle’s achievements. Finally, I think it is partly
due to certain historical circumstances that prevented the Circle from arriving
at a more unified expression of their view, namely the premature deaths of both
Hans Hahn and Mortiz Schlick, and possibly most dramatically the outbreak
of World War II and the Cold War that followed.8 In any case, until recently,
the logical positivists were almost universally regarded by current philosophers
as some combination of benighted fools, intolerant empiricists, and dogmatic
foundationalists. To put it simply, in the current philosophical folklore the
Vienna Circle are the bogeymen of analytic philosophy’s past.
Making the argument that this view of the logical positivists, or the Vienna
Circle, or even just of Carnap individually, is completely mistaken would be far
too large a task for a work of this size, assuming it is even possible. Indeed, for
all I want to say here it may very well be the case that the current philosophical
folk view of logical positivism is ultimately correct. However, it is my goal to
show that at least Carnap’s view of logic and mathematics as he states it in
his book LSL is not wrong for every reason it is thought to be so. I intend
this to be a very restricted claim, and to make sense of what follows it is worth
6See [Friedman, 1991], p 505.
7See [Popper, 1959], p 36, and [Carus, 2007], ch 7.
8On the effect of Hahn and Schlick’s deaths, see [Feigl, 1969]. On the effect of WWII and
the Cold War see the introduction to [Carus, 2007] and [Reisch, 2005].
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spending some time spelling out all the restrictions. I am not attempting a
blanket defense of Carnap’s view. Though quite a lot of research has gone in
to arguing that there is more continuity than it might at first appear in his
thinking over the course of his philosophical career, I will treat it as if there can
be some definitive boundaries drawn between different streams of his research.
Firstly, I exclude from consideration all of Carnap’s work that was originally
published after 1940. Secondly, I also exclude from consideration Carnap’s two
early books: Der Raum, which is the somewhat modified book version of his
Ph.D thesis, and his second book Der Logische Aufbau der Welt on the subject
of the logical construction of the world via our perceptual experience. These
are excluded partly in an effort to meet the critiques which are the subject of
this thesis on their own terms, and partly because their relevance to his views
in logic and mathematics is questionable. This leaves the work that Carnap
produced during his time in Vienna (1925 – 1931) and in Prague (1931 – 1936)
as our primary sources. We will be particularly, though by no means exclusively,
concerned with his book LSL, originally published in 1934 but revised and
translated into English in 1937. There are, as ever with studies of this kind,
some issues regarding translation and also post-hoc edits; these will be flagged
in cases where I think that they make a difference to the interpretation that I
offer.
I hope that the above restrictions on the claim I am making help to make
clear that what is intended in this thesis is a rigorous, historically based defense
of a portion of Carnap’s thought, namely the view of logic and mathematics
that he held in the 1930s. Sometimes this period of his thought is called his
‘Syntax Period’, though I think this label is misleading for reasons that I will
discuss below. In general, the thesis will be organized chronologically, following
Carnap’s development up to the writing of LSL. Chapters two and three will
focus on how Carnap arrived at this view. I will focus on the three major
influences on his thinking about logic, namely Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell,
and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The main focus of these sections will be to show
that portions of the views of each of these influences were assimilated into
Carnap’s own view, but that this resulting position is distinct from each of
them individually. Chapter two will give an account of Carnap’s logicism, from
its beginnings in his student days in Frege’s lectures, through his reading of
Russell’s work. I stop short of including his own version of the logicist account
of mathematics, which will be taken up in subsequent chapters. Chapter three is
an examination of Carnap’s time in Vienna, focused primarily on the influence
of Wittgenstein on Carnap’s thinking at the time. I build up to his break with
the Wittgenstinnian views of the Circle, paying special attention to the debate
over the nature of protocol sentences, and the interaction between Carnap’s
thinking on this issue with his thinking about his philosophical views more
generally.
There is a sense that there is not much novel in the first few chapters,
and indeed the discussion of Carnap’s intellectual development is relatively
well–trod ground. However, the groundwork that these two chapters lay is
essential to the case that I will present in chapter four. In that chapter, I will
give a detailed account of Carnap’s view on mathematics and logic, grounded
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primarily in my reading of LSL.9 I will argue that the most famous section of
that book, the ‘Principle of Tolerance’, is critical to understanding the position
that he advocates in that book. Additionally, I will argue that the Principle
is, in some substantial sense, not a new portion of his thought first articulated
in LSL, but rather something akin to it was a part of his thinking from his
childhood, though I will note that he seems to have gone away from ‘Tolerant’
thinking during his days in Vienna. As part of this latter argument, I will
answer Karl Menger’s priority challenge to Carnap’s Tolerance. This section is
the final portion of our extended development of Carnap’s position.
In Chapter five, I change focus somewhat, and take up Go¨del’s critique of
this view. The critique was found in his Nachlass, and so it only became publicly
subject to discussion in 1995 when the third volume of the Go¨del Collected
Works was published. However, Go¨del was not the only philosopher to notice
that this line of criticism might work against Carnap. As originally pointed out
by Thomas Ricketts, Hilary Putnam gave a version of it in his “Philosophers
and Human Understanding”.10 This version of the critique is also discussed in
chapter five, along with some contemporary secondary literature which make
the case that these kinds of criticisms do devastating damage to Carnap’s view
of logic and mathematics. In particular, we focus on work by Gabriella Crocco,
Patricia Blanchette, Hilary Putnam, and Michael Potter. However, this chapter
is purely expository, and we hold off from a final evaluation of these criticisms
until later.
In the final chapter, we confront the critiques directly. In order to do so,
we return to considering the Principle, and I argue for a reading of it, which I
dub the ‘wide’ reading, whereby there are no antecedent constraints on which
languages can be proposed. After pausing to consider, but ultimately dismiss,
a revenge type worry due to Michael Friedman, we examine the criticisms from
chapter 5. I argue that they can be put into two groups, analogous to the twin
lines of attack from the sketch of the criticisms I gave above. They are: (1)
criticisms that focus on the question of the applicability of mathematics, and
(2) those criticisms which argue that the Principle is either incoherent or self-
refuting. I analyze both groups in the light of the wide reading of the Principle
and conclude that they do not succeed in doing any damage to Carnap’s position
so understood. In the end, this thesis is not a vindication of Carnap, or of the
Principle of Tolerance, tout court. What I do take it to establish, however,
is that there is at least one family of strategies that will not succeed against
Carnap’s Tolerance-inspired philosophy of logic and mathematics. But, this aim
is immediately confronted by a pressing worry, namely why this kind of limited
defense of a philosophical position – a position which has not been current for
at least seventy-five years – should be of interest to contemporary philosophers.
Before moving on to the opening considerations of this thesis, I think it is worth
pausing on this question at some length.
9Though I will follow the commonly accepted practice of calling his view ‘Conventionalism’,
this must be done with caution. In section 1.2 I explain the ways in which some philosophers
in the past have been misled by this title.
10See [Ricketts, 1994], [Putnam, 1983], and section 5.2 below.
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1.1 On the Value of History of Philosophy
Analytic philosophy is famously a-historical, if not outright anti-historical.11
However, since almost the very beginnings of this way of doing philosophy,
there has been an interest in laying out its history. In the Vienna Circle’s
1929 manifesto, for example, the authors are at great pains to link their group
with various figures in the history of philosophy.12 There are several potential
motivations that could lie behind attempts such as the Circle’s to set out the
history of analytic philosophy, and one need only look to the introductions of
the many books on this history to find them enumerated.13 One important
motivation, which I think is fundamentally misguided, is to determine what
analytical philosophy is.14 In some cases, these definitions are genealogical
and analytic philosophy is defined as a train of influence that flows from certain
philosophers – most often Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein – to others.15
In other cases, the definition given is methodological, and analytic philosophy is
philosophy done in a particular way; usually a striving for clarity and rigor are
mentioned in this capacity, alongside the use of the tools of formal logic, a focus
on language, and a certain relationship to the sciences (either separate from
them in the early period, or continuous with them after the rise of naturalism
sometime in the 1950s). Finally, though far less often than the other two
definitions thus far discussed, sometimes analytical philosophy is said to be a
certain collection of philosophical problems; this definition occasionally appears
in a negative form as the exclusion of certain problems. In each case, however,
it seems that continued historical scrutiny reveals these attempts to be futile.
Consider, for example, the genealogical approach. There does not seem to be
an economically sized group of philosophers which we can cite as those to whom
we owe the foundation of the our tradition.16
Returning to the topic of this section, if the usual reasons that people do
history of analytic philosophy are doomed to failure, then why should we do
11It is at least plausible that this attitude is one of the lasting vestiges of the influence of
the Vienna Circle over the way analytic philosophy is done.
12Authorship of this manifesto is somewhat hard to determine. I have given it to Neurath.
A fuller discussion of my reasons for this assignment is found in section 3.1.2 below.
13For example, the introduction to Glock’s [Glock, 1997], and in particular pp vii – ix, is a
clear example.
14There might be some distinction to be drawn between ‘analytic’ philosophy and ‘analyt-
ical’ philosophy. We might say that in the former case we are discussing a particular school
of philosophy which has been dominant in the English speaking world for the majority of the
last hundred years, while in the latter case we are naming a particular method of doing phi-
losophy – philosophical analysis, which investigates the world by analyzing propositions into
their component parts, and stands in contrast to a kind of monism or synthetic approach to
philosophical system building. I, however, do not mean anything substantial by the difference
in terminology here, and I trust that, having noted this possible confusion, it will not trouble
us further.
15Michael Dummett’s [Dummett, 1993] is perhaps the most famous example, though there
certainly are others.
16A paradigmatic case is Richard Rorty, who is usually not included in the foundational
group, but is not related genealogically to Frege, Russell, Moore, or Wittgenstein in any
obvious way. Martinich and Sosa make a general version of this point in the introduction to
their [Martinich and Sosa, 2001].
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it at all? There are two reasons that I think warrant mention here. The
first we have already seen in action. The attempts to do history as a kind of
definition of analytic philosophy are, at root, a kind of boarder guarding. They
are attempts to say who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ in one way or another. One of
the most valuable contributions that history of analytic philosophy can make
is to show that these attempts have failed – that is, to resist these attempts
at systematic exclusion of particular philosophers, areas of investigation, or
philosophical methods from what is considered legitimate philosophy in the
majority of the English speaking world.
There are two other important reasons for doing history of philosophy that
I want to touch on here. The first is the thought that exploring the works of
philosophers from the past can shed light on philosophical positions that have
been neglected in contemporary debates.17 That is, one reason that we might
be interested in studying history is to mine it for ideas. As I see it, this can
be a very profitable enterprise, but comes with substantial risk. For example,
since someone engaged in this kind of historical profiteering is only interested
in finding ideas that lead them to positions relevant in contemporary debates,
they may allow themselves a certain leeway in their scholarship – after all, they
are only after the idea insofar as they can use it, and if the historical subject
of their research did not actually hold the position they discover, then so much
the worse for the historical philosopher.
The second motivation is the converse of this first one: we study historical
philosophers thinking not for the benefits that it can provide to contemporary
philosophy, but rather for the sake of ‘getting things right’. That is, we might
think that it is important to ensure that the historical record is correct; that, for
example, when we say to our students that some philosopher believed that P ,
they did in fact believe that that P . This approach has risks as well. Those of us
who are more interested in history than contemporary philosophy might allow
ourselves too much leeway in the philosophical portion of our work because our
main interest is historical.18 It is my aim in this thesis to chart a course between
these two extremes. Additionally, while it is primarily a project in this latter
camp – namely that of setting the historical record straight – I hope that there
is value for philosophers whose interests are more closely aligned with those in
the former group.
1.2 A Short Note on Terminology
As with any longer written work in philosophy, in this thesis there will be a
number of central terms whose meaning may not be entirely clear. For most
of them, I provide clarificatory remarks at the place where they are first used.
However, two terms, ‘Vienna Circle’ and ‘logical positivism’, do not fit neatly
into this pattern, and so it will be beneficial to give rough glosses for them
at the outset. The name ‘logical positivism’ was used by its adherents to de-
17There are plenty of examples of this in recent history, but the ‘rediscovery’ of virtue
approaches to ethics in 20th century philosophy is perhaps the most well known.
18Barnes makes a similar point at [Barnes, 1995], p xviii.
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scribe a view that attempted to marry the empiricist claim that all knowledge
is grounded in sense data with the claim that mathematical and logical knowl-
edge are both a priori and necessary. In part because the movement began in
Vienna, where Ernst Mach and Ludwig Boltzmann had held the chair for the
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, the first attempts to spell out what ‘begin-
ning in sense data’ might mean were positivistic.19 That is, they were framed
in such a way that all substantial knowledge of the world, all synthetic sen-
tences, could be directly tied in some way to sense impressions. Later, however,
this commitment to sense impressions was relaxed, and it sufficed for synthetic
knowledge to be verifiable by some kind of scientific testing; more will be said
about this transition in section 3.1.2 below. Concordant with this change, some
of the philosophers who adhered to this view came to prefer the term ‘logical
empiricism’ to the older ‘logical positivism’. In this thesis, however, I use the
names interchangeably and I trust that this will not cause any confusions.
While not exclusive to them, for a number of reasons the group most associ-
ated with logical positivism is the Vienna Circle. Though Hans Reichenbach’s
Berlin Circle also fell under the logical positivist banner, as did the Ernst Mach
Society (which was the organization that the Vienna Circle used for public out-
reach) and the Society for Empirical Philosophy (which was the public arm of
the Berlin Circle), in this thesis the term ‘logical positivism’ will be a stand-in
for the Vienna Circle only, and not these other groups.20 Additionally, the
term ‘Vienna Circle’ itself will be used to refer only to those people who self-
identified as members; a full list can be found at the end of their manifesto,
[Neurath, 1973]. Additionally, I will use the terms ‘Vienna Circle’ and ‘the Cir-
cle’ to pick out the same group. With these short terminological preliminaries
out of the way, we begin with the thesis proper.
19Moritz Schlick later came to occupy this same chair.
20There is a small discussion of the relationship between the Circle and the various other
scientifically minded philosophical groups in [Kraft, 1952], pp 5 – 6.
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Chapter 2
Carnap and the Logicist
Tradition
In this chapter we will examine the influence that two of the people who most
impacted Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics and logic, namely Gottlob Frege
and Bertrand Russell, had on him. These two philosophers represent the genesis
of the logicist stream of Carnap’s thought, though the types of logicism they
espoused were substantially different.1 The goal of part two of this chapter will
be to trace out what of their views are included in Carnap’s own view, and in
what sense he can be called a logicist as a result of this influence. Of course,
there is a way in which labels of this kind do not matter – indeed, nothing much
hangs on whether or not the position that we will eventually lay out as Carnap’s
is a ‘logicist’ one in some ultimate sense. This is merely a way at getting at what
I believe Carnap had in mind for his position, and I believe it to be an instructive
lens through which to examine his views. Moreover, Carnap repeatedly called
himself a logicist, and did so throughout several different stages in his life.2
Presumably this label had some meaning for him, and it will be instructive, I
think, to draw out what it was.
This chapter will be structured into two parts. In the first, we give a brief
overview of Carnap’s philosophy of logic and mathematics in the 1930s. The
main concern in that section is simply to give a frame with which we can
compare his view with those of Frege and Russell, as well as those of Carnap’s
other influences to be examined in later chapters. We will revisit and further
develop this overview in section 4.2 below. The first section of the second
part will detail Carnap’s relationship with Frege. The aim will be to show in
precisely what ways Frege’s views influenced Carnap’s thinking about logic and
mathematics into the period in which he wrote LSL. The second section of the
second part we examine the influence that Russell had on Carnap’s logicism. In
1Russell also exerted a large influence on Carnap’s thought beyond his logicism. For
example, it is often said that the impetus for Carnap’s second book, [Carnap, 1967], comes
from Russell’s external world program. However, this aspect of his influence is not of further
relevance to the investigation we undertake here. The interested reader is commended to
[Carus, 2007] (in particular chapter 5), [Friedman, 1999], [Pincock, 2002], [Reck, 2004], and
[Richardson, 1998] for more on this part of Russell’s influence on Carnap.
2For two instances see [Carnap, 1963], p 12, and p 47.
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particular, we will be concerned to show the way in which Carnap took Russell
and Whitehead’s book Principia Mathematica to have settled the question of
whether mathematics could be reduced to logic once and for all. As we will see,
this conviction plays a critical role in shaping Carnap’s attitudes towards the
debate over the foundations of mathematics, and indeed towards foundational
questions in general.
2.1 Carnap’s Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic:
An Overview
The view of logic, mathematics, and the relationship between them that Car-
nap is most known for is that found in his 1934 book The Logical Syntax of
Language. Though we will revise our account of his view later, for now we will
use this brief summary. Firstly, Carnap assumes that it is uncontroversial that
mathematics can be reduced to logic in the manner of Russell and Whitehead’s
Principia Mathematica, of which more will be said in section 2.2.2 below.3 The
question that is the subject of the debate over the relationship between logic
and mathematics is therefore not a technical question about whether the one
(mathematics) can be represented in the other (logic), which Carnap believed
had been answered, but rather it must be a metaphysical one. Put roughly, it
is something like this: “Is the fundamental nature of mathematics such that (1)
it discovers properties of independently existing things (be they logical objects
or other abstracta), or is it (2) about mental entities that proceed from the
‘form of inner sense’, or (3) is it about finite strings of marks on a page that are
given in empirical sensation?” These three possibilities approximate the posi-
tions that various historical mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics
took on the debate. However, as with all such metaphysical arguments, Carnap
thinks the issue is not one of the nature of certain things, but rather it is one
of language. That is, he thinks that the metaphysical issue is vexed and the de-
bate intractable, and so would rather us address the question “Which language
is most perspicuous for the formal reconstruction of our existing mathematical
practice?”4 By language he means a constructed language that can be either
formal, in the modern sense, or something like a natural language but with the
ambiguities ironed out. Each language is composed of a vocabulary of uninter-
preted signs, and some rules (of formation, which tell us which strings of the
vocabulary constitute sentences, and of transformation, which tell us how we
3This interpretation of Carnap’s relationship with the Russell and Whitehead version of the
logicist program has been challenged by Michael Friedman in his [Friedman, 2001], where he
claims that “Nevertheless, he recognizes that traditional logicism cannot succeed; we cannot
reduce mathematics to logic in some antecedently understood sense, whether in the sense of
Frege’s Begriffsschrift or Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica” ([Friedman, 2001],
p 223). For reasons that will become clear below, I think he is incorrect on this point. Carnap
did know that there were significant differences between his own version of logicism and the
‘traditional’ kinds, but he nonetheless saw his as continuous with theirs, and, crucially, thought
that the reduction had been accomplished by Russell and Whitehead (not withstanding some
debates about the genuine logicality of certain axioms they used).
4See, for example, [Carnap, 1937], pp xiv – xv.
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can make inferences from one sentence to another). There are no constraints,
as Carnap sees it, on which vocabulary and on which rules one may include in
one’s language. Carnap refers to this freedom frequently, and encapsulates it
in his ‘Principle of Tolerance’. The languages as conceived of in this manner
come with a distinction between three groups of sentences: the ‘analytic’, which
are consequences of the null class of sentences alone, the ‘contradictory’, which
have every sentence as a consequence, and the ‘synthetic’, which are the rest.5
On this view, logic is the analytic and the contradictory sentences, i.e. those
whose validity does not depend on any other sentences.6 Mathematics, then, is
a part of logic in the sense that the validity of mathematical statements in no
way depends on any other sentences, and in particular not the synthetic ones.
As I will show below, the development of Carnap’s view is an interesting
reflection of his intellectual history. Over the course of this chapter and the
next, I will show how various parts of his view are assembled from the views of
his main philosophical influences: Frege (section 2.2.1), Russell (section 2.2.2),
and Wittgenstein (section 3.1). Some of this ground is already well known, and
some has already been discussed in the literature, but many of what I see as
the key bits are not as well known as they should be. It is my intention here to
help correct this.
2.2 Logicisms: Frege, Russell, Carnap
A key piece of Carnap’s view as presented in the last section is the claim that
mathematics is a part of logic. Historically this has been one formulation of a
position called ‘logicism’, and Carnap often referred to himself as a logicist.7
In some respects this is not surprising. After all, as an undergraduate he was a
student of Gottlob Frege, one of the founders and staunchest defenders of logi-
cism, and later in his career he carried on a long correspondence with Bertrand
Russell who was one of the other main proponents of logicism. The effect of
these interactions remained throughout his life, and in the IA, written some 43
years after his last class with Frege, he says,
Whereas Frege had the strongest influence on me in the field of logic
and semantics, in my philosophical thinking in general I learned
most from Bertrand Russell.8
Further on he adds a bit more and says,
5This classification appears to commit Carnap to the inference ex falso quodlibet, or explo-
sion. I will argue in chapter 6 below that he need not be committed in this way, and that it
is a matter of pragmatic considerations that he proceeded in the manner that he did on this
issue.
6If we were being completely rigorous here references to ‘validity’ would have to be replaced
with talk of ‘being a consequence’. I take it that in each place I use the word ‘validity’ it
could be replaced by a suitable phrase that omits it in favor of ‘being a consequence’. I trust
that allowing myself this minor convenience will not cause any confusions.
7Other versions include the view that mathematics is logic, or that, whatever mathematics
is, it can be fully represented using only logical definitions and inferences. A standard overview
of logicism can be found in [Shapiro, 2000], chapter 5.
8[Carnap, 1963], p 13.
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For me personally, Wittgenstein was perhaps the philosopher who,
besides Russell and Frege, had the greatest influence on my think-
ing.9
While Carnap was influenced immensely by these two thinkers, the logicism he
adopts is quite different from both. Below we will trace out in exactly which
ways this is so. Of the third philosopher mentioned, Wittgenstein, it would be
problematic to include him in a section on logicism. Instead, we will examine
his influence on Carnap in section 3.1 below.
2.2.1 Frege
Gottlob Frege was a member of the faculty of mathematics at the University
of Jena for 44 years.10 During that time, he offered three lecture courses in
logic entitled Begriffsschrift I, Begriffsschrift II, and “Logic in Mathematics”.
Generally there were not enough students to actually hold the lectures for any of
these courses other than Begriffsschrift I which ran with a kind of regularity; by
tradition in German universities there must be three people for a lecture to be
held: the lecturer and two others. Indeed, Begriffsschrift II was held only once.
Frege also offered lectures in other areas of mathematics and presumably these
were better attended. Our examination of Frege’s work will be split into two
parts. In the first, we will give a brief account of his logicism, and the paradox
that felled it. In the second, we will look at his influence on Carnap. The idea
that Frege was a major influence on Carnap is common, and originates with
Carnap himself as we will show in section 2.2.1 below. Our account of this idea
will spell out what exactly this influence amounts to, with an eye to showing
in what ways this interaction influenced Carnap’s mature view.
Frege Before the Paradox
Frege is justifiably famous in modern analytic philosophy for several things.
In this section, we will focus on one part of his views on the nature of math-
ematics, namely his logicism. As mentioned above, logicism is the view that
mathematics either is logic in some substantial sense, or that it can be derived
from logic with the help of definitions for mathematical concepts given in a
logical notation. This latter version finds its beginning in Frege’s first book,
Begriffsschrift, published in 1879.11 In the book he has two main goals. The
first is to lay out his ‘concept script’, one of the very first systematically de-
veloped formal notations. With it, he showed how every statement could be
analyzed in terms of functions and arguments. In the most basic case this would
consist of a predicate being applied to an object. However, it was also possible
to have predicates of higher types applied to lower-level predicates. This also
9[Carnap, 1963], p 25.
10This overview of Frege’s academic career draws heavily on material in both [Beaney, 1997]
and [Awodey and Reck, 2004].
11In what follows, I will use the word Begriffsschrift both as the title of Frege’s book and
as the name of his notational system. I trust that it will be clear from context which use I
intend in each particular case.
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has the effect of vastly simplifying the universe of discourse, as it now needs to
include only two sorts of things – namely objects and predicates (though these
come in various levels). He argues that, though the need for such a notation
may not be immediately obvious, it will be invaluable in our formal reasoning,
especially in mathematics and science. In his introduction to the book, Frege
says,
I believe I can make the relationship of my Begriffsschrift to ordi-
nary language clearest if I compare it to that of the microscope to
the eye. The latter, due to the range of its applicability, due to the
flexibility with which it is able to adapt to the most diverse circum-
stances, has a great superiority over the microscope. Considered
as an optical instrument, it admittedly reveals many imperfections,
which usually remain unnoticed only because of its intimate con-
nection with mental life. But as soon as scientific purposes place
great demands on sharpness of resolution, the eye turns out to be
inadequate. The microscope, on the other hand, is perfectly suited
for just such purposes, but precisely because of this is useless for all
others.12
The second goal is the investigation of the foundations of arithmetic. Indeed,
this is the ‘scientific purpose’ that he has in mind in the passage above. As we
noted in the first chapter, with the advent of set theory, the need for secure
foundations became increasingly obvious inside the mathematical community.
Since, as Frege also argues in the introduction to the Begriffsschrift, the firmest
proofs are purely logical ones, he sets out to see how much of arithmetic he
can derive directly from logic.13 If he could derive it all, then the doubts about
the foundations would be alleviated. Sadly, he did not manage to derive all
of it, but he did show that mathematical induction could be analyzed purely
logically.14 Armed with this early success, he announces in the conclusion to
Begriffsschrift his intention to give logical analyses of the other fundamental
notions for arithmetic, and says,
Arithmetic, as I remarked at the beginning, was the starting point
of the train of thought that led me to my Begriffsschrift. I therefore
intend to apply it to this science first, seeking to provide further
analysis of its concepts and a deeper foundation of its theorems. I
announce in the third Part some preliminary results that move in
this direction. Progression along the indicated path, the elucidation
of the concepts of number, magnitude, etc., will form the object of
further investigations, to which I shall turn immediately after this
work.15
With the analyses Frege announces here, he would have all the tools necessary
to derive the whole of arithmetic from logic, and therefore to place it on firm
12[Frege, 1997a], p 49. My emphasis.
13[Frege, 1997a], p 48.
14For a modern rendition of Frege’s analysis, see [Beaney, 1997], pp 75 – 76.
15[Frege, 1997a], pp 51 – 52.
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foundations. However, the task was perhaps harder than the success he had
enjoyed in Begriffsschrift made it appear, and his next book did not appear for
five more years.
In the meantime, reception of Begriffsschrift was poor, and the book fell
almost entirely on deaf ears. Few knew of Frege’s work, and those that did
failed to appreciate what he had accomplished. There were some published
reviews, but they were almost entirely negative. A paradigmatic example is the
review written by the English mathematician John Venn who says,
But, making all due allowances for these considerations, it does not
seem to me that Dr. Frege’s scheme can for a moment compare with
that of Boole. [. . . ] I have not made myself sufficiently familiar with
Dr. Frege’s system to attempt to work out problems by help of it,
but I must confess that it seems to me cumbrous and inconvenient.16
As Beany notes in his [Beaney, 1997], even sympathetic readers thought that
an exposition of his ideas in plain language, rather than in his formalism, might
assist him in answering some of his critics.17 His second book goes a fair ways
towards this aim.
Frege’s Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, is now a classic in analytic phi-
losophy, and as such needs no introduction. Suffice it to say that in it Frege
powerfully answers many of the criticisms that were leveled at Begriffsschrift,
and also advances his positive research program of giving logical analyses of
mathematical concepts. The major result that Frege manages in Grundlagen
is an analysis of the concept ‘number’. Essentially, Frege held that numbers
were objects that, though abstract, were nonetheless objective. He has three
arguments for why, all based to a greater or lesser extent, in his philosophy of
language.18 The first argument that Frege offers is to note that sentences like
“Jupiter has four moons” are really ascriptions about the concept “. . . being a
moon of Jupiter”. Namely, it ascribes the property of having four instances to
that concept. We might be tempted on that basis to say that what numbers are
is second level predicates, which is to say that they are predicates of predicates.
However, in these cases the number word, like ‘four’ in our example above, is
just a part of the predicate, not the whole of it. So, were we to think that num-
bers were predicates in this way, then we would also have to think that there
were different numerical predicates for each concept. Moreover, in other sen-
tences numbers can be the subject of the sentence (for example, in the sentence
“The number 2 is an even number”). Given this, then, it would be misguided to
think that numbers are predicates of any level. Instead, they should be objects.
The second argument is that we use definite articles to refer to numbers, as in
the sentence “The number 2 is prime”, coupled with the observation that we
generally use definite articles to refer to objects. Finally, Frege notes that a
hallmark of objecthood is the ability to say which object we are referring to by
16[Bynum, 1973], pp 234 – 235. My emphasis. Beany also notes this review in his
[Beaney, 1997], p 4.
17[Beaney, 1997], pp 4 – 5, and p 83 fn 18.
18Here I follow the presentation of this material in [Wright, 1983], pp 10 – 12. Frege’s
original can be found in [Frege, 1980], §57.
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means of identity statements. So, if numbers are to be objects, then we need to
see if there are contexts in which the right kind of identity claims for numbers
occur. Of course, we need not look far since number theory gives us the kinds
of claims we want. There, we make both existence and identity statements
about numbers regularly. The net effect of all of these arguments is to proceed
by analogy. Frege shows that there are significant similarities between our talk
where the subject of the sentences are uncontroversially objects and our talk
when the subject is a number. Wright puts the point this way,
According to this reading, then, Frege is treating linguistic facts as
decisive of whether or not a concept is genuinely sortal in the sense
glossed earlier. Let us grant that the sort of considerations sketched
go a good way towards establishing that the syntax of our numerical
language can be very closely assimilated to that characteristic talk of
less controversial kinds of object. [. . . ] Frege’s proposal, I suggest,
is that the fact that our arithmetical language has these features
is sufficient to set up natural number as a sortal concept, whose
instances, if it has any, will thus be objects, furnishings of the world
every bit as objective as mountains, rivers and trees. And, once
again, that the concept does indeed have instances is settled by the
truth of the appropriate arithmetical statements.19
What is important about Frege classifying numbers as objects on linguistic
grounds in the way that he has done is that now number talk is located back
in territory that he had established as logical in Begriffsschrift. So, now armed
with the analysis of numbers in terms of logic, Frege is one very large step closer
to his goal of giving a logical foundation to mathematics. There are only two
more tasks to be accomplished: to set out the rules of inference (Frege’s term is
‘basic laws’) that govern our arithmetical reasoning and argue that they too are
purely logical, and finally to use these rules to actually derive the propositions
of arithmetic on the basis of the analyses of the mathematical concepts.
The setting out of the basic laws of arithmetic and the demonstration of
their logicality is the task that Frege sets himself in his last book Grundgesetze
der Arithmetik (Basic Laws of Arithmetic), published in two volumes, the first
in 1893 and the second in 1903. Despite the argumentative successes that he
had enjoyed with the Grundlagen, his work remained mostly unread and so
he had a great deal of difficulty finding a publisher who was willing to print
Grundgesetze. It was finally published at Frege’s own expense.20 Though he had
intended this to be his masterwork, summing up and improving on his previous
results, and finally finishing the derivation he had announced 14 years earlier,
as with his other works, publication of Grundgesetze went essentially unnoticed,
until it came to the attention of Bertrand Russell. The result is extremely well
known, but for reasons that will become clear in the next section it is worth
pausing a bit on this episode.
19[Wright, 1983], p 13. Frege also has arguments for the objectivity of numbers separate
from these linguistic considerations, though we leave them aside for reasons of space. The
interested reader is commended to [Frege, 1980], §26.
20[Carnap, 1963], p 4.
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The principle that was the undoing of Frege’s version of the logicist program
was, notoriously, his ‘Basic Law V’. When combined with his commitment to
unrestricted comprehension, Russell was able to use it to derive a contradiction
in Frege’s system. Initially, Frege was confident a solution could be found. In
the appendix to Grundgesetze he famously says,
The prime problem of arithmetic may be taken to be the problem:
How do we apprehend logical objects, in particular numbers? What
justifies us in recognizing numbers as objects? Even if this problem
is not yet solved to the extent that I believed it was when I wrote
this volume, nevertheless I do not doubt that the way to a solution
has been found.21
However, it seems that despite the work Frege put in, no satisfactory fix could
be found, and at some point Frege gave up. Based on research in Frege’s
Nachlass, Michael Dummett gives the date that Frege realized that his search
for a solution was futile as sometime between April and August 1906.22 With
that, Frege tacitly acknowledged that his logicicist project was over, and that
it had failed. With this overview of his position in hand, we can turn to the
question of Frege’s influence on Carnap.
What Carnap Learned from Frege
Carnap’s family was from Wuppertal in western Germany near the Dutch bor-
der. However, after his father died in 1898, Carnap’s mother decided to move
the family first to the nearby town of Barmen, and then in 1909 across to the
country to live with her older brother Wilhelm Do¨rpfeld, a noted figure in the
history of archeology, who at that time was living in Jena.23 This latter move
was fateful for Carnap in many ways, but for our purposes it will suffice to
remark on the sheer luck that he happened to be living in Jena when Frege was
still active there, and that he decided to attend the University there.24 Carnap
was enrolled as a student there from the fall term of 1910 until the spring term
of 1914. During that time, he studied with the neo-Kantian philosopher Bruno
Bauch.25 Bauch’s influence on Carnap was strong at the time, but did not last.
Exactly when Carnap stopped being interested in neo-Kantian themes is the
subject of some debate, but suffice it to say that it did not survive the 1920s.26
21[Frege, 1997b], p 289.
22See [Dummett, 1991], p 6.
23[Carus, 2007], pp 45 – 46. Why Do¨rpfeld was living in Jena is unclear. Indeed, even more
so since we know that by 1913 he had moved to the Greek island of Lefkas to pursue his
archeological research. See [Bittlestone, 2005] for an overview of his work there.
24In the IA, Carnap notes that he also took classes at the University of Freiburg, located
in Freiburg im Breisgau.
25Carnap’s involvement with various parts of the neo-Kantian program has been the subject
of quite a lot of research. Some excellent examples include [Friedman, 1999], [Friedman, 2000],
[Stone, 2006], and [Carus, 2007].
26In his [Carus, 2007], Carus argues that Carnap was shaken loose from his neo-Kantian
phase by his engagement with Bertrand Russell, which began in 1918 or 1919. Friedman, in
his [Friedman, 1999], thinks that it lasted longer, up until at least the time that Carnap spent
writing the Aufbau.
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However, the impact that Frege had on Carnap was to last his entire life.
In the IA Carnap recalls Frege fondly. There is a relatively long passage
describing his lecture style and personality. In addition, he mentions Frege as
one of his influences several times throughout the IA. For example, he says,
Whereas Frege had the strongest influence on me in the field of logic
and semantics, in my philosophical thinking in general I learned
most from Bertrand Russell.27
Further on in the IA he continues in the same vein by saying,
For me personally, Wittgenstein was perhaps the philosopher who,
besides Russell and Frege, had the greatest influence on my think-
ing.28
In total Carnap took five classes from Frege: the three that Frege offered on
mathematical logic and two others entitled “Analytical Mechanics I” and “An-
alytical Mechanics II”.29 We know from the IA that he took Begriffsschrift I in
the fall semester of 1910 more or less on a whim; a friend, who goes unnamed,
told him that someone else had found the class interesting.30 It is worth re-
marking on both how fortuitous and simultaneously how unsurprising it is that
Carnap ended up in Frege’s orbit. Prior to his arrival at university, he was ac-
tively involved with the German Youth Movement (Jugendbewgung), and even
attended the first national meeting of the (then disparate) youth movement
groups which had started to appear throughout Germany. These groups were
intimately connected with a general trend towards Lebensphilosophie, that is,
a kind of wholistic philosophy of life that was popular in Weimar Germany.31
During his time enrolled in the University, he was associated with the youth
movement group there, which called itself the Sera Circle (Serakreis). This
group was rather eclectic, and it actively read and distributed pamphlets writ-
ten by all of the competing factions within wider youth movement circles.32
Given Carnap’s association with the Youth Movement, in particular the ‘Sera
Circle’ at the University of Jena, it is perhaps less surprising that he fell in with
a somewhat offbeat crowd academically.33 However, it is also worth remarking
that his willingness to study mathematics, physics, and especially mathematical
logic is, in fact, quite surprising. It is remarkable that someone who was so in-
fluenced by the Jugendbewgung in general and Lebensphilosophie, both of which
often expressed broadly anti-scientific sentiments, chose to take up theoretical
sciences. However, once this choice was made, Carnap’s natural affinity for the
subjects seems to have taken over. In the case of Begriffsschrift II, which was
not offered until the summer semester of 1913, Carnap had to strong-arm a
27[Carnap, 1963], p 13
28[Carnap, 1963], p 25.
29See [Gabriel, 2004b], p 11.
30[Carnap, 1963], p 5.
31See [Forman, 1971] for a discussion of the interesting connections between Lebensphiloso-
phie and positivism.
32[Carus, 2007], p 54 – 55.
33See [Carus, 2007], pp 50 – 56, as well as [Gabriel, 2004a].
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friend, who Gottfried Gabriel identifies as Kurt Frankenberger, into attending
with him so that the class would be held.34 This fact already shows the ex-
tent to which Carnap was impressed by what he had seen from Frege in the
first course, especially in the context of the two year gap between the two Be-
griffsschrift lectures. But, I contend that Carnap was not merely impressed.
Rather, the experience of Frege’s lectures was formative for key parts of Car-
nap’s later view. In what follows, and by making use of Carnap’s student notes
from Frege’s lectures, I will argue that what Carnap learned from Frege was
not his logicism, but instead a general methodology.
As discussed above, by the time that Carnap was his student in 1910, Frege
had realized that the full-blooded logicism he had advocated through his career
had failed. In discussing his memories of Frege in the IA, Carnap says:
I do not remember that he ever discussed in his lectures the problem
of this antinomy and the question of possible modifications of his
system in order to eliminate it. But from the Appendix of the second
volume [of the Grundgesetze] it is clear that he was confident that
a satisfactory way for overcoming the difficulty could be found. He
did not share the pessimism with respect to the “foundation crisis”
of mathematics sometimes expressed by other authors.35
The absence of any discussion of the paradox, or of possible solutions to it, is not
surprising in light of the fact that Frege had given up on his logicism. However,
he was not so disappointed by this failure to throw away the entirety of his work,
and he carried on teaching his Begriffsschrift. As we see from Carnap’s student
notes, the system that Frege was teaching in 1910 was mostly that found in
his 1879 book, though there were a few small changes.36 Some of the changes
include trading some of the axioms of Begriffsschrift for rules of inference, and
indeed the inclusion of rules beyond modus ponens. However, we also know
that, while Carnap was deeply impressed by the power of the Begriffsschrift, he
gave up using it almost as soon as he encountered Russell’s Principia notation,
and so it cannot be the notation that had a lasting effect on his thought.37
In the class not devoted to Begriffsschrift, entitled “Logic in Mathematics”
(LM), Frege engages in a lengthy review of various foundational programs in
mathematics. As one might have suspected from his writing, especially the
Grundlagen, Frege is at his rhetorical best when mocking others’ attempts at
giving definitions of mathematical concepts. From Carnap’s notes, it seems
that LM was something akin to a live performance; Carnap even notes down
the places where the audience laughs at Frege’s snarky remarks. While Frege
does a typically thorough job of demolishing the other views on offer, he does
not go on to put forward a view of his own. Had this course been delivered in
34See [Carnap, 1963], p 5, and [Gabriel, 2004b], p 10 fn 21. As is well known, there was a
third attendee at these lectures, who Carnap says was a retired army major. Gabriel, in the
same footnote, identifies this man as Richard Seebohm.
35[Carnap, 1963], pp 4 – 5.
36Gabriel makes a similar point in his [Gabriel, 2004b], pp 2 – 10.
37[Carnap, 1963], p 11. More will be said about Russell’s influence on Carnap, which was
substantial, in section 2.2.2 below.
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the 1890’s, he presumably would have advanced his logicist view, but it is telling
that in 1914 he stays silent. While Frege’s rhetoric was no doubt effective, it is
hard to imagine that this is what Carnap has in mind when discussing Frege’s
influence on him. So, if it is not the Begriffsschrift nor the content of LM that
had such an impact, we must look elsewhere.
There is one more incident recorded in Carnap’s IA, and in his student
notes, that merits our attention, namely Frege’s demonstration of the error
in the ontological proof for the existence of god. What is interesting about
this incident from our current perspective is not its content, but instead the
methodology that Frege employs. Instead of engaging in metaphysical specula-
tion about what it might be for there to be a most perfect being, he simply gives
a formal treatment of the notions in play, in particular existence, and shows
that the argument itself has misapplied the concepts.38 It is this very same
methodology that Carnap employs throughout his career. His famous article
“The Overcoming of Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of Language”
(OM) is an exercise in exactly that.39 There, he shows the ways in which the
misapplication of concepts can lead to nonsense formulations like “The Nothing
nothings”, and how these misapplications can be detected via logical analysis.
We might wonder whether such a minor incident really could be the thing that
made such a lasting impression on Carnap, indeed the discussion only takes up
two pages in his notebook. However, even years later in his IA he remembers
the proof clearly.40 While this might seem like a minor thing to have taken away
from his five lectures, it clearly colored Carnap’s entire philosophical outlook.
Frege’s impact on Carnap’s thinking was not limited to their time together
in the classroom. In fact, it seems clear from Carnap’s comments on Frege,
both in the IA and elsewhere, that to a large extent it was the sustained study
of Frege’s published work that Carnap undertook after his time in the army in
World War I that effected his outlook most. It is from this period of study that
Carnap came to the belief that mathematics is analytic and a priori. In the
IA, Carnap says,
I had learned from Frege that all mathematical concepts can be
defined on the basis of the concepts of logic and that the theorems
of mathematics can be deduced from the principles of logic. Thus,
the truths of mathematics are analytic in the general sense of truth
based on logic alone.41
In this way, then, Carnap credits Frege for his logicism. But, as we noted
above, by the time Carnap attended his lectures, Frege was not teaching his
logicist approach to the foundations of mathematics. Rather he confined himself
to teaching the Begriffsschrift notation and to giving an examination of the
deficiencies of certain well known programs in the foundations of mathematics.
38See [Awodey and Reck, 2004], pp 80 – 81, especially fn 19.
39[Carnap, 1959a], p 70. In Ayer’s collection, this article is titled “The Elimination of
Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of Language”. However, I prefer to translate the
German word ‘U¨berwindung’ as ‘overcoming’ as I think it is closer to the spirit of the original.
40[Carnap, 1963], p 6.
41[Carnap, 1963], p 46.
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So, it would seem that the primary lessons Carnap took from Frege were gained
not through his personal contacts, but by the study of his published work.
Before moving on to our examination of the influence of Bertrand Russell
on Carnap’s thought, we should sum up what we have seen so far. At the
outset, we saw that Frege undertook to show that neither the empiricists nor
the psychologists could give an adequate account of the nature of logic and its
relationship to mathematics. He gave an account of the concept ‘following in
a series’, as well as the concept ‘being a number’ on the basis of purely logical
principles. From this account he showed that one could derive all of arithmetic
by making use of only logical inferences, and that no ‘intuition’ of any sort
was needed. However, the system that he used to make his analysis and do his
derivation was fatally flawed. Despite initial optimism, by 1906 Frege had given
up his attempts to rescue his work. By the time Carnap was his student, from
1910 to 1914, all that survived of Frege’s work in his lectures was his notation
and analyses of number and series, alongside his critiques of some of his rivals’
views. From this, we concluded that it was not any substantial Fregean doctrine
that Carnap learned from Frege, but rather the general convictions that: (1)
logic was analytic, (2) the general logicist thesis that mathematics could be
in some sense reduced to logic, and (3) the method of subjecting philosophical
claims to logical scrutiny. However, none of these lessons were enough to deflect
Carnap from pursuing a career in physics. For him to become the logician and
philosopher that he was to be took an encounter with the work of the man who
took up the logicist project when Frege abandoned it: Bertrand Russell. It is
to his influence that we now turn.
2.2.2 Russell
As we noted in the previous section, Frege’s version of the logicist program
came to its notorious end with the discovery of a paradox lurking in his fifth
Basic Law. This discovery was, of course, made by Bertrand Russell. Unlike
Frege, however, the failure of this version of the logicist project did not dis-
courage Russell from pursuing a slightly modified version of it. This pursuit
eventually led to one of the most comprehensive books ever written in the foun-
dations of mathematical logic, Principia Mathematica (PM ), co-authored with
his collaborator Alfred North Whitehead. It will be the purpose of this section
to examine the influence that Russell, and in particular his logicism, had on
Carnap’s views on logic and the philosophy of mathematics. We begin with a
description of Russell’s logicism and the ways in which it differs from Frege’s,
before moving on in the second part of this section to discuss its impact on
Carnap’s development.
We begin with an account of Russell’s view of the nature of logic. In general,
his view is fairly straightforward. For example, in his book Introduction to
Mathematical Philosophy (IMP), he says,
Logical propositions are such as can be known a priori, without
study of the actual world. [. . . ] This is a characteristic, not of logical
propositions in themselves, but of the way in which we know them.
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It has, however, a bearing upon the question what their nature may
be, since there are some kinds of propositions which it would be
very difficult to suppose we could know without experience.
It is clear that the definition of “logic” or “mathematics” must
be sought by trying to give a new definition of the old notion of
“analytic” propositions. Although we can no longer be satisfied
to define logical propositions as those that follow from the law of
contradiction, we can and must still admit that they are a wholly
different class of propositions from those that we come to know em-
pirically. They all have the characteristic which, a moment ago, we
agreed to call “tautology”. This, combined with the fact that they
can be expressed wholly in terms of variables and logical constants
(a logical constant being something which remains constant in a
proposition even when all its constituents are changed) – will give
the definition of logic or pure mathematics.42
So, under the influence of Wittgenstein, Russell adopts the view that logic is
analytic and a priori. Its statements are tautologies, though Russell admits
that he does not have a satisfactory definition of what it is to be a tautology at
the time he wrote the book.43 Though he previously believed that logic had a
special subject matter, on the basis of the thought that “every word occurring in
a sentence must have some meaning”, he came to the view that logic is linguistic
from his work with Wittgenstein.44 That is, while it is true that every word in a
sentence must have some meaning, not all of the words, in particular the logical
connectives and purely mathematical terms like numbers, need denote anything.
However, he nonetheless continued to think that whatever mathematics is, it
is derived from logic, and it is this portion of his view with which we are
particularly concerned here.
Russell wears his logicism on his sleeve, and it is abundantly clear in several
of his works. For example, at the beginning of his book The Principles of
Mathematics he says,
But now Mathematics is able to answer [the question of its own
fundamental nature], so far at least as to reduce the whole of its
propositions to certain fundamental notions of logic. [. . . ] By the
help of ten principles of deduction and ten other premisses of a gen-
eral logical nature (e.g. “implication is a relation”), all mathematics
can be strictly and formally deduced; and all the entities that oc-
cur in mathematics can be defined in terms of those that occur in
42[Russell, 1920], pp 204 – 205. Original emphasis. In a footnote to the sentence immedi-
ately following the last in this quotation Russell credits Wittgenstein with showing him the
tautological character of logical statements, and also famously comments that he is unsure as
to whether Wittgenstein is “alive or dead” owing to his involvement in World War I.
43[Russell, 1920], p 205. Prior to writing IMP it seems that Russell may have thought of
logic as something akin to ‘the most general science’. Indeed that view partially lingers here,
and Russell says “Logic, I should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology; for
logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract
and general features” ([Russell, 1920], p 169).
44See [Russell, 1996], p x.
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the above twenty premisses. [. . . ] The fact that all Mathematics
is Symbolic Logic is one of the greatest discoveries of our age; and
when this fact has been established, the remainder of the principles
of mathematics consists in the analysis of Symbolic Logic itself”.45
In another example, from IMP, he puts matters quite directly:
But both [mathematics and logic] have developed in modern times:
logic has become more mathematical and mathematics has become
more logical. The consequence is that it has now become wholly
impossible to draw a line between the two: in fact, the two are
one.46
Both of these quotations show that Russell was committed completely and
without reservation to logicism, despite the paradox that he had discovered in
Frege’s version of it. In IMP he goes so far as to say that the proof that mathe-
matics is just developed logic is simply “a matter of detail”.47 This commitment
reached its ultimate expression in PM. There, Russell shows in extensive and
painstaking detail precisely how one might accomplish the reduction of math-
ematics to logic. He proceeds in a manner similar to Frege by defining the
basic notions of mathematics in terms of purely logical vocabulary, and then
by deriving several important theorems using only his definitions and a few
logical rules of inference.48 Special attention is paid to developing his theory
of types so as to avoid the paradox that beset Frege’s work. What will draw
our attention for the rest of this section is the way in which Russell’s version of
this project differs from Frege’s. This difference centers on the question of how
much of mathematics is covered by the claim that mathematics is logic.
For Frege, as we saw above, the task was to show that arithmetic could be
reduced to logic, and thus to show that one need not invoke anything beyond
logic to account for it. However, geometry was a different matter altogether.
It could not be grounded in logic on his view, but required some other sort
of justification. This point becomes quite clear when we examine the extended
exchange of letters that Frege carried on with the mathematician David Hilbert
during the early years of the 1900s. For example, in one of these letters he says,
I call axioms propositions that are true but that are not proved
because our understanding of them derives from that nonlogical
basis which may be called intuition of space.49
45[Russell, 1996], pp 4 – 5. Hereafter Principles.
46[Russell, 1920], p 194.
47[Russell, 1920], p 194.
48This is somewhat contentious. Since the systems that both Russell and Frege used were
high order (indeed, ω-order in Russell’s case), some current philosophers might not want to
call them logical. However, it was common at the time to regard set theory as a part of logic,
as Quine points out in [Quine, 1994], p 348:
In those days [during the writing of “Truth by Convention”,] I still conformed
to the usage of Frege, Russell, and Carnap in letting the word “logic” cover set
theory.
49[Frege, 1971a], p 9. Unfortunately, no precise date is given for this letter.
22
In a similar vein, in his essay “On the Foundations of Geometry” published
in 1903, Frege says, “Here we shall not go into the question of what might
justify our taking these axioms to be true. In the case of geometrical ones,
intuition is generally given as a source”.50 This stands in stark contrast to
his project in earlier works, namely to disentangle arithmetic from any kind of
dependence on intuition. So, even at this relatively late date in Frege’s research
into logicism (as mentioned previously, he was to abandon the project entirely
just a few years later), he maintains a distinction in kind between arithmetic
and geometry, and thinks that only the former can be reduced to logic.
Unlike Frege’s view, Russell thought there was no difference in the justifica-
tory grounds of arithmetic and geometry. Both were reducible to logic, and so
inherited their characteristic certainty from it. By way of an example, consider
the first chapter of Principles. There, he distinguishes pure mathematics by
saying that a mathematical statement that contains no undefinable signs other
than logical constants is pure; the rest he calls applied. However, this difference
is only skin deep for Russell. The statements of applied mathematics, he says,
are just substitution instances of pure mathematical statements, but with an
extra premise added in. His example is Euclidean geometry:
In applied mathematics, results which have been shown by pure
mathematics to follow from some hypothesis as to the variable are
actually asserted of some constant satisfying the hypothesis in ques-
tion. Thus terms which were variables become constant, and a new
premiss is always required, namely: this particular entity satisfies
the hypothesis in question. Thus for example Euclidean Geometry,
as a branch of pure mathematics, consists wholly of propositions
having the hypothesis “S is a Euclidean space.” If we go on to:
“The space that exists is Euclidean,” this enables us to assert of the
space that exists the consequents of all the hypotheticals constitut-
ing Euclidean Geometry, where now the variable S is replaced by
the constant actual space. But by this step we pass from pure to
applied mathematics.51
It is quite instructive that the example Russell gives is that of a geometry.
What it makes clear is that for Russell there is no difference between arithmetic
and geometry, at least not from the perspective of the relationship between
mathematics and logic. But, continuing the quotation from the beginning of this
subsection, and just a few pages before the quotation just above in Principles,
he is even more explicit:
By the help of ten principles of deduction and ten other premisses of
a general logical nature (e.g. “implication is a relation”), all math-
ematics can be strictly and formally deduced; and all the entities
that occur in mathematics can be defined in terms of those that
occur in the above twenty premisses. In this statement, Mathemat-
ics includes not only Arithmetic and Analysis, but also Geometry,
50[Frege, 1971b], p 23.
51[Russell, 1996], p 8.
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Euclidean and non-Euclidean, rational Dynamics, and an indefinite
number of other studies still unborn or in their infancy.52
So we see that Russell was quite clear on the matter: both arithmetic and
geometry are logic. Moreover, both are reduced to logic via the same procedure.
Indeed, there was even a planned volume of PM that was to deal specifically
with the reduction of geometry to logic. Though this volume never appeared
in print, the fact that it was planned as part of the work that was to be the
fulfillment of the logicist program lends further support to the thought that
Russell thought that all mathematics, and not just arithmetic, was part of
logic. This difference is quite large, and it is worth pausing briefly to consider
where it comes from.
At the beginning of the Begriffsschrift, Frege indicates that the motivation
for his project is to secure the foundations of arithmetic, insofar as he can,
by showing that its theorems can be proved purely logically, as opposed to
requiring some empirical investigation as well. He says,
The firmest proof is obviously the purely logical, which, prescinding
from the particularity of things, is based solely on the laws on which
all knowledge rests. Accordingly, we divide all truths that require
justification into two kinds, those whose proof can be given purely
logically and those whose proof must be grounded on empirical facts.
[. . . ] Now in considering the question of to which of these two kinds
arithmetical judgments belong, I first had to see how far one could
get in arithmetic by inferences alone, supported only by the laws
of thought that transcend all particulars. The course I took was
first to seek to reduce the concept of ordering in a series to that of
a logical consequence, in order then to progress to the concept of
number.53
The attitude here expressed, that his aim is to see how much of what we think
is part of arithmetic can be reconstructed on the basis of logic alone, when
combined with his arguments in The Foundations of Arithmetic to the effect
that arithmetic cannot be grounded on the basis of either empirical knowledge
or any sort of intuition, produces a normative picture. That is, whatever can
be properly called arithmetic can be so called because it is constructable from
purely logical laws on the basis of Frege’s definitions of ordering in a sequence
and of number. Even if, as a matter of fact, no changes in which theorems we
think are properly arithmetical are called for, the possibility at least existed
for Frege. In Russell’s view, however, the project was not so much to (at least
possibly) change what it is we think we know, but rather it was to account for
the mathematical knowledge we do actually have. As Coffa puts the point,
Logicism is often defined as the thesis that mathematics is reducible
to logic. This is correct as long as one understands that at this
early stage, mathematics was a reality and logic was a project. In
52[Russell, 1996], pp 4 – 5. My emphasis.
53[Frege, 1997a], p 48. Original italics.
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Russell’s practice, at any rate, the logicist motto was less a doctrine
than a regulative maxim, intended as much to provide a guide to
characterizing logic as to clarifying mathematics.54
The task in Russell’s view, then, was to arrange logic such that he could derive
mathematics from it. We might give a fast gloss of this difference as ‘logic first
logicism’ in Frege’s case, and ‘mathematics first logicism’ in Russell’s. To sum
up the differences between them quickly, for Frege the logicist project flowed
from logic to arithmetic, whereas for Russell it flowed from all of mathematics
to logic. Before we move on to examining the influence Russell had on Carnap,
there is a very important similarity between his view and Frege’s that we should
mention, namely that both of them saw logic as universal.
In Russell’s view, as in Frege’s before him, logic was the all encompassing
framework for reasoning. While it was not exactly impossible for him to counte-
nance certain kinds of reasoning about reasoning itself, he nonetheless thought
that attempts to do so would be circular – that it would presuppose the very
principles that were up for consideration. Milne makes this point clear in his
[Milne, 2008],
For Russell, logic is the theory of deduction, presented in an in-
terpreted formal language (whose syntax is never properly stated!);
the point of formalization is as a safeguard, an admittedly imperfect
safeguard, against the unconscious employment of assumptions. As
the theory of deduction logic lies back of any enquiry. Russell says
exactly this at the start of M5:
Treated as a ‘calculus’, the rules of deduction are capable
of many other interpretations. But all other interpreta-
tions depend upon the one here considered, since in all
of them we deduce consequences from our rules, and thus
presuppose the theory of deduction. ([Russell, 1906], p
183.)55
However, Russell was not as meticulous as Frege about maintaining this bound-
ary between first and higher order reasoning, so to speak. While Frege only
rarely discusses what might be properly thought of as meta-theoretic concerns,
Russell considers them several times, despite maintaining that one could not
sensibly do so.56 As we will see in section 4.2 below, this same tension between
the desire to reason about logic, and the inability to step outside of it in order
to do so, plays a key role in Carnap’s development.
2.2.3 Russell’s Influence on Carnap
In the IA Carnap says that by 1914 he had begun research into theoretical
physics at Jena with the aim of writing a doctoral degree, but his research was
54[Coffa, 1991], p 113.
55[Milne, 2008], p 49.
56See, for example, [Russell, 1996], p 15.
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interrupted by the outbreak of World War I.57 After spending the war years
in the army, first at the front and later at a research laboratory in Berlin, he
returned to his research but was now unsure whether he wanted to do his degree
in physics or philosophy. It was at this time that he read most of the works on
logic that influenced his later views, including PM.58 Of course, he had been
aware of the book from Frege’s lectures. In the IA, he says that the reason he
became interested in pursuing more logic was with the aim of creating an axiom
system for the use of the concepts of space and time in the physical sciences.59
In his [Carus, 2007], Carus argues that the motivation for this project came di-
rectly from the war. Carnap, on Carus’ account, thought that the catastrophe
of war could only be avoided in the future if the rhetoric and fear mongering
that had characterized the buildup was dispelled by a scientific approach to
life, which would be expressed most clearly by the replacement of our natural
languages with a scientifically constructed ‘total system of concepts’. The guar-
antor that the problematic concepts would not make their way into the total
system would be to derive the new language from a small number of unprob-
lematic axioms. The model for this sort of thinking, he thought, was the logical
analysis of mathematical concepts that Frege had given. It was, however, a fur-
ther step to the claim that the same kind of analysis could be given for concepts
that feature everywhere and not just in mathematics. Carnap had an inkling
of these ideas, but the push to truly pursue them came when he read Russell’s
book Our Knowledge of the External World.60 In the IA, Carnap recounts his
reading in a dramatic fashion:
In the winter of 1921 I read [Russell’s] book Our Knowledge of
the External World, as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy.
Some passages made an especially vivid impression on me because
they formulated clearly and explicitly a view of the aim and method
of philosophy which I had implicitly held for some time. In the Pref-
ace he speaks about “the logical-analytic method of philosophy” and
refers to Frege’s work as the first complete example of this method.
And on the very last pages of the book he gives a summarizing char-
acterization of this philosophical method in the following words:
The study of logic becomes the central study in philoso-
phy: it gives the method of research in philosophy, just
as mathematics gives the method in physics [. . . ]
All this supposed knowledge in the traditional systems
must be swept away, and a new beginning must be made
. . . To the large and still growing body of men engaged in
the pursuit of science . . . the new method, successful al-
ready in such time-honored problems as number, infinity,
continuity, space and time, should make an appeal which
57[Carnap, 1963], pp 6 – 7.
58How Carnap managed to obtain a copy to read is a rather remarkable story. See
[Reck, 2004] for the details.
59[Carnap, 1963], p 12.
60See [Carnap, 1963], p 13.
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the older methods have wholly failed to make. . . . The one
and only condition, I believe, which is necessary in order
to secure for philosophy in the near future an achieve-
ment surpassing all that has hitherto been accomplished
by philosophers, is the creation of a school of men with sci-
entific training and philosophical interests, unhampered
by the traditions of the past, and not misled by the liter-
ary methods of those who copy the ancients in all except
their merits.
I felt as if this appeal had been directed to me personally. To work
in this spirit would be my task from now on! [. . . ] I now began an
intensive study of Russell’s books on the theory of knowledge and
the methodology of science. I owe very much to his work, not only
with respect to philosophical method, but also in the solution of
special problems.61
Carnap saw PM as a model of the kind of language construction that he needed,
as it derived the language of mathematics from a small number of axioms. His
post-war project was to extend this kind of analysis to the concepts ‘space’
and ‘time’.62 While his plans for the total system of concepts never coalesced
into written form, the influence of the sustained study of PM that he had
undertaken in preparation left a lasting impression.63 As with the previous
section on Frege, we now turn to what Carnap took from Russell’s logicism into
his own.
The story is not a complicated one. After reading PM in 1919 while he was
preparing to write his PhD dissertation, Carnap came to the view that all of
mathematics could be reduced to logic, not just arithmetic as he had learned
from Frege. In fact, what he took from PM was even stronger than that. He saw
that there was no longer a question of whether mathematics could be reduced to
logic, but rather just a mission to let the rest of the world know that it already
had been. Or, to put the point slightly differently, in Carnap’s view after reading
PM the logicist claim was no longer a philosophical one, but rather it was a
technical one; it was not a claim that the fundamental nature of mathematics
was logical (or some other metaphysical claim), but rather a technical challenge
to show that one in fact could give an account of the propositions of mathematics
using only logical rules and definitions. This challenge, Carnap thought, was
met by Russell and Whitehead’s book, albeit with a few small difficulties. As
a consequence of this view, Carnap also came to think that all mathematics
are logic. It is not entirely clear that this constitutes a change in his view, and
he may have never followed Frege in thinking that it was only arithmetic that
was amenable to the logicist reduction. This may be due to the fact that he
61[Carnap, 1963], p 13.
62See [Carus, 2007], chapter 1, in particular the section entitled ‘War and Revolution’, and
chapter 3.
63It is possible that some pieces of the ‘total system’ project survived and were incorporated
into Carnap’s Aufbau. See [Carus, 2007] chapters 5 and 6 for an account of the development
of that idea. See also [Richardson, 1998] chapter 1.
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only became aware of Frege’s philosophical views on the matter around the same
time that he began to study Russell’s position.64 It is similarly unclear whether
or not Carnap adopted the view that all of mathematics is logic precisely from
Russell. Nonetheless, this is a strong similarity between their views. In these
respects, then, Carnap’s logicism owes quite a lot to Russell.65
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined Carnap’s interactions with the two main
figures in the logicist tradition, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. The impact
of their ideas on him was deep, lasting from his years as a university student
until the end of his life. Ever after Frege mentioned it in a lecture, Carnap
never lost the convictions that mathematics could be reduced to logic, and that
it was analytic. Additionally, Carnap took Frege as the model for his overall
strategy in approaching philosophical problems; he would employ this model
for the rest of his philosophical career. After reading Russell and Whitehead’s
PM, he saw how the reduction could be done. He was also impressed by the
passion in Russell’s writing, as, for example, in the Supreme Maxim of Scientific
Philosophizing, “Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted
for inferred entities”.66 Carnap took up the banner of scientific philosophy, and
in doing so he caught the attention of the new movement of scientifically inclined
philosophers that was taking hold in certain parts of Germany and Austria,
further setting the stage for meeting for the last of the biggest influences on his
philosophy of mathematics, Ludwig Wittgenstein. The interaction between
them, and Carnap’s development as a member of the Vienna Circle is the
subject of the next chapter.
64[Carnap, 1963], p 6.
65Though it is well known that both Russell and Frege were universalists about logic, the
question of whether Carnap is a universalist as well has attracted some recent scholarship. In
his [Schiemer, 2013], Georg Schiemer argues that Carnap could not have been a universalist in
the mold of Frege and Russell because of the way he seems to be thinking of variable domains
in his early model theory, presented in the posthumously published [Carnap, 2000]. However,
this interpretation of Carnap’s work has been challenged by Iris Loeb in her [Loeb, 2013]. For
everything I want to say here, either account is fine. As I will argue in section 4.2 below,
Carnap throws off his universalist shackles in the early 1930s as part of his move towards
what I call a ‘many-languages’ view.
66[Russell, 1917], p 115.
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Chapter 3
Carnap in Vienna
This chapter follows closely on the heels of the previous one in that its primary
concern is with two more of Carnap’s influences: Ludwig Wittgenstein and the
Vienna Circle. However, unlike those in the previous chapter these two influ-
ences are not easily categorized together under a single banner. There is quite
a lot of overlap since, as we will see, Wittgenstein was also a major influence
on the Circle. But, the Circle was not as homogenous a group as it might at
first appear. There were major differences between what we will call the ‘left-
wing’ of the Circle, and the ‘right-wing’. These differences largely centered on
two questions: the nature of meaning, and the form that ‘protocol sentences’
should take. As I will argue below, it is in attempting to reconcile the tension
between these three views that produces Carnap’s own unique position. The
chapter will be divided into two sections. In the first we address the effect that
Wittgenstein had on Carnap. In particular, we show how the Vienna Circle’s
reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and their adoption of
certain ideas from it, caused serious difficulties for their project of separating
science from metaphysics. In the second, we present Carnap’s solution to these
difficulties, and argue that it was through his thinking on this issue that his
resolution to certain difficulties in the foundations of mathematics and logic
became apparent to him.
3.1 Wittgenstein
The first influence on Carnap’s thought that we take up in this chapter is the
Viennese philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. His impact on Carnap’s thinking
comes especially through his short book Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; they
also had a series of conversations in the late 1920s, about which more will be
said below. Carnap first encountered the Tractatus in 1922, shortly after it was
published. In the IA, he mentions that on first reading the work did not seem
very impressive.1 The story of how his opinion changed, and how Wittgenstein
became one of the most important influences on Carnap’s thinking is also the
story of much of Carnap’s time in Vienna with the Circle. In this section we
1[Carnap, 1963], p 24.
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will give an historical account of Carnap’s move to Vienna, and his interac-
tions with Wittgenstein while he was there. We will also detail those parts of
Wittgenstein’s thought that Carnap adopted and eventually abandoned, as well
as those parts that he retained in his view, at least through the writing of LSL.
We begin with an account of how Carnap came to Vienna.
3.1.1 Carnap, The Vienna Circle, and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Filled with missionary zeal by Russell’s stirring writing, in the early 1920’s
Carnap set to work organizing conferences on the new scientific conception of
philosophy. Initially, he had planned to hold two conferences, one on ‘The The-
ory of Relations as a Tool for the Epistemologist’ and another on his manuscript
entitled From Chaos to Reality. In the end, only one of the conferences came
to pass, and it was a kind of hybrid between the two planned ones. It was held
in 1923 at Erlangen, near Nuremberg in Germany.2 While Carnap’s ideas were
generally well received at the conference, though perhaps not entirely under-
stood, more important for his future philosophical development was the chance
to meet many of the like-minded thinkers in Germany at the time. Attendees
included Heinrich Behmann (a student of David Hilbert’s at Go¨ttingen, and a
long time correspondent with Carnap), and, most importantly for our present
purposes, Hans Reichenbach.3 The meeting at the conference was fateful, as it
was through Reichenbach that Carnap was introduced to Moritz Schlick, the
organizer and leader of the Vienna Circle.4
Despite Carnap and Schlick’s association beginning in 1923, Carnap did not
actually go to Vienna until 1925. When he finally did go it was at Schlick’s
invitation, and while there he presented a series of talks to the Circle on early
drafts of the material that was to become his Aufbau. Sufficiently impressed
by what he saw, Schlick invited Carnap to join the faculty at the University of
Vienna as a privatdozent. In 1926 he moved to Vienna full-time and took up the
post, which he held until the summer of 1931. In the years prior to Carnap’s
arrival, the Circle had engaged in a reading of the Tractatus, primarily at the
suggestion of the junior members, in particular Herbert Feigl. Their discussions
of the text were led by Hans Hahn.5 When Carnap arrived in 1926, the Circle
took up reading Wittgenstein’s work for a second time. Carnap recounts the
meetings of this second reading in the IA,
In the Vienna Circle, a large part of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s book
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was read aloud and discussed sen-
tence by sentence. Often long reflections were necessary in order to
find out what was meant. And sometimes we did not find any clear
2For Carnap’s comments on the Erlangen conference, see [Carnap, 1963], p 14. Carus gives
a more comprehensive account of the conference at [Carus, 2007], pp 154 – 160.
3For more on the relationship between Carnap and Behmann, see [Reck, 2004], p 167.
We will also return to this relationship in the next section below. Some small details of the
relationship between Carnap and Reichenbach can be found in [Feigl, 1969].
4Carus comments that Schlick was actually invited to the Erlangen conference, but was
not able to attend. See [Carus, 2007], p 157.
5See [Feigl, 1969], pp 634 – 638.
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interpretation. But still we understood a good deal of it and then
had lively discussions about it.6
In the meantime, and through no small amount of personal effort, Schlick be-
came acquainted with Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein resolutely refused to attend
the regular meetings of the Vienna Circle, but, after some initial hesitation,
he did agree to hold philosophical conversations with Schlick and a few oth-
ers. Carnap was invited to participate as well as Freidrich Waismann, Feigl,
and his wife Maria Feigl.7 It was during the course of this second reading, as
well as the subsequent conversations, that Carnap began to change his mind
about Wittgenstein’s ideas. There are two key themes in the Circle’s reading
of the Tractatus that we will focus on.8 The first is the relationship between
Wittgenstein’s rejection of metaphysics and verificationist presentation of the
Tractatus on the one hand, and the Circle’s own rejection of metaphysics and
verificatonism on the other. The second theme is Wittgenstein’s view of logic
as both tautological and universal. We take up each of these in turn in the
remainder of this chapter.
3.1.2 Verificationism and the Rejection of Metaphysics
As mentioned briefly in the previous section, in 1926 and 1927, the Circle used
their meetings as a reading group to work through Wittgenstein’s Tractatus for
a second time. It was this focused reading and the results of the corresponding
discussions that formed the core of many of the doctrines that we commonly
associate with the Circle. The first of these doctrines that (at least partially)
came from this reading is their verificationism, perhaps the doctrine for which
they are most (in)famous.9 They interpreted Wittgenstein to have given an
analysis of the meaningfulness of language that was based on its relationship to
the world. In particular, he seemed to the Circle to be saying that the only way
a proposition could be regarded as true was by comparing it with the way the
world actually is. He further seemed to be saying that the way this comparison
was done was via the natural sciences. For example, in the 4s Wittgenstein
says:
6[Carnap, 1963], pp 24 – 25.
7Records of some of these conversations were eventually published as [Waismann, 1979]
and [Wittgenstein and Waismann, 2003]. [Waismann, 1979] also has a brief description of
how Schlick came to know Wittgenstein (pp 12 – 16).
8Rather a large amount has been written about Wittgenstein’s influence on the Vi-
enna Circle, and on Carnap in particular. The reader is commended to [Uebel, 2004], and
[Awodey and Carus, 2007] for detailed examinations. For a general account of the meetings,
see also [Feigl, 1969], pp 637 – 639.
9I say partially because, in fact, the Circle had a long history with various versions of
verificationism dating back to the first Vienna Circle, and indeed further to the work of Ernst
Mach and the positivists of the late 19th century. See [Feigl, 1969], and also [Neurath, 1973]
for the Circle’s own official account of this history. It should be further remarked here that
assigning authorship to [Neurath, 1973] is rather difficult. I have chosen to attribute it to Otto
Neurath because he wrote the first draft. However, both Carnap and Hans Hahn assisted in
writing and editing, and several other members of the Circle also made editorial contributions.
See [Neurath, 1973], fn 2 for Marie Neurath’s comments on the issue.
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Reality is compared with the proposition. [4.05]; Propositions can
be true or false only by being pictures of the reality. [4.06]; The
totality of true propositions is the totality of natural science (or the
totality of the natural sciences). [4.11]; Philosophy is not one of the
natural sciences. [4.111]
If the only true propositions are those of the natural sciences, and if philosophy
is not one of those sciences (as proposition 4.111 says), then none of the propo-
sitions of philosophy can be true. This was music to the Circle’s ears, and one
of the projects they saw themselves as actively engaged in was sweeping away
the old systems of philosophy to make room for the products of modern science.
But the picture that Wittgenstein presents in the Tractatus is more nuanced
than a simple dismissal of traditional philosophy. What he is writing about in
the quotation above is what, in his idiom, can be said – that is, what can be
expressed in language. But, he goes on to say that there are some very impor-
tant things which cannot be expressed in language.10 These things can only be
shown, that is, exhibited by language but not expressed in it. This distinction
plays a crucial role in Wittgenstein’s thinking in the Tractatus. One example
that plays a crucial role in the present investigation is the notion of logical form,
which he says can only be shown.11 As we will see below in section 4.2, this
inability to speak about logical form is one of the eventual causes of Carnap’s
break with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic. However, for the time being, we
focus our attention on the way in which this saying/showing distinction gives
rise to Wittgenstein’s theory of the nature of logic.
As quoted above, Wittgenstein holds that atomic propositions are true or
false in virtue of their relationship to reality. That is, if they are pictures of the
way the world is, then they are true, and conversely if they are not pictures of
the way the world is, they are false. Propositions can be combined, using the
logical connectives, which results in a ‘molecular proposition’. These molecular
propositions are truth functions of the atomic ones.12 But, certain ways of
combining propositions come out true (or false) no matter which way the world
is, due to the particular logical form of these statements. Wittgenstein calls
these twin cases the ‘extremes’, and labels them tautologies in the true case,
and contradictions in the false one.13 He further says of them that they have
no sense, because they are unverifiable and so say nothing. But he goes on to
say that the laws of logic are not thereby senseless. The truths of logic are said
to be tautological, and so without sense but not senseless. All of this the Circle
swallowed wholesale.
However, the Tractatus is not the verificationist, anti-metaphysical, and
logically grounded account of meaning that the Circle took it to be. Another
major feature of the book, and indeed one that lives uneasily alongside the
themes discussed above, is its transcendentalism and mysticism. While these
themes run right through the book, they become prominent towards the end in
10[Wittgenstein, 1983], propositions 6.54 and 7.
11See [Wittgenstein, 1983], propositions 4.121, 4.1212, 6.1, and 6.11.
12[Wittgenstein, 1983], proposition 5.3.
13[Wittgenstein, 1983], proposition 4.46.
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the 6s and proposition 7. For example, Wittgenstein says
For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be
expressed. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all,
then it can also be answered. [6.5] We feel that even if all possible
scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not
been touched at all. Of course, there is then no question left, and
just this is the answer. [6.52] There is indeed the inexpressible. This
shows itself; it is the mystical. [6.522]
Sentiments such as these were extraordinarily important to Wittgenstein’s mean-
ing in writing the Tractatus. Despite the fact that these comments were much
too metaphysical for the Circle’s liking, they nonetheless could not simply ig-
nore their inclusion in the book. We might expect, then, to see the Circle
repudiate the book, or at least see their enthusiasm for it somewhat tempered
by the mystical parts. However, we do not see any such thing. Instead, it
is held up as a model of the kind of philosophy they admire, and they cite
Wittgenstein often and with approval.14 An important question that arises is
how could the Circle have misunderstood the importance of the metaphysical
portions of Wittgenstein’s thought so badly?
First, we must remark that the Circle did not blithely ignore the parts of
the book they found troubling, and its members were quite up front with the
fact that they had not fully understood Wittgenstein’s meaning. For example
Feigl says, “In the Circle we began to penetrate Wittgenstein’s ideas on the
nature of language and its relation to the world, his repudiation of metaphysics
(notwithstanding a few aphorisms toward the end of the Tractatus that had
a mystical flavor), and his conception of logical and mathematical truth”.15
Carnap says something similar in the IA when discussing the Circle’s reading
of the book,
In the Vienna Circle, a large part of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s book
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was read aloud and discussed sen-
tence by sentence. Often long reflections were necessary in order to
find out what was meant. And sometimes we did not find any clear
interpretation. But still we understood a good deal of it and then
had lively discussions about it. [. . . ] Earlier, when we were reading
Wittgenstein’s book in the Circle, I had erroneously believed that
his attitude toward metaphysics was similar to ours. I had not paid
sufficient attention to the statements in his book about the mysti-
cal, because his feelings and thoughts in this area were too divergent
from mine.16
He goes on to say that it was only in the course of personal interactions with
Wittgenstein that he came to see how different his views, and indeed the views
of the majority of the Circle’s members, on metaphysics were from Wittgen-
stein’s. However, the Circle’s misunderstanding was not simply a case of wishful
14See for example [Neurath, 1973], p 307 or [Carnap, 1959a], p 65.
15[Feigl, 1969], p 634.
16[Carnap, 1963], pp 24 – 27.
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reading, so to speak. By the time that Wittgenstein agreed to hold discussions
with some of the members of the Circle, he had changed his views somewhat.
For example, in a conversation from 1930 Waismann reports that Wittgenstein
said:
To understand a proposition means to know how things stand if the
proposition is true.
One can understand it without knowing whether it is true.17
These first few sentences sound more or less Tractarian; compare them with
proposition 4.024: “To understand a proposition means to know what is the
case, if it is true. (One can therefore understand it without knowing whether it
is true or not)”. So, to an audience as familiar with the Tractatus as the Circle
was it may have sounded as if Wittgenstein’s current view was the same as the
one he had advanced in the book. However, elsewhere he would say things that
were drastically different. For example, from the very same conversation as the
previous quotation:
A proposition cannot say more than is established by its method of
verification. [. . . ] The sense of a proposition is the way it is verified.
Sense itself is a method of verification; that method is not a means,
not a vehicle. [. . . ] To say that a statement has sense means that
it can be verified.18
And elsewhere, he carried on in a similar fashion:
The sense of a proposition is the method of its verification. A
method of verification is not the means of establishing the truth
of a proposition; it is the very sense of a proposition. In order to
understand a proposition, you need to know the method of its ver-
ification. A proposition can only say what is established by the
method of its verification.19
In other words, here Wittgenstein claims that the method of verifying a propo-
sition is its sense, and that in order to understand that proposition one must
17[Waismann, 1979], p 244.
18[Waismann, 1979], p 244. Original emphasis.
19[Waismann, 1979], p 227. As I will discuss below, this idea was known in the Vienna
Circle as the Verifiability Principle, and the Circle was always careful to note that they were
indebted to Wittgenstein for it. However, in their reminiscence of Wittgenstein, published
shortly after his death in 1951, Gasking and Jackson say that Wittgenstein is wrongly cast as
an adherent of this principle. Rather, they suggest that this was simply one proposal of his
amongst many ([Gasking and Jackson, 1951], p 79). This picture of Wittgenstein is hard to
square with the views expressed in Waismann’s record of the conversations from this period.
Perhaps Wittgenstein engaged in a bit of revisionist history later in life when Gasking and
Jackson knew him; perhaps he did hold that there were many ways of coming to know the
meaning of a proposition and these other ways were left out of the conversational record;
perhaps he simply misremembered what he had said nearly twenty years earlier. In any case,
these issue need not be settled here. What is important to our present inquiry is that the
Circle was committed to the Verifiability Principle for a time, and that in their mind it was
due to Wittgenstein.
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know the method of its verification. As we pointed out above, on Wittgenstein’s
view if a proposition were to have no method of verification then it would say
nothing at all. However, in the Tractatus, all that was required to understand a
proposition is that one knows how things would stand were the proposition to
be true. One could do this without knowing the method of verifying the propo-
sition. Thus, the position Wittgenstein presented in conversation is a purified
form of verificationism. Despite this, we also learn from Carnap’s recollections
of these conversations that, no matter how large the shift towards verification-
ism that he had taken was, Wittgenstein had nonetheless not abandoned the
mystical parts of the Tractatus. There was still a gulf in understanding between
the members of the Circle and Wittgenstein, however. According to Carnap’s
later comments on the issue, it centered on the status of metaphysics.20 But,
as noted above, Wittgenstein’s new position is couched in enough Tractarian
language that Schlick, Carnap, and the other members of the Circle may well
have thought that Wittgenstein was simply elucidating in conversation what
he had written in the book. Additionally, the extremely verificationist position
that he was taking in conversation would have been congenial to the Circle even
if they disagreed on the certain metaphysical issues. However, as we will see
below, there was a problem lurking in this way of understanding the view that
was to dog the Circle for many years.
It is easy to understand, then, how the Circle came to understand the Trac-
tatus in the way that they did. Firstly, given that they were already inclined to-
wards a verificationist way of thinking, and given the difficulty of Wittgenstein’s
writing, they were inclined to see what they wanted in the book. Secondly,
when they heard pronouncements in conversation like those quoted above, they
seemed to think that Wittgenstein was in broader agreement with their own
verificationism than might have actually been the case. This in turn they took
as license to ignore those parts of the book that sounded too metaphysical for
their liking. In fact, adopting this reading gave the Circle a framework which
they could use to say many of the things they already wanted to say about
traditional philosophy and its relationship with science. For example, just after
citing Wittgenstein as one of the pioneers of the new way of doing philosophy
in their 1929 manifesto, they say,
Beyond this, the Vienna Circle maintain the view that the state-
ments of (critical) realism and idealism about the reality or non-
reality of the external world and other minds are of a metaphysi-
cal character, because they are open to the same objections as the
statements of the old metaphysics: they are meaningless, because
unverifiable and without content.21
20[Carnap, 1963], p 27.
21[Neurath, 1973], p 308. Original emphasis. The final clause of the last sentence might be
read to suggest that the problem with metaphysical sentences is that they are meaningless for
two reasons: (1) they are unverifiable and (2) they have no content. However, I believe this
is just a rhetorical flourish. What is meant here is that they are meaningless only because
they are unverifiable, though their unverifiablility also tells us that these statements have no
content on the Circle’s view. To a modern reader, this will sound quite strange as it makes
clear that whatever notion of meaning the Circle had was not recursive. Consider the way that
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The attitude expressed here is of a piece with Wittgenstein’s view in the quo-
tation above. In the Circle’s parlance it was known as the ‘Anti–metaphysical
Stance’ which was based on a principle they called the Verification Criterion for
Meaning (VCM). In brief, and as the quotation from the manifesto makes clear,
this principle states that in order for a statement to be meaningful it must be
either analytic or empirically verifiable, where analytic means something like
‘true in virtue of meaning’ and empirically verifiable means complete verifica-
tion.22 Carnap enthusiastically took up this view, and for a time was one of its
major champions. For example, in his polemical 1932 paper “The Overcoming
of Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of Language”, he says, “In the
domain of metaphysics, including all philosophy of value and normative the-
ory, logical analysis yields the negative result that the alleged statements in the
domain are entirely meaningless”.23 What he goes on to argue, just as Wittgen-
stein had before him, is that the meaninglessness of metaphysical statements
is caused by their unverifiability.24 For example, while discussing the mean-
ingfulness of individual words, he says, “Secondly, for a primitive sentence S
containing the word an answer must be given to the following question, which
can be formulated in various ways: [. . . ] (4) How is S to be verified? ”.25 A
bit later on, he reiterates and says,
Let us briefly summarize the result of our analysis. Let “a”
be any word and “S(a)” the elementary sentence in which it occurs.
Then the sufficient and necessary condition for “a” being meaningful
may be given by each of the following formulations, which ultimately
say the same thing:
1. The empirical criteria for a are known.
2. It has been stipulated from what protocol sentences “S(a)” is
deducible.
3. the truth-conditions for “S(a)” are fixed.
4. The method of verification of “S(a)” is known.26
statements are formed on their view: complex statements are built up out of truth-functional
combinations of basic statements. If we take the disjunction of an unverifiable basic statement
and some verifiable truth, we should be left with a meaningful true statement. But this cannot
be the case for the Circle.
22See [Ayer, 1946], especially pp 5 – 9 for a discussion of the variations of the VCM that
the Circle examined. [Hempel, 1959] also has a nice discussion of the VCM. We will return to
the notion of analyticity and the need for it as a part of the VCM below and so leave it aside
for now. Additionally, we will discuss the way in which Carnap’s use of the term changes in
LSL in section 4.2 below.
23[Carnap, 1959a], pp 60 – 61. Original emphasis. Hereafter this paper is referred to as
“OM”.
24In fact, Carnap has two separate arguments in OM for the meaninglessness of metaphys-
ical statements. The first is the Wittgenstinnian argument to the effect that metaphysical
statements must be unverifiable. The second, which is more well known, is that metaphys-
ical statements are simply not grammatically well-formed, though in some cases (pseudo-
statements) their ill-formation is difficult to detect. See [Carnap, 1959a], section 4 for this
second argument.
25[Carnap, 1959a], p 62. Original emphasis.
26[Carnap, 1959a], pp 64 – 65.
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In the footnote appended to this list of conditions, Carnap directly cites the
Tractatus as the “logical and epistemological conception which underlies [the
Vienna Circle’s] exposition”. So, we can see from OM the extent to which
Carnap and the Circle had adopted Wittgenstein’s ideas and were, at least
publicly, promoting them. However, though the Circle’s, and Carnap’s, affair
with verificationism burned hot it was not to last.27 It is also in OM that we
get a glimpse of the cause.
For Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, every meaningful proposition is a truth
function of atomic propositions. That is, complex propositions are built up
out of atomic ones held together, so to speak, by the logical connectives. The
Circle enthusiastically embraced this view. One consequence of it, however, is
that since every meaningful proposition is a truth function of atomic sentences,
then it should be possible to know conclusively for any meaningful proposition
whether it is true or false. In conversation, Wittgenstein put the point this
way:
Is it always possible for me to doubt whether a proposition is veri-
fied? Could it not be the case that verifications only make it prob-
able? But if I cannot specify under what conditions the proposition
is to count as verified, I have not given the proposition a sense. A
statement that cannot be verified definitively is not verifi-
able at all.28
The Circle referred to this part of the view as the Verification Principle (VP).29
But there is a problem. The Circle was very scientifically minded, after all many
of them had degrees in a science, and as such one thing they never wanted to
happen was for their philosophical view to impede the practice of the modern
sciences. However, the statements that make up our best scientific theories
are never completely verified, nor can they be. Consider a law of physics, for
example one of Newton’s Laws. In order that it be completely verified, we must
be able to know that there will never be a case where force acting on a body fails
to be equal to its mass times its acceleration. This seems unlikely, as we know
that there is no finite number of existential statements – that is, statements
expressing single observations that we might make – from which we can derive
a universally quantified statement. It is therefore a consequence of the VP that
the statements of our scientific theories are senseless by Wittgenstein’s lights
because they are in principle not fully verifiable. In this way, then, the Circle’s
fears had been realized and their philosophical views had brought them into
tension with scientific practice.
This result was deeply problematic for the Circle, but it was not the worst
one they encountered with the VP. The truly fatal issue, from the Circle’s per-
spective, comes from considering just how to spell out the nature of the primitive
sentences. Initially, the Circle favored a positivistic account of these sentences.
Under the influence of philosophers like Hume, Comte, and Mach, they thought
27For a survey of the Circle’s affair and troubles with verificationism, see [Misak, 1995],
chapters 1 and 2.
28[Waismann, 1979], p 245. Original emphasis, my boldface.
29[Carnap, 1963], p 57.
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that an account of this kind was the best way to ensure an empirical grounding
for knowledge.30 It is precisely an account of this kind that Carnap develops in
his Aufbau, which is perhaps the paradigmatic expression of the Cricle’s view
in the late 1920s. This positivistic account, in brief, holds that the primitive
sentences are statements about sense data experiences, for example “A has an
experience of red at position x, y, z in his perceptual field at time t”.31 But, as
before, a problem emerges when we consider how we are supposed to do modern
science on this picture. Put bluntly, the problem is this: it is supposed to be
the case that all the statements in our scientific theories are deducible from the
primitive statements. But, there is no chain of deduction that will ever get one
from a (set of) primitive statements of the positivistic kind to a scientific law,
as for example Newton’s Laws of Gravitation. This follows from the fact that
we only ever have finitely many observation statements, each of which is an
existential statement, but scientific laws are universal sentences. Unfortunately
for the Circle, this problem has nothing to do with the form of the protocol
sentences, but only to do with logic. So any way they tried to spell out the
nature of the primitive sentences, they still ran into the same difficulty. The
only view on the issue that did not suffer from this problem is Carnap’s, which
we now take up.
These two problems with the Circle’s philosophical stance, which are par-
ticularly troubling by the Circle’s own lights, engendered one of the most signif-
icant internal debates in the Circle. At root, the debate concerned the nature
of the primitive sentences, which the Circle referred to as ‘protocol sentences’.
In OM, Carnap summarizes the various positions that members of the Circle
took up this way,
For our purposes [in this article] we ignore entirely the question
concerning the content and form of the primary sentences (protocol
sentences) which has not yet been definitely settled. In the theory
of knowledge it is customary to say that the primary sentences refer
to “the given”; but there is no unanimity on the question what it is
that is given. At times the position is taken that sentences about
the given speak of the simplest qualities of sense and feeling (e.g.
“warm”, “blue”, “joy”, and so forth); others incline to the view that
basic sentences refer to total experiences and similarities between
them; a still different view has it that even the basic sentences speak
of things. Regardless of this diversity of opinion it is certain that a
sequence of words has a meaning only if its relations of deducibility
to the protocol sentences are fixed, whatever the characteristics of
the protocol sentences may be; [. . . ].32
Each of the proposals in the quotation represents one of the positions that mem-
bers of the Circle defended at some time. For example, under the influence of
30[Carnap, 1963], p 57. See also [Neurath, 1973], p 304 for a list of the Circles influences.
31In fact, there is a further problem regarding the first personal nature of such statements,
but we leave that issue aside here. The reader is commended to [Richardson, 1996] for an
examination of it.
32[Carnap, 1959a], p 63.
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Wittgenstein’s continued strict verificationism, Schlick and Waismann, grouped
together as the ‘right wing’ of the Circle, preferred the positivistic view that the
protocol sentences expressed simple attributions of sense or feeling. In response
to the difficulties that this view engendered, Schlick simply accepted the (prima
facie drastic) consequences that (1) statements that appear to express laws of
science are not statements properly so called but instead are an important kind
of nonsense, and (2) that the aim of science was not the discovery of laws, but
rather it is to produce the ‘sense of fulfillment’ that comes along with the mak-
ing of correct predictions.33 So, with regard to (1) he says in his 1931 essay
“Causality in Contemporary Physics”:
It has often been noted, indeed, that we can really never speak of
the absolute verification of a law, since we always make the tacit
reservation, as it were, that we may modify it on the strength of
later experience. If I may say a few words in passing about the
logical situation, the circumstance just mentioned means that at
bottom a law of nature does not even have the logical character of
an ‘assertion’, but represents, rather, a ‘prescription for the making
of assertions’. (I owe this idea and terminology to Ludwig Wittgen-
stein.)34
Laws of nature do not have the logical character of assertions because assertions
are reducible to atomic propositions and, as we have seen, laws of nature are
not. But, because they are not reducible in this way, they are also not proper
statements at all, but rather meaningless prescriptions. On this view, laws of
nature can be regarded as akin to rules for the logical connectives in that they
indicate how to construct proper assertions.35 Moreover, since laws of nature
are meaningless, then the aim of science must not be to discover them. This
result drives Schlick to say in his essay “The Foundation of Knowledge”:
If attention is directed upon the relation of science to reality
the system of its statements is seen to be that which it really is,
namely, a means of finding one’s way among the facts; of arriving
at the joy of confirmation, the feeling of finality. The problem of
the “basis” changes then automatically into that of the unshakeable
point of contact between knowledge and reality. We have come to
know these absolutely fixed points of contact, the confirmations, in
their individuality: they are the only synthetic statements that are
not hypotheses. They do not in any way lie at the base of science;
but like a flame, cognition, as it were, licks out to them, reaching
each but for a moment and then at once consuming it. And newly
fed and strengthened, it flames onward to the next.
33In his [Ayer, 1946], A. J. Ayer terms this acceptance “heroic”, but goes on to say that the
admission that the nonsense is of an ‘important’ kind is simply an acknowledgment that the
view is, as things stand, deficient and in need of further development ([Ayer, 1946], p 37).
34[Schlick, 1979], p 188. Popper also notes this quotation at [Popper, 1959], pp 36 – 37, fn
4 and 7, and again at [Popper, 1945], p 282 – 284, fn 51.
35[Carnap, 1937], p 321.
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These moments of fulfillment and combustion are what is essen-
tial. All the light of knowledge comes from them. And it is for the
source of this light the philosopher is really inquiring when he seeks
the ultimate basis of all knowledge.36
This insistence on verification as the grounds of knowledge, and as the goal
of science, stands in contrast to the ‘left wing’ composed of Carnap, Hahn,
Neurath, Feigl, and Frank, who while they disagreed on precisely what solution
should be adopted, nonetheless preferred a more liberal account that does not
require the protocol sentences to be first–personal reports of sense experiences.37
For example, Neurath believed that the notion of foundational sentences should
be abandoned altogether, while Carnap, to some extent under the influence of
Karl Popper, thought that the protocol sentences for a theory should be treated
as hypotheses, and thus that any sentence whatsoever could play that role.38
This proposal of Carnap’s struck the Circle, even his colleagues in the left wing,
as quite radical and it is worth pausing a moment to spell out clearly what it
is and to show just how radical it is.
Carnap reports that he developed his views on the nature of protocol sen-
tences while he was living in Prague. He had moved there in the summer of 1931
to take up a permanent position in the German University there, the Chair for
Natural Philosophy which had been newly created at the suggestion of Phillip
Frank.39 Just as Carnap was departing Vienna for Prague, the tension in the
Circle’s views was starting to show. To make this clear, we will first examine
the 1929 manifesto to see the view the left wing of the Circle advocated there.
We will then look at Carnap’s eventual view of the issue. In summarizing their
view in the manifesto, the Circle writes,
We have characterized the scientific world-conception essentially by
two features. First it is empiricist and positivist : there is knowledge
only from experience, which rests on what is immediately given.
[. . . ] The aim of scientific effort is to reach the goal, unified sci-
ence, by applying logical analysis to the empirical material. Since
the meaning of every statement of science must be stateable by re-
duction to a statement about the given, likewise the meaning of any
concept, whatever branch of science it may belong to, must be state-
able by step-wise reduction to other concepts, down to the concepts
of the lowest level which refer directly to the given. [. . . ] Inves-
tigations into the constitutive theory show that the lowest layers
of the constitutive system contain concepts of the experience and
36[Schlick, 1959], pp 226 – 227. This text is somewhat confusing because, where Carnap
distinguishes between verification and confirmation, Schlick uses these words interchangeably,
and means verification.
37See [Carnap, 1963], p 57 for the genesis of the right-left distinction in the Circle. As to
the differences inside the left wing, see [Uebel, 2004].
38[Carnap, 1959a], p 465. See also [Carnap, 1963], pp 57 – 58. For Popper’s influence
see [Popper, 1963a], and [Popper, 1963b] sections 16 and 17. The view that any sentence
whatsoever could play the role of a protocol sentence was held only by Carnap, and never by
Popper.
39[Carnap, 1963], p 33.
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qualities of the individual psyche; in the layer above are physical ob-
jects; from these are constituted other minds and lastly the objects
of social science. The arrangement of the concepts of the various
branches of science into the constitutive system can already be dis-
cerned in outline today, but much remains to be done in detail.40
Perhaps it is unsurprising that in a programmatic pamphlet the Circle manged
to present a univocal view, though considering the lack of consensus that charac-
terized their meetings it is still somewhat remarkable. As a case in point, while
most of the Circle agreed that there should be a single language for science, even
this extremely general idea was not universally endorsed. Karl Menger often
objected to this basic feature of the view.41 It is possible that this univocality
may have only been possible because Schlick was away in the United States
on a visit to Stanford University at the time of its writing, and because the
manifesto was prepared by only a small group of the members of the Circle.42
In any case, there are three features of this supposedly uniform view as it is
presented here that are important for our present purposes. The first is to note
the confidence with which the view is expressed. The writers of the manifesto
clearly have not yet seen the problems with the view they are advocating, and
think that all that is left to do is to flesh out the details. The second feature is
the way requirements are laid down on the project: only systems that are (1)
positivistic, and (2) have a first person perspective built in at the lowest level
are acceptable. Finally, we should note that direct reference is made to “the
given”. All of these features are absent from Carnap’s eventual view, as we will
see below.
It is striking how far Carnap had already diverged from both the Circle’s
and Wittgenstein’s stances by the time he wrote OM (primarily in 1931), even
though the view he describes in the paper is the classic Circle one. As noted
just above, there he says that there is no longer a settled opinion on the nature
of protocol sentences, though he does express optimism that the problem will
eventually be resolved. But, as he continued to think on this issue in Prague, his
view continued to diverge from the old Circle view. By his own account, quite
a lot of the initial writing and thinking on the protocol sentence debate took
place in 1932, and in that year as well as the next few he published regularly
on the issue in the Circle’s journal Erkenntnis. For example his essay “U¨ber
Protokollsa¨tze” (“On Protocol Sentences” (OPS)) appeared in the 1932/1933
edition, as did several papers by other members of the Circle. The view he
develops in OPS marks a radical departure from the old Circle view. On the
surface, the subject of the paper is to determine whether protocol sentences
must be regarded as “inside” or “outside” the language of science, or, in other
words, whether the protocol sentences are sentences of the language or not. This
is already a remarkable departure from the single language approach that the
40[Neurath, 1973], p 309. Original emphasis. Because of their general resemblance to the
project that Carnap undertook in the Aufbau, I believe the sentences after the ellipsis are
Carnap’s rather than Neurath’s.
41[Menger, 1994], p 141. We will say much more about Meger and his interactions with the
Circle in section 4.2.2 below.
42[Kraft, 1952], pp 4 – 5.
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Circle took earlier, grounded as it was in Wittgenstein’s conception of language
as universal. It is worth dwelling on this point in order to appreciate just how
large a change in view this paper represents. At the outset of the paper, after
discussing some of the recent debate, Carnap says:
The questions of whether the protocol sentences occur outside or
inside the system language and of their exact characterization are,
it seems to me, not answered by assertions but rather by postula-
tions. [. . . ] [Answers to questions of this kind] are to be understood
as suggestions for postulates; the task consists in investigating the
consequences of these various possible postulations and in testing
their practical utility.43
What should strike us immediately about this quotation is Carnap’s new prag-
matic orientation. This is to say that, on Carnap’s new view, disputes over
the correct form of the language of science should be resolved by treating ri-
val views as proposals, and then investigating the pragmatic consequences of
adopting these proposals. In the heart of the essay, he goes on to examine
two such proposals, one due to Neurath and one he credits to Popper, before
coming down in favor of a kind of combination of the two toward the end. But,
again, these considerations take a secondary role to his methodological point.
Just before coming to a determination of which of the proposed languages he
prefers, Carnap praises both of them by saying,
In all the theories of knowledge up until now there has remained
a certain absolutism: in the realistic ones an absolutism of the ob-
ject, in the idealistic ones (including phenomenology) an absolutism
of the “given”, of “experience”, of the “immediate phenomena”.
There is also a residue of this idealistic absolutism in positivism;
in the logical positivism of our circle [. . . ] it takes the form of an
absolutism of the ur-sentence (the “elementary sentence”, “atomic
sentence”). Neurath has been the first to turn decisively against
this absolutism, in that he rejected the unrevisability of protocol
sentences. From other starting points Popper has succeeded a step
further: in his testing procedure there is no last sentence; his system
describes therefore the most radical elimination of absolutism.44
Despite the tone he takes here, there was nonetheless still a certain absolutist
strain in Carnap’s view. He says of the two proposed languages that they are
both acceptable languages for science because they “can be carried through
consistently”. It is not clear precisely what he means by this phrase, but it
nonetheless comes through as another requirement on proposed languages over
and above that of the pragmatic consequences of their adoption. In any case,
Carnap did not maintain this view much beyond the publication of OPS, though
he continued to think and write on the issue.
Carnap’s considered view on the protocol sentence debate did not appear in
print until 1936 when it was published in the journal Philosophy of Science as
43[Carnap, 1987], p 458.
44[Carnap, 1987], p 469.
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a two-part monograph under the title Testability and Meaning (TM).45 Essen-
tially, the view Carnap presents in TM is a restrained, and somewhat muted,
version of the position he argued in OPS. There are two basic claims that make
up the view, which are: (1) sentences are cognitively meaningful just in case
they are analytic or confirmable, and (2) which terms and sentences are taken as
basic for the language is a matter of free choice, or convention. We will examine
each of these two in turn. While (1) fulfills the same role in the overall position
as the VCM did, there are two significant differences between it and the older
Circle view. Firstly, while the VCM is a criterion for meaningfulness full stop,
(1) is a criterion for being cognitively (or sometimes ‘factually’) meaningful.
The distinction works by splitting the meaningful sentences into those that are
confirmable by scientific methods, and so regard facts and the way the world
is, and those that have a kind of emotional pull on us, and so do not regard
facts but may nonetheless be quite important to our way of life.46 With this
distinction in hand, Carnap can say that metaphysics is factually meaningless,
as the Circle always wanted to, but he need not thereby say that it does not
express anything at all. Metaphysical statements only fail to express facts, but
they can still convey a kind of expressive meaning. Another way of putting
the distinction that Carnap sometimes uses is to say that while metaphysical
statements do not express facts, they still indicate an attitude towards life.47
The second major change from the old Circle position that we see in (1) is
the move from verifiability to confirmability. This change stems directly from
the difficulties with verifiability that the Circle faced from the moment they
adopted it. The old notion of verification was all or nothing, that is, either
a proposition is definitively verified (or is definitively verifiable) or it is not.
Confirmation, by contrast, comes in degrees. So, while we still have a cleavage
between those propositions which are confirmable and those that are not, the
ones that can be confirmed to different degrees by the evidence at hand, or by
the testing that one does. This change rather elegantly gets around the problem
of verification of scientific laws by allowing that propositions in our theory need
not be totally verified, but rather confirmed to a certain degree. Precisely what
degree the confirmation needs to reach before the proposition is incorporated
into the theory, Carnap says, is a matter of social agreement within particular
scientific communities. Whatever the benefits of it might be, this change from
verification to confirmation was not universally embraced within the Circle.
As was often the case in their debates at the time, the divide broke down to
the more liberally minded left wing of the Circle favoring the change (in one
form or another), and the right wing arguing for maintaining the requirement
of verification.
For our purposes, the second of Carnap’s changes in his view of the nature
of protocol sentences is more significant. To recap slightly, in the original Circle
position, the primitive sentences of the theory must be sense data reports, or
45[Carnap, 1963], p 58. This essay is also noteworthy because it is Carnap’s first publication
in English.
46See [Carnap, 1959a], pp 80 – 81 for Carnap’s own explanation of this point. Some caution
is warranted, however, as this explanation was written much later than the original paper.
47See [Carnap, 1959a], section 7.
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as they put things in 1929 they must “refer directly to the given”. As we noted
above, these were first personal but should be nonetheless intersubjectively
available.48 Carnap’s breaks with this view came in fast succession during the
years he was in Prague. They started when he abandoned the thought that
there was a unique answer to what form protocol sentences should take. For
example, in OM he talks about settling the question of the form of the protocol
sentences definitively (if only to say that it has not yet been done). However, in
his pamphlet The Unity of Science, published in the very same 1932 edition of
Errkentnis as OM, he gives three different options and indicates that there is
not much to choose between them.49 But by far the biggest break came when
he abandoned the idea that there is any particular kind of content that must be
in the protocol sentences. Instead of holding that they must be primitive sense
data reports of some kind, as all the others in the Circle did, Carnap thought
that one could take any sentences one liked as primitive. The only constraint
that he thought could be applied to this choice was pragmatic utility. For now,
we’ll refer to this thesis by its traditional name ‘conventionalism’, though we
also acknowledge that since many quite different views in philosophy go by that
name it is somewhat unhelpful. As we will see below in section 4.2, Carnap has
a long history with this train of thought, though we leave that history aside for
now. Instead, we will examine why he re-adopted this radical idea.
For Carnap, the discussions in the protocol sentence debate were always
about languages to be constructed for use in reconstructing scientific theories
to ensure they are free of metaphysics. Natural languages, on his view, were en-
cumbered with imprecise meanings and difficult-to-formulate syntactical rules,
and so it seemed more promising to simply start over. This stands in opposition
to those like Neurath who thought that we are always constrained by the par-
ticular natural languages we have at a given time, and therefore must attempt
a program of disambiguating the meanings of words in those languages; as he
put it, “no tabula rasa exists. We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship
on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct it
there out of the best materials”.50 So the task as Neurath saw things was to
discern what changes we should make to these languages in order to resolve
the problems that, in the Circle’s view, had impeded the progress of science
and lead to metaphysical confusions.51 Moreover, he thought that there was no
guarantee that decreasing imprecision in one area of a language will not increase
it elsewhere in that language. Carnap, however, was much more optimistic. On
48Neurath was particularly adamant that protocol sentences must be both intersubjective
and direct reports of an individual’s experience. In his essay “Protocol Sentences”, he goes
so far as to suggest that their proper form is as follows: “Otto’s protocol at 3:17 o’clock: [At
3:16 o’clock Otto said to himself: (at 3:15 o’clock there was a table in the room perceived by
Otto)]” ([Neurath, 1959], p 202). Sentences of this type were to be constructed purely from
factual statements, i.e. those which refer to sensory experience in a verifiable way, and were to
be actually said aloud, even in cases where the speaker was alone, to allow for the discussion of
dreams and hallucinations. Moreover, the references to the speaker were absolutely essential
to the correct account of protocol sentences on Neurath’s view.
49[Carnap, 1934], pp 24 – 52, in particular p 50.
50[Neurath, 1959], p 201.
51[Neurath, 1959], p 201.
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his view it is possible to construct a new language, and when doing so we are
not bound by any existing structure and thus are free to arrange things with
that language as we see best:
A question of the second kind concerns a language-system L which
is being proposed for construction. In this case the rules of L are not
given, and the problem is how to choose them. We may construct
L in whatever way we wish. There is no question of right or wrong,
but only a practical question of convenience or inconvenience of a
system form, i.e. of its suitability for certain purposes.52
This freedom extends quite far. We are not only free to choose which concepts
and kinds of sentences will be taken as primitive, but also the rules of our lan-
guage. This is quite a radical position, and an enormous departure from the
earlier position of the Circle. On this view, as in OPS before, we need not take
as primitive sentences those that refer to sense experiences, or even possible
sense experiences. We can, for example, take sentences that express scientific
laws as primitive. Moreover, there can be no standard relative to which the
choices we make for the construction of our language can be judged. The only
consideration can be a kind of pragmatic utility for a purpose. But even when
evaluating candidate languages for their practical utility there does not need
to be a determinate best choice on Carnap’s view. Which concepts we take as
primitive, and what rules we give ourselves in our language-system must be bal-
anced against our other theoretical commitments. So, for example, if we prefer
to have a phenomenalistic language, then our primitives will have references to
‘the given’. If, on the other hand, we prefer to have a physicalistic language,
then our primitives will instead have references to things themselves. Even if
it were to be the case that one of these ways of setting up a language made
expressing our scientific theories easier, but we preferred the other formulation
for some reasons, then it would still be acceptable on Carnap’s view to pick the
formulation that we prefer.
On the face of it, Carnap’s conventionalism might look to be a retreat from
the view he put forward in OPS. Where before there was no definite end to
confirmation, now there is, even if it can only be regarded as an end relative
to the structure of a particular language-system. In a similar vein, it may look
as if he also pulled back from the claim made in OPS that under the right
circumstances any sentence can play the role of a protocol sentence. In the last
part of this section, I will argue that while the view in TM is indeed less radical
than the one in OPS, it is not best understood as a retreat, and especially
not as a retreat to a more conservative position. As noted above, OPS was
published in the 1932/33 edition of Errkentnis. Following closely on its heels,
Carnap published LSL in 1934. There, in section V, and in particular in §82, we
already see a view that resembles TM more than OPS. So, we know that Carnap
52[Carnap, 1953b], p 74. Original emphasis. This quotation is quite close to an expression
of what Carnap calls the ‘Principle of Tolerance’ in LSL, about which much more will be said
in section 4.2 below.
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changed his view almost as soon as he had published it. 53 In order to settle the
question of whether the new view is a retreat from the old, it will be instructive
to present the reasons for his change of heart. I believe that the crux of the
issue is to do with what Popper calls the ‘Demarcation Problem’. Put briefly,
the problem is to give a criterion that separates science from metaphysics, and
allows us to decide, in the case of sentences, which are properly scientific and
which are metaphysical.54 In OM, Carnap argues that the criterion is a logical
one. He says that in order to be meaningful, a sentence must not only respect
the rules of formation for a language (those rules which tell us which strings
constitute sentences), but they must also “be capable of entering into relations
of deducibility with (true or false) empirical statements”.55 He gives several
examples, but one will suffice to make the point clear. First, harkening back to
his study of Frege, he considers the sentence “Caesar is a prime number”. This
sentence and sentences like it, he says, violate the rules of formation because
the word ‘Caesar’ is a thing word, not a number word.56 So, even though this
might at first appear to be a perfectly good sentence, it is not. These sentences
he calls ‘pseudo-sentences’ because they appear to be legitimate expressions of
a language but, in fact, are not. After making this distinction in OM, Carnap
then moves on to attempt to show that all metaphysical statements can be
detected by examining the rules of the language, and further that those that
fail to meet these rules can then be removed, leaving a language that is free
of metaphysical confusion. In other words, on the view that he is presenting
in OM, the border between science and metaphysics is secured by the rules of
our language. A very similar project is found at the conclusion of OPS. There
Carnap says:
These investigations in the logic of science do not end with the elimi-
nation of absolutism, for we have shown only that it must be purified
in one definite but decisive point. The elimination of impurities is
important, even indispensable, but it only forms the negative side
of the task. Now that we are working in a more positive and unified
way, the philosophy of science will be developed even further.57
Again, we see the emphasis on the removal of impurities from the language of
science, as we did in OM. However, in the ‘radical view’, no reference is made
to the procedure by which we detect these impurities, though perhaps there is
a hint in Carnap’s comments that proposed languages must be carried through
consistently, and that, while any sentence whatsoever can be taken as a protocol
sentence, this last is only true ‘under appropriate circumstances’. I contend that
53In fact, the pace that the members of the Circle were developing their views was so much
faster than the pace that they could publish them that it is not uncommon to see more than
one paper by a Circle member on the same philosophical problem wherein they advocate
different positions within the same edition of Errkentnis. It is possible, then, that Carnap had
already abandoned the OPS view, to the extent that he did, before it ever appeared in print.
54See [Popper, 1959], pp 34 – 39. For Popper, demarcation was never about meaning,
though for Carnap it was, at least at this stage.
55[Carnap, 1959a], p 72.
56[Carnap, 1959a], p 75.
57[Carnap, 1987], p 470.
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the view we see in TM, then, is just the spelling out of what ‘carried through
consistently’ and ‘under appropriate circumstances’ mean. That is to say that
many of those portions of Carnap’s conventionalist view that appear to be
retreats from the radical view are in fact elaborations of it. There is, however,
one area in which Carnap has significantly moderated his stance.
In his earlier paper OPS Carnap endorsed the view that there is no deter-
minate fixed form of protocol sentences in a given language. At the stage of
language construction one can specify a form for them. However, if at some later
time the form initially specified becomes inconvenient, then it can be modified
on the fly, so to speak. As Carnap puts the point,
As soon as one wants – should doubt appear or if one wishes to
lay a more secure foundation for scientific theses – one can take
the sentences previously interpreted as endpoints and reduce them
in turn to other sentences which are interpreted as endpoints by
decree. In no case, however, is one forced to stop at any specified
place. From any sentence one can reduce still further; there are no
absolute initial sentences for the structure of science.58
However, by the time of both LSL and TM, Carnap has backed off from this
stance. He still holds that there is no metaphysically specified form for protocol
sentences – no question of correctness for their form can be entertained – but,
relative to a language there is a particular form they must have, namely the
one laid out in the rules for that language. In section V of LSL he says,
Syntactical rules will have to be stated concerning the forms
which the protocol-sentences, by means of which the results of ob-
servation are expressed, may take.
[. . . ] If a sentence which is an L-consequence of certain P-
primitive sentences contradicts a sentence which has been stated as
a protocol-sentence, then some change must be made in the system.
For instance, the P-rules can be altered in such a way that those
particular primitive sentences are no longer valid; or the protocol-
sentence can be taken as being non-valid; or again the L-rules which
have been used in the deduction can also be changed. There are no
established rules for the kind of change which must be made.59
In this new position one is still free to construct one’s language as one sees
fit, and if the results of adopting it turn out to be inconvenient, then changes
can be made as before. However, notably, one cannot simply carry on reducing
sentences until one is satisfied as was permitted in OPS. There is now a deter-
minate form to the protocol sentences, though it is fixed only by the rules of a
given language. This, then, is the sense in which a retreat has been made from
OPS.
Before moving on to the next section, it is worth pausing to take stock of
what has been shown so far. Carnap began his time in Vienna right as the
58[Carnap, 1987], pp 465 – 466.
59[Carnap, 1937], p 317. Original emphasis.
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Vienna Circle’s fascination with Wittgenstein’s thought, and the Tractatus in
particular, was at its zenith. Under the influence of this book as well as personal
contact with Wittgenstein, he adopted a view whereby the meaningfulness of
statements was guaranteed by their verifiability. This view landed the Circle,
and Carnap as well, in a difficult position: their original aim was to defend
science and what they called the ‘scientific worldview’ from metaphysics, but
the tools they developed in order to make this defense, namely the various cri-
teria of meaningfulness, were so extreme that they also made scientific practice
meaningless. After years of wrangling and argumentation, both in the Circle’s
meetings as well as in publications in their journal Errkentnis, that resulted in
a split in the Circle into left and right wings, Carnap came to a position where
the meaningfulness of terms flows from either their empirical confirmability or
from the rules of the constructed language-system, rules which in turn can be
freely chosen. These changes kept Carnap’s theory more in line with scientific
practice, and also saved it from a debate on the nature of protocol sentences
that, in his mind, had begun to look like the old metaphysical debates the Cir-
cle disparaged. However, the theory was not embraced by his colleagues in the
Circle; those on the right wing preferred to stick with the requirement of verifi-
ability, while those on the left thought that in allowing any sentence or concept
whatsoever to be a taken as primitive Carnap had substantially weakened his
commitment to empiricism.60 At the same time as his views on verifiability and
metaphysics were developing in the ways that we have been examining, Carnap
also underwent a substantial change in his views on logic and its relationship
with mathematics. We take up these changes in the next section.
3.1.3 The Tractatus and Logic
The second part of Wittgenstein’s thought that played a major role in Carnap’s
intellectual development is his view of logic. Like Frege and Russell before him,
Wittgenstein thought that logic is universal. However, unlike his predecessors
Wittgenstein’s universalism was not based in the thought that the laws of logic
were laws of everything, so to speak. As we will see, the brand of universalism
that Wittgenstein proposed was a product of his views on the role of language
in representing the world to us. This linguistic conception of logic made a huge
impression on Carnap, and its adoption is perhaps the single most important
event in his development in the late 1920s and early 1930s. However, as before
with verificationism and the rejection of metaphysics, the period during which
Carnap actually holds a Wittgenstinnian view is rather brief. In this section, we
begin with a short description of the Circle’s struggles with the foundations of
mathematics in the late 1920’s and early 1930’s. We will then move to describing
the view of logic that Wittgenstein presents in the Tractatus, where we will
focus on two parts of the view in particular: the tautological nature of logical
60This assessment of the view is due to Karl Popper in his [Popper, 1959], p 97. In the
cited passage he is addressing Neurath, but the same point holds against Carnap, at least at
this stage. Oddly, Neurath thought that this very same argument held against Popper and
Carnap, and at one time referred to the view that any sentence could be a protocol sentence
as the “Popper-Carnap” view.
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statements, and the status of the rules of logic. We will then detail Carnap’s
struggles with Wittgenstein’s view. A discussion of Carnap’s eventual break
with Wittgenstein’s position and the development of his own view, however,
will have to wait until section 4.2 below.
An issue that was of deep concern to the Circle was to provide an account
of mathematics that was in harmony with their empiricism. In the IA Carnap
says that their mission, as they saw it, was to,
[. . . ] combine the basic tenet of empiricism [that all substantial
knowledge is grounded in experience] with a satisfactory explanation
of the nature of logic and mathematics.61
In order to be satisfactory, such an account must do two things: (1) it must
be consistent with the view that all substantial knowledge is based in empirical
sources (for example, though by no means limited to, sense perception), where
‘substantial’ means something akin to synthetic, and (2) it must allow for at
least as much mathematics as is used in the sciences. By the Circle’s lights, the
history of attempts to give empirically satisfying accounts of mathematics was
not promising. In his A System of Logic, John Stuart Mill had tried to give an
account satisfying at least the first of these requirements. However, this effort
came to a notorious, and notoriously sarcastic, end at Frege’s hands.62 But,
Frege’s own attempt to provide a foundation for mathematics was also defective,
as we saw above, and even if it were not it would still have been problematic
for the Circle due to its rather Kantian grounding in pure reason.63 By the
time the Circle was actively discussing the issue, the standard account of the
foundations of mathematics was that given in Russell and Whitehead’s PM. As
we saw, it was taken by its authors, as well as several members of the Circle,
to have shown that mathematics was reducible to logic. But, the Circle had
worries about some of the axioms used in PM, in particular those of infinity,
reducibility, and choice, none of which which were obviously purely logical.
That is, it seemed that these axioms made substantial claims about the world
that were not based in a source acceptable to empiricists. For example, the
axiom of infinity stipulates that there are at least infinitely many things, but
is not based in some experiment, or even in a possible one. If these axioms
were not logical, then it seemed that PM was open to a variant of the kind of
attack that was leveled against Mill. This leaves two options: either one must
show that the axioms are indeed logical, or find another account of logic. In
the Tractatus, the Circle thought they found a route to the second option.
To understand how Wittgenstein’s view of logic in the Tractatus helps the
Circle out of their problem, we must first say a bit about his understanding of
language, though with some overlap with what was said in the previous section.
The fundamental role of language on his account is to represent the world to us,
61[Carnap, 1963], p 47.
62Mill’s logic is found in [Mill, 1973]. See [Frege, 1980], p 15 for an example of Frege’s
assault on Mill’s work. An attempt to defend Mill by appealing to the Calculus of Individuals
is made by Kessler in his [Kessler, 1980].
63See [Carnap, 1963], p 47 for Carnap’s comments on the flaws of both of these approaches
from the Circle’s perspective.
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which it does by picturing atomic facts in atomic sentences. Complex sentences
can be built out of atomic ones quite simply: they are just truth-functions. In
other words, atomic sentences are stitched together using the logical vocabulary
“and”, “or”, “not”, etc. Sentences are true or false in virtue of their relationship
with reality, and are discovered to be so by comparing the state of affairs they
picture with reality; those sentences which are verified by reality are true while
those which are not are false. But there are certain sentences which come out
true (or false) no matter which way the world is; they are true in every possible
way the world could be. On Wittgenstein’s view these statements are called
tautologies, and the truths of logic are of this kind.64 Their truth is due to
the structure of language itself. However, as we noted above, by the time that
Wittgenstein was in conversation with Carnap and other members of the Circle,
he was advancing the view that we earlier called the Verifiability Principle: what
a statement says is its method of verification. Since the statements of logic have
no method of verification they therefore say nothing at all.65 Wittgenstein
further distinguished between those sentences which were nonsense and those
which simply lacked a sense. A rough gloss on the distinction is that while the
sentences which lack a sense are at least well-formed, the nonsensical ones are
neither well-formed nor verifiable. As we will see, this was of critical importance
to the Circle, and is largely responsible for their enthusiasm for his views.
The resolution of the Circle’s worry worked like this. If one accepts that all
substantial knowledge is based empirically while still wanting to preserve the
possibility of logical and mathematical knowledge, then one must find a way to
say that logical knowledge is not substantial. Accepting the view that logical
statements are tautological and so do not have a sense, but are nonetheless
not nonsensical, does precisely this. Since logical statements say nothing at all,
they certainly say nothing substantial. So understanding logical statements in
this way gets the Circle out of the trouble that befell Mill’s account. But there
is an important caveat. This solution only works on the assumption that one
can reduce mathematics to logic, in one way or another. The Circle in general,
and Carnap in particular, were already inclined to think along these lines, but
Wittgenstein was not. For him, it was true that mathematics was a “logical
method”, which is to say that we use logic in our inferences in mathematics,
but mathematics is nonetheless distinct from logic.66 This is obviously a far
cry from Carnap and the Circle’s logicism. However, this disagreement did
not bother Carnap at all, and he saw no contradiction in taking Wittgenstein’s
view together with the results from PM that showed how to reduce mathemat-
ics to logic.67 There was, however, another problem for the Circle lurking in
Wittgenstein’s view.
As was noted in the previous section, a part of the Tractatus with which
the Circle lived only uneasily was its apparently mystical conclusion, namely
that once its readers had fully grasped its meaning, then they would see the
propositions contained in the book as meaningless, strictly speaking, and in
64[Wittgenstein, 1983], proposition 6.1.
65[Wittgenstein, 1983], propositions 6.11 and 6.111.
66[Wittgenstein, 1983], proposition 6.2.
67[Carnap, 1963], p 47.
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his memorable phrase would “throw away the ladder, after [they have climbed]
up on it”.68 The reason the propositions in the book were meaningless, on
Wittgenstein’s account, is that they purported to say things that could only be
shown, in particular they seemed to say things about the nature of logic, and
of language, directly. However, in proposition 5.61 Wittgenstein asserts that
language cannot say things about its nature, only show them. So, for example,
there can be no discussion of the rules of logic, as they are not the kind of
thing that can be said. That there are rules is only evidenced by the actual
use of language, and through this use the rules can be exhibited. This presents
a series of disastrous consequences for the Circles views. Firstly, it makes the
statement of some of their most cherished results – for example that tradi-
tional metaphysics is meaningless, or that all substantial knowledge is based
on empirical experience – impossible. Of course, one could still exhibit these
facts by showing, in the case of the meaninglessness of metaphysical statements,
that a particular metaphysical statement is not a truth-functional combination
of atomic sentences. But this is not the sweeping dismissal that the Circle
wanted, or indeed took themselves to have already given. Moreover, any at-
tempt to articulate a criterion by which one could demarcate the meaningful
from the meaningless would fall prey to the same problem, that is, it would it-
self be meaningless for the reason that it tried to say something that cannot be
said. In a similar vein, the debate over the form that protocol sentences should
take that was detailed in the previous section also turns out to be meaningless
since there can only be one universal language with a definite form, a form
that is read off from the structure of the atomic facts. Any debate about this
structure would be an attempt to say the unsayable. Making a similar point
in their [Awodey and Carus, 2007], Awodey and Carus term this predicament
“Wittgenstein’s Prison”:
Wittgenstein had recognized that [the laws of logic] were laws of lan-
guage. He had been the first to consider the entirety of language as
nothing but a system of rules. But he had arrived at this idea via a
theory of representation that forced language to consist always and
everywhere in a particular system of rules, arising necessarily from
the representational function of language – the picture theory. The
possibility of representation determined a particular form of linguis-
tic intuition, so to speak. This elementary logic built into our form of
representation was, like a Kantian form of intuition, an inescapable
straight-jacket. The very nature of language, in Wittgenstein’s view
(at least as seen by the Vienna Circle), prevented us from stepping
outside it. One could call this quasi-Kantian view “Wittgenstein’s
Prison”.69
After pointing to problems similar to these just above, they go on to tell the
story of Carnap’s escape from this prison through the lens of the work he did on
axiomatic theories in the late 1920s and early 1930s, with particular attention
68[Wittgenstein, 1983], proposition 6.54.
69[Awodey and Carus, 2007], p 181.
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paid to the unpublished manuscript Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiom-
matik (Investigations into General Axiomatics).70 For everything I want to say
here, this account of Carnap’s transition away from Wittgenstein’s philosophy
of logic is essentially right, though there are some rough edges.71 I do, however,
think there is one aspect of this move to which they have given somewhat short
shrift, namely the interaction between Carnap’s understanding of logic and the
effect it had on his views in the debates that the Circle had over the language of
science. We turn to that issue, and to the position that Carnap finally takes up
on the nature of logic and its relationship to mathematics, in chapter 4 below.
3.2 Conclusion
In this chapter we have traced Carnap’s development from the time he came to
Vienna in 1926, until around 1930. We showed the two ways in which his think-
ing was shaped by Wittgenstein, through reading his Tractatus and through
personal conversations. Moreover, we examined the problems the adoption of
Wittgenstein’s views caused for the Circle in general, and for Carnap in par-
ticular. These began with the use of verifiability as a criterion for meaning,
which we saw was eventually relaxed to confirmability by a portion of the Cir-
cle we called the left wing which included Carnap and Neurath amongst others.
We also examined Wittgenstein’s view of logic, which, as was noted above,
was highly influential for the Circle. We argued that Carnap’s view of logic
around 1930 was heavily influenced by Wittgenstein in two specific ways: (1)
in holding that the truths of logic are true in virtue of being tautological, and
(2) that logic is universal. Combining these two tenets with the logicist thesis
that mathematics can be reduced to logic yields the optimistic view that the
Circle held in the late 1920s, namely that all substantial knowledge is empirical
in nature, but that logical knowledge is still possible because it says nothing
substantial. However, this view was not a panacea and its adoption led to a
series of unpalatable consequences, as we saw. Especially problematic was the
Circle’s adoption of Wittgenstein’s universalism about language, whereby any
attempt to say meaningful things about the structure of language is impossi-
ble. It was therefore impossible, strictly speaking, to even articulate the view
that the Circle held. This predicament we called “Wittgenstein’s Prison” in
section 3.1.3 above. What we have not yet examined is Carnap’s escape from
this prison. This is the subject of the next chapter.
70This has been posthumously published as [Carnap, 2000]. Unfortunately, as yet there is
no English language edition available.
71I think they breeze too quickly over certain aspects of Carnap’s engagement with meta-
mathematical ideas from the Hilbert school, as well as those suggested by Russell’s intro-
duction to the Tractatus. Additionally, their characterization of Wittgenstein’s thought is
somewhat unfortunate. While it is, of course, true that he was one of the first to emphasize
the linguistic nature of logic, it is at best contentious whether he thought of logic as a “system
of rules”. It seems to me that a better interpretation of the Tractatus is to take proposition
5.132 seriously, where Wittgenstein says, “The method of inference is to be understood from
the two propositions alone. Only they can justify the inference”. Which inferences are the
correct ones is shown by the truth grounds of the relevant propositions, not encoded somehow
by rules.
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Chapter 4
Logic, Science, and Tolerance
We have seen so far that Carnap was in contact with several of the major
thinkers and schools of thought in philosophy of mathematics and logic of the
day. To review briefly, he was Frege’s pupil, a correspondent of Russell, and
personally acquainted with Wittgenstein. However, so far we have only asserted
that his own position on the nature of logic and mathematics was distinct from
any one of the others on offer. Though he identified as a logicist, he was not
committed in the same ways that Frege and Russell were. While he thought
that debates on the status of mathematics were really debates about language,
he was not bound by the universalist conception of language that Wittgenstein
was. As we will see in this chapter, though he was interested in investigating
mathematics from the metamathematical standpoint that Hilbert and the for-
malists took, he was nonetheless not committed to the foundationalist project
that the formalists were engaged in. In this chapter, we will finally examine
Carnap’s own position in detail with the goal of showing which parts of it are
uniquely his own, as opposed to adopted or adapted from the views of others.
In particular, we will focus on the ‘Principle of Tolerance’, and his book The
Logical Syntax of Language.1
The chapter will be split into two sections. In the first, we will lay out
certain aspects of Carnap’s upbringing that will, I argue below, form the basis
of the Principle later in his life. The main focus of the second section is to give
a thorough examination of Carnap’s account of logic and mathematics as it is
presented in LSL. On the way, we present the impact that the incompleteness
theorems’ discovery by Kurt Go¨del had in breaking Carnap out of “Wittgen-
stein’s Prison”. We will also examine the changes Carnap makes in response
to incompleteness in his account of protocol sentences. As I will argue, these
changes are the first published manifestation of Carnap’s new ‘tolerant’ views.
We will finally give a brief examination of Karl Menger’s claim to priority on
the Principle, and to what extent, if at all, this claim can be said to be true.
1I will refer to this principle variously as the ‘Principle of Tolerance’, ‘Tolerance’, and ‘the
Principle’.
53
4.1 Carnap’s Early Years
Though it is first articulated in LSL, it will be the purpose of this section to
argue that, at least in some sense, the Principle of Tolerance was a feature of
Carnap’s thought from an early age, and that he acted on the basis of something
akin to it during his years as a student, even if he had not yet articulated
it as an explicit principle. In what follows, we will give a brief account of
his early intellectual development up through his years as an undergraduate
student. First, we will argue that through his early childhood, Carnap’s mother
modeled a tolerant attitude towards other ways of life from their own, and that
this model partly conditioned Carnap’s own thinking. Following on, we see
how this conditioning played out in his years spent as a student, and in his
interactions with other students.
Carnap’s mother, Anna Carnap (nee´ Do¨rpfeld), exerted a very strong influ-
ence on his life and upbringing. In the IA Carnap comments that she home-
schooled both Carnap and his sister.2 Additionally, he says that his mother was
quite religious and that she attempted to pass that on to her children. But,
the particular fashion in which her religiousness manifested itself was not con-
cerned with the details of some doctrine or other, but rather with the thought
that “[. . . ] the essential in religion was not so much the acceptance of a creed,
but the living of the good life; the convictions of another were morally neu-
tral, as long as he sought seriously for the truth. This attitude made her very
tolerant toward people with other beliefs”.3 In his [Carus, 2007], Andre´ Carus
fills in further details of Carnap’s upbringing, supporting the thought that he
was raised by his mother in a manner that lent itself to the free exploration of
ideas. In particular Carus reports that she stressed to her children the mere
conventionality of language. As he puts the point:
‘She took the same attitude’ Carnap adds, ‘toward the conventions
of language. When I said “er esst” in analogy to “ich esse” [. . . ] she
told me, of course, that one says “er isst”.’ But when asked for the
reason, she said there was none; ‘it just happened to be the general
custom’ [. . . ].”4
That is, on her view, the reason that some forms of natural languages are
acceptable and others are not is purely a matter of social conventions.5 This
view left a deep impression on Carnap. Again, as Carus reports, even much
later in his life Carnap was still guided by this way of thinking: “Because of this
casual attitude of hers [that is, Carnap’s mother] towards customs, conventions,
and traditions, I never had the widespread reverence toward the sanctity of
2This fact is particularly interesting when combined with the fact that Anna’s father,
Friedrich Wilhelm Do¨rpfeld, was a famous educational reformer in 19th century Germany. See
[Carus, 2007], chapter 1 for a discussion of this potential influence.
3[Carnap, 1963], p 3.
4[Carus, 2007], p 45. This quotation is from the draft version of Carnap’s intellectual
autobiography. It differs substantially from the published version, and in particular these
reminiscences about Carnap’s early life with his mother are absent from the version that
appeared in print.
5[Carus, 2007], pp 44 – 45.
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traditions, which is such an obstacle in the way of cultural progress”.6 While
in this particular passage Carnap is talking about issues that concerned him
later on in his philosophical career (i.e. ‘language planning’), what is important
to the present investigation is the explicit connection that he draws between
the attitude he inherited from his mother and his willingness to investigate
alternative ways of thinking.
During his time as a student at the University of Jena, and in the years
following, Carnap was in contact with a wide network of philosophically-minded
young people, largely due to his participation in the German Youth Movement.
He would exchange and circulate letters from them to his friends, even during
his time in the army in World War I. The willingness to investigate alternative
ways of thinking that his mother instilled in him stayed with Carnap, and he
says in his intellectual autobiography that during this time he would change his
way of speaking to match the philosophical outlook of his interlocutors.7 As he
puts it,
Since my student years, I have liked to talk with friends about gen-
eral problems in science and in practical life, and these discussions
often led to philosophical questions. [. . . ] Only much later, when
I was working on the Logischer Aufbau, did I become aware that
in talks with my various friends I had used different philosophical
languages, adapting myself to their ways of thinking and speaking.
With one friend I might talk in a language that could be character-
ized as realistic or even as materialistic [. . . ] with another friend,
I might adapt myself to his idealistic kind of language [. . . ]. With
some I talked a language which might be labelled nominalistic, with
others again Frege’s language of abstract entities of various types
[. . . ], a language which some contemporary authors call Platonic.
[. . . ] Only gradually, in the course of years, did I recognize clearly
that my way of thinking was neutral with respect to the traditional
controversies [. . . ].8
This is all to say that he did not feel any particular pressure to adopt one way
of speaking or thinking about an issue because it was supposed to be the right
way. The only constraints that Carnap thought were relevant at this early stage
were making himself understood by the other participants in the conversation.
By analogy to the case of proper conjugations in German mentioned above, it
seems that Carnap saw no standards of correctness to which his philosophical
language should be bound, he only needed respect the preferences of those
6[Carus, 2007], p 45.
7[Carnap, 1963], p 17.
8[Carnap, 1963], pp 17 – 18. It is worth noting that this view commits Carnap to the exis-
tence of a translation (and potentially one that operates purely syntactically yet nonetheless
respects meaning) from any language to any other language. This existence claim is highly
non-obvious, even where one understands ‘meaning’ in the way that Carnap does in LSL,
that is, as preservation of the class of all non-analytic consequences. There are a number of
nuances to be spelled out here (does the translation have to be purely syntactic? What is the
status of Carnap’s purported proof of this in LSL (§61)?) but we leave them aside as they are
somewhat distant from our focus in this thesis.
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with whom he talked. So, we see here that from his childhood, through his
years as a student, up through his working on the Aufbau, by his own account
Carnap adhered to something like the Principle, though it was not yet explicitly
articulated as such. This attitude, which places the ability to communicate at
the forefront and diagnoses many traditional philosophical problems as failures
of communication, I call the “tolerant attitude”. I will argue below that the
Principle of Tolerance is a natural way of making precise the tolerant attitude
that, as we have seen, characterizes Carnap’s view from an early age. However,
what remains to be shown is the way in which this attitude becomes the famous
articulated principle.
4.2 The Principle of Tolerance
Before examining the way in which Carnap arrived at the principle that is cod-
ified in LSL as “The Principle of Tolerance”, let us first review what we have
seen so far. Carnap learned his logicism directly from Frege, though as we noted
in chapter 2 not through Frege’s lectures but via later study of his publications,
and, somewhat less directly but no less influentially, from Russell. In addition
to his logicism, and under the additional influence of Wittgenstein, Carnap
came to hold the view that logic was both linguistic and universal. That is,
that logic arises of necessity from the structure of our capacity to represent the
world through language. This is the position that, following Awodey and Carus’
memorable phrase, we called “Wittgenstein’s prison” in section 3.1 above, and
that Carnap adhered to around the beginning of 1930. In addition, Carnap and
the rest of the Circle followed Wittgenstein in holding to a kind of verification-
ism wherein the only meaningful statements were those that could be shown to
be completely verified by sensory experiences. This caused some serious diffi-
culties for the Circle’s view that the paradigm of meaningful work should be
the natural sciences, as the statements found in most scientific theories were
not of the right, completely verifiable, kind. The year 1930 would prove to be
decisive for Carnap in another way, however, and his position would be forever
changed by an event in the summer of that year. This was, unsurprisingly,
Go¨del’s discovery of the incompleteness of certain kinds of formal theories.9 He
told Carnap of his result on the 26th and the 29th of August during a pair of
meetings they had at the Cafe´ Reichsrat in Vienna.10 It took Carnap some time
to digest the result, a fact that has been much remarked in some literature.11
To illustrate, we consider the conference that took place at Ko¨nigsburg from
the 5th to the 7th of September, 1930.
The aim of the conference was to present several views on the foundations
of mathematics. To this end, Carnap, Arend Heyting, and John von Neu-
mann were all invited to give talks on varying approaches to the foundations,
9Of course, we now know that every recursively axiomatizable theory with the resources
to represent every primitive recursive function will be incomplete as well, but this fact eluded
Go¨del until sometime in early 1931.
10See [Goldfarb, 2003], p 335, [Dawson Jr., 1984], p 115, and [Dawson Jr., 1997], p 68.
11See Dawson’s “Translator’s Introduction” in his [Dawson Jr., 1984] for one particularly
strident example.
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to be delivered on the first day of the conference. Carnap’s talk, entitled “Die
Grundgedanken des Logizismus” (“The Logicist Foundations of Mathematics”),
focused on setting out both the advantages of logicism, as well as some discus-
sion of the difficulties involved.12 The second day of the meeting featured short
talks by more junior academics. Go¨del gave a talk in this second session on the
completeness proof that had been the goal of his PhD dissertation. However,
what draws our attention is not the subject matter of these talks, or even the
content of their remarks in the roundtable conversation that occurred on the
final day of the conference. Rather it is the language that Carnap is still using
to describe the project of providing a foundation for mathematics. In his talk,
after giving a very brief overview of higher-order classical logic with identity, as
was standard at the time, Carnap says,
It is the logicist thesis, then, that the logical concepts just given suf-
fice to define all mathematical concepts, that over and above them
no specifically mathematical concepts are required for the construc-
tion of mathematics.13
We can see from this comment that Carnap still thinks, in the manner of Frege,
Russell, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein, that it will be possible to give a char-
acterization of all of mathematics in a single language. The point is made
somewhat more explicitly in the subsequent discussion session, where Carnap
comments,
The differences among the schools may perhaps be explained by
the differences in the demands that are placed on the structure of
mathematics by the different points of view. The logician (repre-
sented first by Frege, later by Russell, and in certain respects also
by Brouwer) demands: “Every sign of the language, and hence also
of the mathematical symbolism, must possess a definite specifiable
meaning”. [. . . ] They [physicists] require of the logico-mathematical
system that it not only be self-consistent, but that it also be appli-
cable in the realm of empirical science.14
In each case, Carnap uses the singular article to refer to the structure of math-
ematics. This, taken on its own, is not conclusive evidence that Carnap still
sought a universalist solution, that is, one where a single language serves for
the construction of the totality of logic and mathematics. However, read in
light of Menger’s comments on the persistence of the single-language approach
in the Circle’s thinking, to be discussed in detail in section 4.2.2 below, it does
seem that this usage is indicative of his continued universalism. Moreover, Car-
nap reiterates his view that a consistency proof for a theory in the language of
mathematics suffices for its correctness in his remarks during the final discus-
sion period. Of course, this is forgivable at this stage. After all, Carnap had
12The translation of the title of Carnap’s talk, due to Erna Putnam and Gerald Massey
(see [Carnap, 1959b], p 41), is somewhat problematic. Perhaps a better rendering of
‘Grundgedanken’ might be ‘basic ideas’.
13[Carnap, 1959b], p 42.
14[Dawson Jr., 1984], pp 120 – 121. Original emphasis.
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only learned of the results ten days before the start of the conference, and the
second incompleteness theorem had not yet been proven. However, after it had,
and as he came to realize what the results meant, his view of both logic and
language in science changed radically, as we shall see below.
Interlude: Incompleteness
Go¨del managed to prove the first of his two incompleteness theorems in the
summer of 1930, and announced it at the Ko¨nigsburg meeting in an understated
fashion that was typical of his personality.15 As was noted above, his formal
presentation at the conference was confined to the completeness result that he
had achieved in his PhD thesis, and it was not until the roundtable discussion
the next day that he revealed his new result. In his second interjection into the
conversation he says,
One can (assuming the consistency of classical mathematics) even
give examples of propositions (and, indeed of such of the type of
Goldbach or Fermat) which are really contentually true but un-
provable in the formal system of classical mathematics. Therefore
if one adjoins the negation of such a proposition to the axioms of
classical mathematics, one obtains a consistent system in which a
contentually false proposition is provable.16
So, we can see that now mere consistency will not be enough for showing that
a single theory captures mathematics, and on that basis one of Carnap’s claims
from his talk is proved incorrect. However, as is now well known, Go¨del did
not yet have a proof of the second incompleteness theorem at the time of the
Ko¨nigsburg meeting. So, the single-language approach had not yet completely
unraveled. We know that the second theorem came quickly after Go¨del returned
from Ko¨nigsburg, and an abstract of the full incompleteness paper, containing
both theorems, was presented to the Vienna Academy of Sciences on October
23rd by Hans Hahn.17 The paper was submitted to the Monatshefte fu¨r Math-
ematik und Physik for publication on November 17th, though it did not appear
in print until 1931.
From the perspective of our examination of Carnap’s development, the sec-
ond theorem is decisive. While the first shows that consistency is not enough
to guarantee the correctness of a formal language for deriving all of mathemat-
ics, one might still have thought that some other notion could be developed
to sidestep this problem. However, the second theorem shows that no formal
theory will be provably adequate whatever the criterion, as long as that theory
15See [Dawson Jr., 1984], pp 114 – 115 and especially fn 25.
16[Dawson Jr., 1984], p 126.
17The date of this abstract is important for settling whether it was Go¨del or von Neumann
who proved the second theorem first. Von Neumann sent a letter to Go¨del in November
of 1930 saying that he had proved an extension of the results that Go¨del had announced
at Ko¨nigsburg which amounts to the second theorem. However, Go¨del had already seen it
himself, as the presentation to the Academy, and the published abstract of that presentation
shows. See [Dawson Jr., 1997], pp 69 – 70, and [Go¨del, 1930].
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has the resources for arithmetic and on the assumption that the theory is con-
sistent and codifiable with recursive functions.18 This is the final blow to the
universalist view to which Carnap still adhered despite the difficulties that had
been mounting, as we detailed in chapter 3. He simply cannot have a single
language which is capable of serving for the derivation of all of mathematics.
As we commented above, Carnap’s view began to change around the autumn
of 1930, but it did not show until after he moved to Prague in the summer of
1931. The first published indications came in his 1932 paper “On Protocol
Sentences”. There Carnap advocates an extremely liberal view whereby one is
free to alter one’s language in any way one sees fit at any time.19 This is a
somewhat desperate attempt to save some portion of his universalism as, while
this is still a single-language approach, it is one where the single language does
not have a determinate form since it can be altered at any time. The speed with
which he moved away from this desperate view, as discussed in section 3.1.2
above, illustrates the deep-seated nature of Carnap’s tolerant attitude. At the
same time that Carnap was advocating this extremely liberal view of protocol
sentences, he was also wrestling with the constraints of Wittgenstein’s prison
in another way. Spurred in part by his engagement with the metamathematical
techniques of the Hilbert school, which he encountered primarily in the logical
investigations of Go¨del and Tarski, and in part by his own research in logic,
Carnap began to push against the universalism about logic that he had held at
least since the early 1920s.20 The story of the resulting break with his influences,
as well as with his own earlier views, and the result of that break, namely the
Principle of Tolerance, forms the subject of the remainder of this section.
The rest of this section will be split into three parts. In the first, we will
examine the way in which Carnap’s Tolerance evolved from his consideration
of Go¨del’s incompleteness results. We will examine the similarities between his
first published reactions, namely his papers in the protocol sentence debate,
and his settled view in LSL. In the next section, we will address a challenge
regarding the provenance of Tolerance that was made by Karl Menger, though
we will ultimately conclude that it is unfounded. In the third part of this section
we will present the view that Carnap formulates in LSL. Special attention will
be paid to the two projects he takes up there: (1) giving a logical foundation for
the language of science that is in line with the left wing of the Vienna Circle’s
18In their [Awodey and Carus, 2003], Awodey and Carus suggest that one way out of this
problem for Carnap is to give up the requirement of provable consistency. They are right and
this is indeed a way he could have gone. However, what is interesting is that he did not, in
fact, choose this route. It is possible that it did not occur to him. I think it more likely that
the reason he did not simply opt away from proving consistency is revelatory of his stance on
the foundations of mathematics, and I will say more about this in chapter 6 below.
19This view may, in fact, commit Carnap to already thinking that more than one language
is necessary, namely an object language and a language from which to specify the rules of the
object language (which Carnap later refers to as a syntax language (see, e.g. [Carnap, 1937],
p 4.) Carnap is notoriously dismissive of this commitment, and often claims that natural
languages can serve this purpose. We will return to this topic in chapter 6 below, and so leave
it aside for now.
20For more on the way in which Carnap’s own research pushed him towards Tolerance, see
[Awodey and Carus, 2001], [Reck, 2004] and [Carnap, 2000]. Tarski’s influence on Carnap is
well known, see [Coffa, 1991], pp 300 – 305 for an exemplar.
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“Unified Science” program, and (2) showing, contra Wittgenstein, that one
can represent the syntax of a language in that very language itself. The third
section will make plain the interactions between the position that Carnap took
on the nature of protocol sentences and the position he takes on the language
of mathematics. I will argue that the inspiration for this latter view comes
from the success that he found with the former view, and that one of the main
aims of LSL is to replicate that success, but with a focus on the debates over
the foundations of mathematics. In brief, Carnap thought that a way to end
certain disputes over the nature of the language of science that he thought were
unproductive was to adopt a tolerant view whereby requirements are read as
proposals which are then in turn investigated and compared on the basis of
their respective pragmatic virtues. In the case of mathematical disputes, the
procedure would be analogous: competing views on the nature of mathematics,
or on which logical laws are valid, would be read as proposals for ways in which a
calculus for doing mathematics could be constructed; as before these proposals
are then investigated and compared by means of their pragmatic virtues.
4.2.1 The Birth of Tolerance
To briefly rehearse what was discussed in section 3.1.2 above, under the influence
of Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle advocated the view that the only meaningful
sentences were those which could be empirically confirmed.21 The process of
confirmation consisted in deriving from the universally quantified laws of our
scientific theory sentences of the appropriate empirically testable type called
protocol sentences. A debate ensued within the Circle over precisely what
form these protocol sentences should take. By 1932, however, Carnap had
become convinced of what he sometimes called the “thesis of the conventionality
of language forms” solved this problem.22 According to this thesis, language
is freely constructed and this construction is not antecedently constrained by
anything; one is completely free with regard to the form of language that one
constructs. So, as we showed above, in his 1932 essay OPS Carnap argues that,
Every concrete sentence of the physicalistic system language can
serve under certain circumstances as a protocol sentence. [. . . ]
Thereby it is a matter of decision which sentences one wants to
use at various times as such endpoints of reduction and thus as pro-
tocol sentences. As soon as one wants – should doubt appear or if
one wishes to lay a more secure foundation for scientific theses –
one can take the sentences previously interpreted as endpoints and
reduce them in turn to other sentences which are interpreted as end-
points by decree. In no case, however, is one forced to stop at any
21As was remarked in chapter 3 above, there was a further related divide in the Circle
between those who stuck to the criterion of complete empirical verification, like Schlick and
Waismann, and those who relaxed this criterion in various ways, as for example did Neurath
and Carnap. The word this latter group preferred was ‘confirmation’ and we follow this usage
in the present chapter.
22[Carnap, 1963], pp 54 – 55.
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specified place.23
Again, this is to say that there are no constraints at all on the language of sci-
ence. Moreover, if the choices one makes in originally constructing the language
make it inconvenient later, one is free to change it at any time.24 This view,
however, never gained much traction with the other members of the Circle, and
even Carnap was unable to maintain it for very long. By 1934, he had retreated
to a somewhat more modest version. Discussing protocol sentences in LSL, he
says,
Syntactical rules will have to be stated concerning the forms which
the protocol sentences, by means of which the results of observa-
tion are expressed, may take. [. . . ] If a sentence which is an L-
consequence of certain P-primitive sentences contradicts a sentence
which has been stated as a protocol-sentence, then some change
must be made in the system. For instance, the P-rules, can be al-
tered in such a way that those particular primitive sentences are no
longer valid; or the protocol-sentence can be taken as being non-
valid; or again the L-rules which have been used in the deduction
can also be changed. There are no established rules for the kind of
change which must be made.25
Here, we can see that while Carnap has maintained a certain level of freedom
with regards to what is to be done with protocol sentences, this freedom is
not nearly as radical as his proposal in OPS above. Now, not just anything
can serve as a protocol sentence once a language has been established. That
is, at the stage of language construction we are free to specify any form we
wish for the protocol sentences – they need not be “the contents of immediate
experience, or the phenomena; and thus the simplest knowable facts,” or indeed
any of the particular proposals that the Circle had considered.26 However, it
is part of the specification of a language to lay down a specific form that the
protocol sentences in that language will take. That is, they must have some
form or other, once and for all, that is precisely laid out in the rules that govern
one’s language. To illustrate, let us consider some examples that Carnap gives
in “TM”:
The fluid at space-time-point b has a temperature of 100◦; [. . . ]
A mercury thermometer is put at b; we wait, while stirring the
liquid, until the mercury comes to a standstill; [. . . ]The head of the
23[Carnap, 1987], pp 465 – 466. My emphasis.
24In the paper, Carnap credits this idea to Karl Popper who he says convinced him
of it in conversation ([Carnap, 1987], p 465). This conversation is similarly reported in
[Popper, 1963b], p 71, where Popper goes on to say that the conversation in question oc-
curred on a holiday that he, Carnap, and Feigl took together in the Tyrolean Alps. However,
what Carnap says here is not the view that Popper suggested to him in Tyrol, and indeed
Popper later called a version of this view, put forward by Neurath, “throw[ing] empiricism
overboard” ([Popper, 1959], p 97).
25[Carnap, 1937], p 317. Original emphasis.
26[Popper, 1959], p 96.
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mercury column in the thermometer at b stands at the mark 100 of
the scale.27
What is critical here is that there is no antecedent preference given for which of
these sentences exhibits the form that protocol sentences should take. Moreover,
they are not even equivalent, as the logical forms will differ between them, as
does the content contained in each of them. This is not a return to the old
absolute criteria for languages, however. If the results of adopting a particular
language are not to one’s liking, it is still possible to make changes to one’s
language, or to construct a new one. Though this is akin to the radical view,
where if one did not like the results of taking certain sentences to be protocol
sentences it was possible to change the criteria for being such at any time, it
is nonetheless importantly different. In the view presented in OPS there was
no requirement that the protocol sentences in a language have any particular
form. After all, one could change the form that particular protocol sentences
took on the fly, so to speak, by a mere decision to continue reducing a sentence
that one previously took to be a protocol sentence. By contrast, in LSL it is
part of how languages are constructed that some form or other must be given
to protocol sentences. There is still freedom to change the form, but it must be
done by changing the rules that govern the protocol sentences, and cannot be
as ad hoc as before; in this latter case, it is still a matter of decision whether
to accept a given sentence as a protocol sentence, but if one decides to reject
it, then one must give new rules for the langauge.
What is importantly the same in these two views, however, is the aforemen-
tioned freedom in language construction. It is precisely this freedom that is
eventually enshrined in Carnap’s thought as the Principle of Tolerance. There,
Carnap makes this freedom explicit by saying,
Our attitude to requirements of this [absolutist] kind is given a gen-
eral formulation in the Principle of Tolerance: It is not our business
to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions. [. . . ] Everyone
is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language,
as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to
discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical
rules instead of philosophical arguments.28
Read in the context of the debate over protocol sentences, the Principle is
what licenses the move that Carnap makes to confirmation rather than ver-
ification. Additionally, as we will see below, it gives him the tools to avoid
certain unpalatable consequences of the Circle’s Wittgensteinian views on logic
and mathematics. It is to these problems, and the solutions that Carnap gives
in LSL that we now turn.
As was shown above, in section 3.1.3, by the end of 1930 Carnap found
himself in a difficult situation. His commitments to both universalism about
logic and verificationism had led him into philosophical trouble, and some-
thing new was needed if he was to be able to save some parts of his vision of
27[Carnap, 1953b], p 459.
28[Carnap, 1937], pp 51 – 52. Original emphasis.
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a scientifically-informed, metaphysics-free philosophical theory. The problem
that seemed to worry him the most at that time was the question of whether or
not one could talk about the syntax of a language. Famously, Carnap and the
Circle understood Wittgenstein to think that this was impossible, or at least
impossible to do so truly.29 But, at the same time as he maintained his uni-
versalism about logic, Carnap was also interested in some recent developments
in mathematical logic. In particular, during the summer of 1930, Carnap had
been in close contact with Go¨del as he produced his incompleteness theorems.
Indeed, Carnap was one of the first people Go¨del told of his discovery.30 One of
the key insights that Go¨del had in the proofs is the notion that one can encode
statements about the language of arithmetic into the language of arithmetic
itself. To Carnap’s mind, though this method struck directly at the heart of
Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing which was a lynchpin
of the Circle’s account of meaningfulness, it nonetheless appeared to make per-
fectly good mathematical sense. Moreover, the technique was quite fruitful as
Go¨del had produced a revolutionary result using it.
This tension in Carnap’s thought, on the one hand persuaded by his univer-
salism and verificationism while on the other admiring the technical fruitfulness
of metamathematical techniques, came to a head in the final months of 1930,
lasting until January of 1931 when he finally saw his way out of the difficulty.
The moment when his new perspective came to him is dramatically reported
in the IA:
After thinking about [the problem of whether or not it is possi-
ble to speak about language] for several years, the whole theory of
language structure and its possible applications in philosophy came
to me like a vision during a sleepless night in January 1931, when
I was ill. On the following day, still in bed with a fever, I wrote
down my ideas on forty-four pages under the title “Attempt at a
Metalogic”. These shorthand notes were the fist version of my book
Logical Syntax of Language.31
What he saw that night was a structure where the expressions of one language
refer to the expressions of another. In modern parlance we call this the distinc-
tion between an object-language and a metalanguage. But, for our purposes at
this juncture, the real importance of this episode is that it marks Carnap’s real-
ization that he could bring the tolerant attitude from his childhood to bear on
his logical and mathematical views. He seems to have realized that by adopting
this tolerant attitude he could resolve the divergence between the universalists
about logic (Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein) on the one hand and those who
took logic itself to be an object of logical investigation (Hilbert, Tarski, Go¨del)
29If it were possible, then it would imply that there were facts, in Wittgenstein’s sense of
the word, about syntax. Rather, on his view, the syntax of our language arises because of the
structure of our representational faculties, and so can only be shown by our representations. As
noted above, this understanding of Wittgenstein is contested by Kuusela in his [Kuusela, 2012].
30See [Goldfarb, 2003], p 335, [Dawson Jr., 1984], p 115, and [Dawson Jr., 1997], p 68.
31[Carnap, 1963], p 53. In fact, the development from these notes to the book was a labor
of almost three years. See [Carus, 2007], chapter 9 for a detailed account.
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on the other. Though the realization that abandoning a single-language ap-
proach might resolve his difficulties came from considering his stance on logic
and mathematics in the light of Go¨del’s results, the first published evidence of
his change of heart comes in the papers on the protocol sentence debate.
As we saw in our discussion of the protocol sentence debate in chapter 3
above, Carnap thought that if the requirement of verification was maintained as
an absolute, then we run the risk of “fall[ing] into metaphysical dead ends”.32
Because of this danger, the only appropriate way to understand requirements
that appear to be absolutes, he thinks, is as suggestions for possible ways we
might construct the language of science. To reiterate the way he puts the point
in OPS:
The questions of whether the protocol sentences occur outside or
inside the system language and of their exact characterization are,
it seems to me, not answered by assertions but rather by postula-
tions. [. . . ] They are to be understood as suggestions for postulates;
the task consists in investigating the consequences of these various
possible postulations and in testing their practical utility.33
And so, as noted before, the way disputes like those over the nature of the
protocol sentences are to be settled is by investigating the consequences of the
various proposals. In the case of his universalism about logic and mathematics,
Carnap saw a similar situation. For both Wittgenstein and the right wing of
the Circle, the adherence to a philosophical requirement forced the rejection of
certain technical programs in mathematics, for example both the metamathe-
matical approach of the Hilbert school, and Brouwer’s intuitionism. But Go¨del,
who had adopted some of the formalists’ techniques, had made a significant dis-
covery. So here it would seem that the consequences of adopting his approach
had a real benefit, namely the ability to show some very deep results, whereas
the restrictions that the Circle had originally adopted might prevent one from
recognizing these results.34 But, this resistance to certain mathematical tech-
niques on the basis of a philosophical view was precisely the sort of dogmatism
that Carnap had repeatedly railed against in his writings.35 It now started to
become clear to him that the old Circle view suffered from the same defects as
those programs which the Circle had mocked.
The many-languages approach that Carnap adopted was suggested to him
by his interactions with Neurath and Popper during the protocol sentence de-
bate, and by Go¨del in their discussions in the summer of 1930 on the topic of the
axiomatic methods in science.36 It was additionally suggested by Karl Menger,
one of the members of the Circle, and the convener of the Mathematical Col-
loquium which was one of several reading groups that formed in the Circle’s
32[Carnap, 1987], p 469. Carnap’s quotation is taken from an article by Neurath.
33[Carnap, 1987], p 458.
34I do not mean to suggest that any members of the Circle rejected the incompleteness
results. Rather, that as a consequence of the prohibition on expressing the rules of language
in that language itself, it might have seemed that the results were achieved in a philosophically
suspect way.
35As noted above, [Carnap, 1959a] and [Neurath, 1973] are good examples.
36[Carnap, 1963], pp 56 – 58.
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orbit.37 As Menger reports in his “Introducing Logical Tolerance”, when he
joined the Circle in 1927 he repeatedly took exception to the members’ use of
singular expressions when discussing ‘the’ language of science, or ‘the’ logic of
science.38 The results of Carnap’s thinking on this issue appear in partial form
in OPS, but take their mature shape in LSL as the Principle of Tolerance, first
introduced as such in the introduction to that book:
For language, in its mathematical form, can be constructed accord-
ing to the preferences of any one of the points of view represented; so
that no question of justification arises at all, but only the question
of the syntactical consequences to which one or other of the choices
leads, including the question of non-contradiction. The standpoint
which we have suggested – we will call it the Principle of Toler-
ance [. . . ] – relates not only to mathematics, but to all questions of
logic.39
The full statement of the Principle comes a short way into the book. After
a prolonged examination of different restrictions that various philosophers and
mathematicians had argued must be placed on logic, Carnap says:
In the foregoing we have discussed several examples of negative
requirements (especially those of Brouwer, Kaufmann, and Wittgen-
stein) by which certain common forms of language – methods of
expression and of inference – would be excluded. Our attitude to
requirements of this kind is given a general formulation in the Prin-
ciple of Tolerance: It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but
to arrive at conventions. [. . . ]
In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up
his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes. All that
is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his
methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical
arguments.
The tolerant attitude here suggested is, as far as special mathematical
calculi are concerned, the attitude which is tacitly shared by the ma-
jority of mathematicians. In the conflict over the logical foundations of
mathematics, this attitude was represented with especial emphasis (and
apperently before anyone else) by Menger.40
As ever, here Carnap is quite bold in his writing. But, dramatic as this sounds,
the question that must be answered is whether we can take him at his word.
That is, does he really mean to say that there are no restrictions at all on
language construction? Or, should we instead think that, while there are no
37See [Popper, 1963b], p 66.
38[Menger, 1979a], p 12. More will be said about Menger’s claim that Tolerance is due to
him in section 4.2.2 below.
39[Carnap, 1937], p xv.
40[Carnap, 1937], p 52. Carnap’s emphasis and formatting. The change in formatting of
the text in the last paragraph in this quotation indicates a footnote (or perhaps a comment)
in Carnap’s text.
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restrictions of the kind that he has considered in the pages leading up to his
statement of the Principle, there could in principle be restrictions of some kind?
Call the reading whereby Carnap is committed to there being absolutely no
restrictions whatsoever Wide Tolerance, and correspondingly call the thesis
that it is possible, at least in principle, to have some kinds of restrictions on
languages Narrow Tolerance. In chapter 6 below, I will argue that Carnap is
committed to Wide Tolerance. In this chapter, however, we have two remaining
tasks. The first is to lay out, at long last, the position on mathematics that
Carnap defends in LSL. The second is to address Menger’s charge that the
attitude Carnap adopts in this period, and encapsulates in the Principle of
Tolerance, is essentially the same one that Menger advocated in his paper “On
Intuitionism”. We take up the priority challenge first.
4.2.2 Menger’s Priority Challenge
As mentioned above, Karl Menger was a member of the Vienna Circle from
1927, when he joined the mathematics faculty at the University of Vienna as
the Professor of Geometry, until the Circle’s meetings came to an end with
the deaths of Hahn in 1934 and Schlick in 1936. The Circle benefitted greatly
from Menger’s participation. He organized the Mathematics Colloquium, which
was one of the satellite reading groups that formed around the members of the
Circle, and it was also partly due to the time he spent in Amsterdam that L.E.J.
Brouwer was invited to give two talks in Vienna in 1928.41 However, what
will occupy our attention here is not the connections that Menger had with
Intuitionism, but rather the claim that he makes, both in his essay “Logical
Tolerance in the Vienna Circle” and reiterated in his memoir, that Carnap’s
Principle of Tolerance and the corresponding tolerant attitude he adopts, is
fundamentally the same as Menger’s own tolerant view, and that Carnap did
not properly acknowledge this intellectual debt.
In a terse passage in his memoir, Menger claims that, despite Carnap’s
assertion that he operated in a ‘tolerant’ manner at least from the time he
was an undergraduate student at Jena in the published version of the IA, or
from even earlier in the manuscript version (see section 4.1 above), in fact this
attitude is due to Menger’s questioning the universalism prevalent in the Circle
at the time he joined their discussions. Menger says:
Another of my questions [to the Circle] concerned language. I
objected to the recurring references in the Circle to the language and
repeatedly asked Carnap, Schlick, and other members what justified
the implied belief in the uniqueness of language. [. . . ]
In the course of the following years, however, Carnap not only
gave up th[e] belief [in the existence of a single language of science
41The first of these talks was particularly significant because it was as close as Wittgen-
stein ever came to attending an official meeting of the Circle, and Menger speculates in his
posthumously published memoir that the content of these talks inspired at least some of
Wittgenstein’s later remarks on the infinite. See [Menger, 1994], pp 135 – 137. Also, Feigl
claims that it was these two talks by Brouwer that inspired Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy
at all. See [Feigl, 1969], p 639.
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or of mathematics] but emphasized the importance of the existence
of a multiplicity of languages between which one may choose, while
Schlick and Waismann continued speaking about the language.
In 1937, when his Viennese period was still fresh in his mind,
Carnap wrote in his book Logical Syntax of Language “. . . the ear-
lier position of the Vienna Circle, which was in essentials that of
Wittgenstein. On that view it was [a] question of ‘the language’
in an absolute sense; it was thought possible to reject both con-
cepts and sentences if they did not fit into the language.” [. . . ]
In contrast to these passages, in the Intellectual Autobi-
ography, written twenty five years later, Carnap strongly
emphasizes the idea of freedom to choose one of a variety of
languages had already been one of his leading thoughts in
his pre-Vienna period. The development of the idea about
the multiplicity of languages is one of those facts that Car-
nap seems to have completely misremembered in his later
years.42
Since this was a relatively unedited manuscript – it was still unfinished at the
time of Menger’s death – there are some difficulties in determining precisely
what Menger means in some passages. In the passage above, there are at least
three different claims that Menger could have had in mind when he wrote these
complaints. Firstly, he could mean that, while Tolerance and Menger’s multi-
plicity view are different things, he is nonetheless due some credit from Carnap
for the Principle. But, as quoted above, in the footnote that immediately
follows his statement of Tolerance, Carnap does give some credit to Menger
for adopting a stance that is in accordance with Tolerance in the debate over
the foundations of mathematics.43 Moreover, he says explicitly that Menger
adopted this stance before anyone else, though he includes a small hedge by
saying that Menger was only ‘apparently’ first. Given this, it would seem that
Carnap has at least acknowledged Menger’s contributions to his thinking, and
so it is not likely that lack of such an acknowledgment is Menger’s complaint.
Perhaps, instead, Menger means that the credit is not enough, couched as it
is in terms that suggest that his stance was merely ‘in accordance’ with what
Carnap is suggesting. However, this complaint hardly seems to warrant ei-
ther the length of the passage or its repetition in at least one other source,
[Menger, 1979a], about which more will be said below. There are two other
interpretations that are somewhat more serious. They are: (1) the possibility
that Menger thinks that the Principle is really the same as his multiplicity view
and should be acknowledged as such, or (2) the possibility that Menger thinks
that Carnap was inspired by the multiplicity view, and that, while Tolerance
is not identical to it, the Principle is nonetheless a development of the mul-
tiplicity view. Indeed, these interpretations seems plausible in light of what
Menger says on this issue in both the introduction to [Menger, 1979a], and in
42[Menger, 1994], p 141. Original italics, my boldface. Presumably the reference to LSL
being published in 1937 is a small error on Menger’s part.
43[Carnap, 1937], p 52.
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his essay “Logical Tolerance in the Vienna Circle” which is published in the
same volume. For example, in [Menger, 1979a] he says,
Part I includes papers published about 1930 which expound an idea
that Carnap, after a short period of opposition in the Circle, fully
adopted; and, under the name “Principle of Tolerance”, he elo-
quently formulated it in great generality in his book, Logical Syntax
of Language (1934), through which it was widely disseminated.44
In this quotation, Menger clearly claims that the view that Carnap expresses in
his Principle is the very same as the one he put forward. That is, Menger claims
that Carnap’s Tolerance is just Menger’s own view, though more ‘eloquently
formulated’. However, when we look back at the relevant papers, this claim
looks unlikely to be true. In the paper “On Intuitionism”, which is the one
that Carnap cites in his statement of the Principle of Tolerance, Menger makes
some gestures at a position that is somewhat similar to the Principle. In the
crucial passage he says,
The author [Menger] has repeatedly expressed the opinion that
the heretofore undefined concept of constructivity could be made
precise in different ways and degrees. Even in the intuitive parts of
geometry there is no word or idea which would inevitably demand
a particular definition and could not be made precise in several dif-
ferent ways. No doubt this is true to an even greater extent of the
nebulous idea of constructivity. For each of the various versions of
constructivity one could develop a corresponding deductive mathe-
matics. [. . . ]
What the intuitionistic attempts to date have done is to attach
themselves dogmatically to some particular notion of constructiv-
ity (in most cases not clearly circumscribed), to accept only the
resulting developments as meaningful, and to reject any others as
meaningless. In the opinion of the author [Menger] such a position
is totally devoid of cognitive content. For what matters in math-
ematics and logic is not which axioms and rules of inference are
chosen, but rather what is derived from them.45
The picture that Menger is presenting here is one where, for any mathematical
notion about which we might disagree, what matters in our disagreement is
not the metaphysical or epistemological status of the relevant notion. Rather
what matters is what one can derive from the deductive system that one sets
up in order to make one’s metaphysical or epistemological views about the dis-
puted principle precise. Menger calls this view ‘implicationistic’ because it is
concerned solely with what the implications of adopting various mathemati-
cal principles are, and not at all with mere biographical facts about particular
mathematicians’ reasons for adopting or rejecting various principles. As Fried-
man argues in his [Friedman, 2001], the attitude that Menger expresses in his
44[Menger, 1979a], p 1.
45[Menger, 1979c], pp 56 – 57.
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implicationistic view, and that Carnap says is shared by most ‘working mathe-
maticians’, is one that is dramatically dismissive of disagreements about foun-
dational principles; after all they are merely uninteresting biographical details
about mathematicians’ choices.46 However, as Friedman goes on to argue, this
is not Carnap’s Tolerance at all. To see the differences requires a brief digression
into the use to which these philosophers put their respective principles.
On Menger’s view, the interesting question is not which axioms and rules
of inference to take as primitive, but what can be derived from various group-
ings of axioms and rules, and perhaps even more interesting, the issue of the
relationships between these various systems. But, this view faces a serious re-
venge problem. To wit, just how should the investigation of the relationships
between the various systems proceed? Any attempt to give a definite answer to
this question simply re-introduces at the meta-level the disputes that we were
advised to dismiss at the object-level, and so nothing is solved by adopting this
stance. However, there is a sense in which, at least from Menger’s perspective,
this revenge issue does not matter. After all, he thinks that the debate over the
foundations of mathematics is merely a collection of “descriptions of subjective
psychological processes or expressions of subjective tastes”.47 In short, then,
Menger thinks that every participant in the foundations debate is wrong, at
least insofar as they attempt to assert their preferences as statements of fact
about the nature of mathematics – moreover, he thinks we should adopt the
attitude of the ‘working mathematician’ and simply get on with the business of
doing mathematics, though just how is left unclear.
At first, it may seem as if Carnap’s Tolerance is quite similar to Menger’s
view as it was just presented. It is certainly the case that Carnap thinks that
the interesting questions about the foundations of mathematics are not about
which things are taken as primitive, but rather about the consequences of these
choices. After all, “[. . . ] language, in its mathematical form, can be constructed
according to the preferences of any one of the points of view represented [in the
ongoing debates over the foundations of mathematics]; so that no question of
justification arises at all, but only the question of the syntactical consequences
to which one or other of the choices leads [. . . ]”.48 He also thinks that much
of the debate as it stood in the late 1920s and early 1930s was comprised of
“pseudo-problems and wearisome controversies”.49 Finally, it is true that Car-
nap acknowledges that the attitude he is proposing in the Principle is that of
“most working mathematicians”, though he does not elaborate on what that
means.50 However, the similarities with Menger’s implicationism end here.
Where Menger suggests that the way to resolve the disputes about the foun-
dations of mathematics is to simply ignore them, Carnap invites us to regard
them as proposals for language-systems which we might adopt for making pre-
cise our scientific practice. These proposals are then investigated to see what
their consequences are, and finally judged on the basis of the pragmatic utility
46[Friedman, 2001], especially section III.
47[Menger, 1979b], p 37.
48[Carnap, 1937], p xv.
49[Carnap, 1937], p xv.
50[Carnap, 1937], p 52.
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of adopting them.51 That is, in cases where mathematicians or philosophers
disagree over what counts as acceptable mathematics, what should be done on
Carnap’s view is to treat any requirements that have been put forward, insofar
as they can be made mathematically precise, as proposals for ways to construct
a logical system. With the proposed systems in hand, then, we trace out the
consequences of adopting each one on our mathematical practice. A decision
about which system to adopt is then made by comparing the proposed languages
in terms of their perspicuity for a particular task (in LSL, the task Carnap has
in mind is giving a foundation for the mathematical portion of our scientific
practice). This pragmatic orientation is in no way dismissive of the founda-
tional debates in mathematics, rather it provides a method for resolving such
disputes which is more substantial than simply ignoring them.52 It is this last
step that marks Carnap’s Tolerance as distinct from Menger’s implicationism.
To sum up briefly, we have seen that while Menger had a view that was in
many ways comparable to Carnap’s, there are certain fundamental differences.
These differences are centered around the way in which they see their principles
being put to use. In Menger’s case, his implicationism is designed to simply
sweep away foundational concerns with a blanket dismissal, and to thereby clear
the path for mathematicians to continue their work. For Carnap, however,
the point is not to simply dismiss these concerns tout court, but to provide
a constructive way to resolve foundational disputes without at the same time
reengaging with tiresome, and possibly intractable, philosophical disputes.
4.2.3 Carnap’s LSL View
The purpose of this section is to give a detailed description of the position on
mathematics and logic that Carnap adopts in LSL. As we have shown above,
the period in which Carnap wrote the book was one in which his views were
in flux. The story that we have told so far is one where Logical Syntax and
the Principle of Tolerance are the result of the collapse of Carnap’s previous
views. In brief, the discovery of incompleteness showed that a single-language
approach to logic and mathematics was untenable. With prompting, partially
from Menger and partly from Neurath and Popper, Carnap returned to the
tolerant attitude of his childhood, and fashioned a multi-language view from it.
The rhetoric of LSL, especially at the beginning, is soaring and it is clear that in
Carnap’s mind the book represents a bold departure from previous orthodoxy
on the nature of logic. We turn now to the question of what the new view is,
and the role that Tolerance plays in it.
Logical Syntax can be roughly divided into two separate, but related, projects.
The first is to construct two languages, named Language I and Language II, to
show that they meet certain requirements, and finally to prove certain meta-
level results about them, in particular to investigate whether they are capable
of giving an effective account of mathematical validity. This first project occu-
pies parts one to four of the book, though the fourth part of the book concerns
51[Carnap, 1937], p 46 – 47.
52Friedman makes a similar point at [Friedman, 2001], p 232. A similar interpretation of
the purpose of Carnap’s Tolerance is found in [Richardson, 1994].
70
what Carnap calls ‘General Syntax’, which is supposed to show certain results
about the syntactical structure of any language whatsoever as opposed to just
languages I and II. The second project is entirely contained in the fifth part
of the book called “Philosophy and Syntax”. This goal of this project is to
lay the foundations for the construction of a language adequate for the logical
reconstruction of science, and was closely tied into the “Unified Science” effort
which Carnap and Naurath were pursuing during the 1930s and into the 1940s.
The aim of part V of the book, and indeed the Unified Science program, was
to create a language that could serve as the common language for all of the
sciences; both formal sciences as, for example, logic and mathematics as well as
natural sciences like physics or biology. Though the ideas in this second part of
the book are better known in the context of his distinction between the formal
and material modes of speech, they are also extremely important for under-
standing Carnap’s view of logic and mathematics.53 In the rest of this section,
I will lay out Carnap’s view of logic and mathematics by working through each
of these two projects, and then showing how the salient pieces are related to
each other. We begin with a discussion of the second project.
The fifth part of Logical Syntax, entitled “Philosophy and Syntax”, is an
attempt to show how one can use formal tools to give a single language ca-
pable of unifying the various sciences. In other words, the idea is to create a
language with a precisely defined logical structure where it can be shown how
the concepts in use in various sciences are related to each other, and, for the
candidate languages that Carnap is interested in, how the concepts of natural
sciences like biology or chemistry can be defined in terms of those in use in the
special sciences. The aim of this project, however, is not foundational in the
traditional sense, though it does give a kind of ‘foundation’ for the sciences.
It will not matter to Carnap specifically which of the sciences’ terms are used
to define those in the other sciences. In order to show this, Carnap engages
in a lengthy examination of the meaningfulness of sentences which begins by
distinguishing between ‘object-sentences’ (sentences whose subject appears to
be objects or their properties) and ‘logical sentences’ (sentences which are con-
cerned with the meanings of terms or the inferential relationships between sen-
tences). Within the category of object-sentences a further distinction between
genuine object-sentences and pseudo-object-sentences is drawn, which serves to
demarcate those sentences which are about objects from those which appear
to be but in fact are not. The point of drawing these distinctions is to show
that there is nothing besides science needed to explain the results of science –
that is, there need not be anything metaphysical used in the sciences – and to
diagnose what he sees as widespread confusion on this point.54 In order to see
why these considerations do the work Carnap wants them to, however, we need
say a bit more about how one knows if a sentence is a genuine object-sentence
53This section of the book also served as the basis for a series of lectures that Carnap deliv-
ered in London in 1934, which were then published in a popularized format as his monograph
Philosophy and Logical Syntax, and thence became better known.
54This conviction of the Circle’s is memorably announced in the 1929 manifesto with the
slogan “In science there are no ‘depths’; there is surface everywhere [. . . ]” ([Neurath, 1973],
p 306).
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or only a pseudo-object-sentence.
In order to get a handle on the line Carnap draws between genuine object-
sentences and their pseudo-object-sentence imitators, we need to first define
some terminology. First, we note that all sentences are sentences of some lan-
guage or other, and that each of these languages has a formal structure. Within
these structures it is possible to give a precise characterization of their domain
of discourse. That is, we are able to say precisely and exhaustively what objects
we are talking about in a given language. With that, we can then see by logical
analysis of the statements of the language in question which of its statements
refer to objects in the language’s domain and which do not. Those statements
that are well-formed but fail to refer, then, are the pseudo-object-sentences.
So, languages conceived of in the way that Carnap suggests are composed of
a vocabulary (predicates and names), and a domain (objects for the names to
range over). The structure is completed with two types of rules: rules of forma-
tion, which give the conditions under which various combinations of symbols
constitute a sentence, and rules of transformation, which give the inferential
relationships between sentences.55 Within the transformation rules, a further
categorization is drawn between L-rules and P-rules, that is between rules that
regard logical inferences and those that regard empirical ones. An example
of an L-rule is modus ponens, while as examples of P-rules Carnap suggests
the universally quantified laws of physics. With these distinctions drawn, we
can close under the rules and arrive at the theory of the language we have
constructed. Within the theory, we can then define a few classifications of
statements. Call those statements whose truth or falsity follows from the rules
alone (or alternatively from the rules plus the empty set of assumptions) ‘an-
alytic’ if they are true, and ‘contradictory’ if false. The other sentences of the
language depend for the determination of their truth on factors other than the
rules of the language, and are called ‘synthetic’.56 It is important to notice that
within the analytic statements there will be some statements which we might
have normally thought were synthetic depending on which L-rules are chosen.
Finally, we define the content of a sentence to be the set of its non-analytic con-
sequences.57 We are now in a position to return the to the task of distinguishing
the object-sentences of a language from the pseudo-object-sentences.
As we just defined it above, sentences have content when they have non-
analytic consequences. But, analytic sentences themselves will have no conse-
quences with content; this follows from the definition of analyticity.58 Consider
some statement of a language, L1. In order to determine whether or not it
is a genuine object-sentence, we first check to see that it is not analytic. If
it is, then we know it is not an object-sentence at all, so we are done. Hav-
ing determined that the sentence in question is synthetic, we next we check
whether or not the sentence has content. If it does, then we have a genuine
55[Carnap, 1937], §2.
56Carnap’s diagram on [Carnap, 1937], p 185 is instructive for understanding his view of
these divisions.
57[Carnap, 1937], 42. See also Ibid. p 175.
58In this way, then, Wittgenstein’s thought that the truths of logic and mathematics are
‘empty’, discussed in 3.1 above, is preserved in Carnap’s LSL view.
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object-sentence, and the set of these will be the only meaningful statements
in the language for Carnap. If it does not have content, however, we have a
meaningless pseudo-object-sentence.
With this analysis of the meaningful sentences in a given language in hand,
Carnap can now return to the question of the ‘foundations’ of the various sci-
ences. The problem of distinguishing the confused pseudo-object-sentences from
the genuine sentences that he had set out to address is now solved. The founda-
tion for the various natural sciences that he proposes, then, is just those things
which the language that one constructs for representing that science (or those
sciences) commits one to.59 However, this leaves him with an apparent prob-
lem, namely his commitments with regard to the formal sciences. If one were to
take the view that we have been developing as it stands so far, then one would
be committed to everything that one’s mathematical theory commits one to in
precisely the same way as one is committed to those things that one’s theory
of physics, say, commits one to its objects. But, for a committed empiricist
like Carnap, accepting numbers or sets as existing in precisely the same way
that atoms do may seem problematic. However, the answer to this problem is
obvious, at least from the perspective of Carnap’s development that we have
built up over the last few chapters.
Taking the view he learned from Frege as a starting point, namely that
logic is the paradigmatic analytic science, and combining it with Russell’s suc-
cessful reduction of mathematics to logic results in the view that mathematics
itself is analytic. This on its own is not quite enough to resolve the difficulty,
but the combination of Carnap’s logicism with Wittgenstein’s view that logic
is fundamentally linguistic, as we have seen happens in LSL, transforms the
problem from one of unacceptable commitments to mathematical objects into
one where the referents of mathematical expressions are simply empty (because
tautologous) sentences that express the linguistic form of the language of which
they are a part. That is to say that since logic, on the LSL view, is nothing but
the system of rules one lays down for the language at the construction stage,
and that since mathematics on this view is reducible to logic, then mathemat-
ics too is just some portion of the consequences of those rules. This means
that depending on what rules one starts with, one will end up with different
logics and therefore different mathematics as well. This is no problem for the
view, though, because it is precisely what Tolerance licenses.60 The position
that Carnap arrived at, then, is one that saves both the analytic truth of logic
and mathematics, but also preserves some potion of the empiricist thought that
knowledge of the content of the world comes only via the senses.61 However,
this appeal to Wittgenstein’s view – or at least to the Circle’s understanding of
59This view is one that similarly remains with Carnap for the rest of his career. It is most
famously found in his 1950 essay “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”.
60Carnap’s view, characterized as we have here, has been given the rather catchy ti-
tle “tautologicism” by Awodey and Carus. For example, see [Carus, 2007], p 188, and
[Awodey and Carus, 2009], p 81.
61It should be remarked, however, that because so much of what would have been the
domain of a posteriori investigation in a classical empiricist view is built into our languages
in Carnap’s, his position would likely have been unrecognizable as empiricist by the likes of,
for example, Hume or Mill.
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it – itself engenders a problem for Carnap. Namely, it was one of Wittgenstein’s
central tenets that language could not express its syntax, only show it. In LSL,
however, Carnap is committed to making the syntax of a language explicit, and
not only that, but explicit in that language itself. This is the project of the
first four parts of the book, and we now turn to it.
We will begin with a brief review of Wittgenstein’s views on why the syn-
tax of a language must be only shown and not said. As we argued in section
3.1.3 above, rules of a language and even statements about a language must,
on Wittgenstein’s view, be formulated somehow from inside the language if
they are to be meaningful, which is to say that they must be formulated in-
side the language if they are to be said. But because the syntactical rules of
a language are not matters of empirical fact, they are not proper contents of
meaningful statements on his view. They can, however, be shown. The rules
are exhibited by the forms of meaningful statements of the language, and ad-
ditionally by the instances of successful inferences, as was noted at the end of
section 3.1.3. However, as we also noted, Carnap saw no problem in adopting
only part of Wittgenstein’s views on this matter, and so left aside the thought
that the syntax of a language must be un-sayable in that language. Instead
of understanding the problem as one of philosophical scruples, rather he saw
it as a technical problem. Namely, the issue was to determine whether one
could actually construct a language such that its syntax is expressible in that
very language, and he interpreted Wittgenstein to have made a technical claim
that such a construction was not possible.62 The refutation of that claim is the
project that Carnap embarks on in the first portion of LSL.
Carnap announces that this is his aim at the very outset of the book. In
the introduction he says,
With Language I as an example, it will be shown, in what follows,
how the syntax of a language may be formulated within that lan-
guage itself (Part II). The usual fear that thereby contradictions –
the so-called ‘epistemological’ or ‘linguistic’ antinomies – must arise,
is not justified.63
There are two striking features of this comment that merit our attention, both
to do with the worry about paradox. The first is the stated goal, that is to show
that languages whose syntax is expressible in that very language are not thereby
paradoxical. The second is the fact that Carnap seems to worry about paradoxes
at all, which is somewhat odd given the interpretation of Tolerance that I will
attribute to him, as we will see below. We take these two points in turn,
beginning with the first. Though he does not attribute the thought that the
expressibility of a language’s syntax causes paradoxes in it to Wittgenstein in
the introduction, he makes it clear that he has precisely Wittgenstein’s doctrine
in mind at the beginning of Part II where he says,
62It is important to note that Wittgenstein would have never agreed that he had made such
a claim, if only to mark how far Carnap has moved away from adopting Wittgenstein’s views
wholesale.
63[Carnap, 1937], p xiv.
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Up to the present, we have differentiated between the object-language
and the syntax-language in which the syntax of the object-language
is formulated. Are these necessarily two separate languages? If this
question is answered in the affirmative (as it is by Herbrand in con-
nection with metamathematics), then a third language will be neces-
sary for the formulation of the syntax of the syntax-language, and so
on to infinity. According to another opinion (that of Wittgenstein),
there exists only one language, and what we call syntax cannot be
expressed at all – it can only “be shown”. As opposed to these views,
we intend to show that, actually, it is possible to manage with one
language only; not, however, by renouncing syntax, but by demon-
strating that without the emergence of contradictions the syntax of
this language can be formulated within this language itself.64
There are two parts to the task. First, Carnap must show how to construct a
language which can represent its syntax in that language itself. Having done
that, he must then show that the language so constructed is consistent. So, how
then is Carnap to accomplish these tasks? The answer for the first part was
suggested to him, as he recounts things in the IA, by Go¨del.65 In the summer of
1930, Go¨del had shown Carnap his incompleteness results, and in so doing had
also shown how to use the technique of ‘arithmetization’ that he had pioneered
for the proofs. It is this technique that allows Carnap to carry out his goal.
Though arithmetization was novel at the time it is now quite well known, so
we need not belabor this point; moreover, there are no surprises in Carnap’s
implementation. What is more interesting, and indeed much more revelatory
of how Carnap understood his view, is his consistency proof.
The proof spans three sections of the book, beginning with §34i and con-
tinuing through §36.66 The overall strategy for the proof is to show that while
every demonstrable sentence of the language is analytic, not every sentence of
the language is. The ‘demonstrable’ sentences are just those sentences which
are derivable from the empty set of premises. This definition is very similar to
that given for analyticty, but Carnap is at pains to note the differences between
these two notions which, as with arithmetization, were novel at the time LSL
was written. Nonetheless, it is worth pausing to see how Carnap marked the
differences. To see how he distinguishes these two notions we will first need
some more definitions.67 We begin with the definiteness: a sentence is said to
possess a definite property when there is an algorithmic method of determin-
ing in a finite number of steps whether it has that property or not. A goal
64[Carnap, 1937], p 53. My emphasis. One might suspect that the problem with a hierarchy
of syntax-languages might have been suggested to Carnap by Russell’s introduction to the
Tractatus (see [Wittgenstein, 1983], pp 22 – 23). Another possible source of this idea is
Tarski. Unfortunately, I cannot find any evidence one way or the other on this issue.
65[Carnap, 1963], p 54.
66The sections in the English translation of LSL that are marked with letters after the
section number is material that was in the original manuscript, though Carnap admits it was
in a slightly different format, but was removed to save space in the first published version.
See [Carnap, 1937], p xi.
67Here I follow the exposition given in [Procha´zka, 2006], sections 2, 5, and 6.
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that Carnap takes up in LSL is to develop a criterion of mathematical validity
which is definite in the language of classical mathematics. However, we know
that the property of ‘derivability’ will only be definite – and therefore able to
serve as the desired criterion of mathematical validity – in very weak languages.
Indeed, as Go¨del’s theorems show, in languages with the resources for addition
and multiplication there are sentences which will be mathematically valid but
not derivable. Call these sentences ‘Go¨del sentences’, as is now common, and
we will refer to them by the symbol G. In LSL, Carnap writes this sentence as:
¬BewSatzII(r, subst[. . . ]) (G)
where ‘r’ is a free variable ranging over series numbers in Langauge II, ‘BewSatzII(a,b)’
is a two place relation that is “true when and only when a is the series number
of a proof in accordance with the rules [of Language II], and b is the series
number of the last sentence in this proof”, and ‘subst[. . . ]’ is a shorthand for
the necessary values of the substitution relation which replace the variable b in
‘BewSatzII’ with the series number of this very sentence.68
A first instinct that one might have to get around this problem is to abandon
a commitment to finite rules of inference. In particular one might think that
enriching the language with a rule that allows one to go from an infinite series
of sentences like:
ϕ(1), ϕ(2), . . . , ϕ(i), . . .
to the universally quantified sentence:
∀xϕ(x)
will sidestep the problem. This rule is now known as an ω-rule. Before we can
motivate the thought that adding a rule of this sort to one’s logic could be a
way around incompleteness, however, we need to say a bit about just how the
proof of the theorems works. The proof of the incompleteness theorems involves
two parts: in the first, we construct a sentence which denies that a sentence
with a particular series number has the ‘BewSatzII’ property, and in the second
we show that this sentence is not demonstrable in Language II as long as II is
consistent.69 The details of the first part need not trouble us here, and instead
we focus on the second. We can see that G is true just in case there is no
number r which is the series number of a proof which has sentence represented
by ‘subst[. . . ]’ as its final line. But, as we defined it, ‘subst[. . . ]’ is just short
hand for the series number of the sentence which results from inserting the
series number for G in the second argument place in the ‘BewSatzII’ relation in
68[Carnap, 1937], p 132.
69Sometimes it is said that these sentences ‘say of themselves that they are true but not
provable’. While this may be a useful aid to understanding how Go¨del sentences work, I think
it is misleading in the current context because, following a rather strict reading of Carnap,
we are presently working in an uninterpreted language. That is, when we deny that there is
a sentence with a certain series number possessing a certain property, we have not yet said
what the ‘meaning’ of the property is. So, even granting that we will interpret the property
as being ‘provability-in-L’, we do not need to do so in order to prove the theorem, and so have
not yet provided such an interpretation.
76
G itself. Put simply, G is true just in case there is no number which is the series
number of the proof of G. So, if it is true, then G is not provable in Language
II. But, what we need to show is that G is undecidable, that is that neither it
nor its negation is demonstrable. So, we now need to show that the negation
of G is not demonstrable either. For reductio, assume that the negation of G
is provable. This is equivalent to proving the sentence:
∃rBewSatzII(r, subst[. . . ]).
That is, if G is false, then there is some value of r which is the series number of
a proof which has G as its final line. But, since r in the original Go¨del sentence
is a free variable, the substitution of any numerical value for it in the sentence
also yields a demonstrable sentence. In other words, we could prove that:
¬BewSatzII(n, subst[. . . ])
for each particular numerical value n. This would mean that, while for each
n we can prove that it is not the series number of a proof with G as its final
line, there is still nonetheless a number which is. That is, the language would
be ω-inconsistent. So, on the assumption that Language II is ω-consistent,
we have shown that neither G nor its negation is demonstrable in II. With
these preliminaries regarding the proof of the incompleteness results out of the
way, let us return the question of whether the ω-rule offers a way to avoid the
problem.
In part, what inspires thinking in the direction of an ω-rule is the proof that
the negation of G is not demonstrable. The situation, as we saw, is that we are
able to prove for each particular n that it is not the series number of a proof
with G as the final line, which, in essence, is a list of sentences:
¬BewSatzII(1, subst[. . . ]),
¬BewSatzII(2, subst[. . . ]),
...
¬BewSatzII(n, subst[. . . ])
which is infinite.70 The thought goes that if instead we were permitted to infer
from this list to their universally quantified counterpart,
∀n¬BewSatzII(n, subst[. . . ])
then it would be the case that the language was complete, because we could
prove G by inferring the equivalent statement ∀n¬BewSatzII(n, subst[. . . ]).
Carnap was not the only person considering such an approach around this
time.71 For example, after he heard about Go¨del’s theorems from his assistant
Bernays, Hilbert, who had previously objected to infinitary rules on philosoph-
ical grounds, thought that an ω-rule might be finitistically acceptable.72 In his
lecture “The Grounding of Elementary Number Theory”, delivered in Decem-
ber of 1930 to the Philosophical Society in Hamburg, and later published in the
Mathematische Annalen, he says,
70We should also add the caveat that ‘1’, ‘2’, etc. need to be defined as number symbols.
71For more on Carnap and the ω-rule, see [Buldt, 2004].
72[Reid, 1970], pp 198 – 199.
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The infinite is realized nowhere; it does not exist in nature, nor is
it admissible as a foundation of our rational thought. And yet we
cannot dispense with the unconditional application of the tertium
non datur and of negation, since otherwise the gapless and unified
construction of our science would be impossible. So operation with
the infinite must be secured in the finite; and precisely this occurs
in my proof theory.73
Despite his uneasiness with the infinite, which seems to still be part of his
thought here, several transfinite rules are included in the presentation of his
proof theory, and amongst them is an ω-rule.74 Indeed, a few paragraphs after
the above quotation, he goes on to say,
I have succeeded in proving these theorems [on the relationship be-
tween consistency and provability] at least for certain simple cases.
I obtained this result by adding to the already given rules of infer-
ence (substitution and inference schema) the following equally finite
new rule of inference:
If it has been proved, for any given numeral z, that the formula
A(z)
is always a correct numerical formula, then the formula
(x)A(x)
can be laid down as a starting formula.75
What is particularly striking about this comment is Hilbert’s claim that the
ω-rule is just as finite as the other rules in his system. It suggests the lengths
that some were prepared to go in search of a consistency proof for mathematics.
Seen in this light, then, Carnap’s proposal to adopt a similar rule to Hilbert’s
is not out of step with some of the contemporary thinking. But this strategy
has a very straightforward problem.
The first fact we need to observe, which was originally pointed out by Tarski,
is that with the addition of an ω-rule to an existing language, L, we are not using
the same syntax anymore precisely because we have added a rule of inference.76
So, strictly speaking, we are dealing with a new language, Lω. While moving
to this new language solves the incompleteness problem encountered in the
original language, namely because it can now prove the sentence it could not
prove before, no light is thereby shed on the status of the old language. That
is, the notion of derivability characterized in L is still inadequate, and we will
need new arguments to show that the notion of mathematical validity in Lω
fulfills any requirements we might have. So, what are the prospects for such
arguments?
73[Hilbert, 1931], p 1152.
74See [Hilbert, 1931], pp 1153 – 1154 for the rules presented at that lecture.
75[Hilbert, 1931], p 1154. My emphasis.
76See [Procha´zka, 2006], p 89.
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Recall that the initial goal was to give a tractable and precise definition
of mathematical validity. In this case ‘tractability’ amounts to being definite
in Carnap’s sense, and is what we would call ‘effective’ or ‘computable’ in
modern terminology. However, the incompleteness theorems showed that while
direct derivability was tractable in this way, it was not an adequate account
of validity. When we augment the language with an ω-rule, and so move to
the new language Lω, we gain completeness back, and so have an account
of mathematical validity, but this new notion of validity is no longer definite
(effective/computable). Carnap is clearly aware of the specific deficiencies of
the ω-rule approach,
But, for our particular task, that of constructing a complete cri-
terion of validity for mathematics, this procedure [of equating math-
ematical truth with derivability], which has hitherto been the only
one attempted, is useless; we must endeavour to discover another
way.
3. In order to attain completeness for our criterion we are thus
forced to renounce definiteness, not only for the criterion itself but
also for the individual steps of the deduction.77
So, rather than continuing to search for a way around the incompleteness phe-
nomenon, Carnap instead sets out to show that despite the inability to represent
mathematical truth as simple derivability, he can nonetheless define a notion
which exactly characterizes it, namely analyticity. Of course, as he admits in
the above quotation, this notion will be indefinite in the language in which it
is given. In other words, he appears to bite the bullet on the consequences of
incompleteness. This admission will have interesting consequences for Carnap’s
view, which we will take up after we discuss the definition of analyticity below.
Carnap’s definition of analyticity is extremely complicated – the definition
of it in Language II runs for twelve pages in LSL – and we need not dwell on
the gory details here.78 There is, however, one very important aspect of the
definition that deserves our attention. The question that Carnap confronts at
the end of section §34d, wherein the definition of analytic for Language II is
finished, is whether or not the predicate ‘[. . . ] is analytic in Language II’ can
be represented in a precisely formulated language, and in particular whether
or not Language II can be that language. This is to say that Carnap is finally
ready to tackle the problem he set himself at the outset of the book. He is now
armed with a criterion of mathematical validity, which he has shown picks out
all and only those sentences which are mathematically valid. However, both
the definition of analyticty and the proof that it is complete with respect to
classical mathematics are given, as Carnap puts it, “[. . . ] in a word-language
that does not possess a strictly determined syntax”.79 So, what remains to be
77[Carnap, 1937], p 100. This passage comes in a larger discussion of various strategies
for giving a criterion for mathematical validity, and spans the final sentences of the second
strategy into the first sentences of the third (hence the floating numeral 3).
78[Carnap, 1937], p 102 – 114.
79[Carnap, 1937], p 113.
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considered is whether or not analyticity can be formulated in a language with
a precise syntax, and whether Language II can be that language.
After the long buildup, the immediate consideration of these two questions
is unceremonious and brief. Carnap notes that it is obviously possible to specify
a language with a strict syntax that can define “analytic in Language II”’. But,
he goes on to note that for Go¨dellian reasons it is impossible to use Language
II for this purpose, though he does not immediately spell the point out in
detail. Instead, he returns to the problem in sections §59 through §60d where
he shows that, as a modern reader would expect, were the predicates “analytic
in Language II” and “contradictory in Langauge II” part of Language II itself,
then it would be possible to construct sentences that say of themselves that they
are contradictory. The final answer to the questions that Carnap posed at the
outset of the book, namely whether it is possible to give a precise syntactical
characterization of the notion of mathematical validity in a language which is
also capable of serving as its own syntax-language, comes in two theorems in
section §60c.
Theorem 60c.1. If [a language] S is consistent, or, at least, non-
contradictory, then ‘analytic (in S)’ is indefinable in S.
Theorem 60c.2. If [a language] S is consistent, or at least non-
contradictory, then no proof of the non-contradictoriness or consis-
tency of S can be formulated in a syntax which uses only the means
of expression which are available in S.80
He goes on to note that this is true for a variety of terms that might be of
interest as, for example, ‘valid’, ‘consequence’, and ‘equipollent’; this point is
close to what we now call Tarski’s Theorem, though Carnap stops short of
noting that truth is amongst the indefinable notions.81 This is all to say that,
while he has shown that it is possible to represent the syntax of a language with
that very language, it is not possible to show that the language satisfies certain
criteria while restricting oneself to only that language. Proofs of consistency
or of completeness require languages with greater expressive power. As we will
see in chapter 5 below, this lack of scruples about ascending to a more powerful
language in order to prove fundamental properties of the language is a move that
Carnap makes which several logicians and philosophers, most notably Go¨del,
think is illegitimate.
4.3 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to examine Carnap’s view of logic and mathematics
as he put it forward in his book LSL. Where in previous chapters we were
concerned to examine those parts of other philosophers’ views which Carnap
adopted into his own, our motivation here was to highlight the parts of LSL that
80[Carnap, 1937], p 219. Original emphasis.
81[Carnap, 1937], p 219. The similarity between Carnap’s work here and Tarski’s Theorem
has been noted several times. A characteristic example is found in [Go¨del, 1987b], p 389.
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were uniquely Carnap’s. The largest of these unique features is the Principle
of Tolerance, to which we paid significant attention. We first showed how an
openness to different ways of thinking was instilled in the young Carnap by his
mother, then carried into his years spent as a student. The connection to his
early behavior was also important, though perhaps not decisive, for answering
the challenge for priority in adopting Tolerance leveled by Karl Menger.
Much more decisive in that discussion were the differences in the work that
the two philosophers took their respective principles to do. For Menger, the
goal, we saw, was to simply brush aside metaphysical and foundational worries.
For Carnap, by contrast, the goal was to give a foundation, though this was not
intended to be a foundation in some ultimate sense, but only in a pragmatic
one. That is, if we inquire into why the mathematical truths that our theory
delivers as true are so, we find that it is an artifact of the way in which the
language of our theory was constructed. Moreover, the Principle of Tolerance
tells us that there can be no further question regarding the correctness of the
theory, or its answerability to some extralinguistic realm.
We also endeavored to show that Carnap’s adoption of the Principle was
influenced by his ongoing debate over the nature of protocol sentences and con-
struction of a language for science with Otto Neurath, and further by discussions
of his position in that debate with Karl Popper. It was Popper’s particular in-
fluence that turned Carnap’s radical view that any sentence at all could serve
as a protocol sentence under the right circumstances, to the more restrained
view that we find in LSL and TM. Finally we turned to the view presented
in LSL itself. We previously noted the influence of both Go¨del, Tarski, and
Behmann in turning Carnap’s interests toward the possibility of metalogical in-
vestigations. In this chapter we saw this train of thought come to fruition in the
investigations that Carnap undertakes with regard to constructing a tractable
account of mathematical validity, and the possibility of representing the syntax
of a language in that very language.
The discussion in this thesis so far has been centered on the genesis of
Carnap’s view in LSL. From here, however, our focus shifts from explaining the
view, to answering a particular strategy of criticizing it. This critique, as we
will see, has its origins in Go¨del’s posthumously published papers, though it
has been put forward several times by other philosophers as well. We examine
each of them in chapter 5 below. The extended discussion of the development
of Carnap’s views will play a decisive role in mounting a defense on his behalf
of the Principle. This defense will be the subject of the final chapter.
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Chapter 5
Go¨del and the Arguments
From Incompleteness
Up to this point in the thesis, we have been primarily engaged in an exegetical
and historical project. The main concern has been to set out what Carnap’s
view, as it was presented in LSL was, and how he came to hold it. In this
chapter, and for the remainder of the thesis, we shift gears somewhat, though
perhaps it will not be so obvious from the outset. Our goal moves from es-
tablishing what it is that Carnap thought, to, in the first instance, examining
a family of criticisms of his view, and later developing a response to those
critiques.
Since the publication of the third volume of The Collected Works of Kurt
Go¨del, in which his developed but not previously published, papers are collected,
there has been a simmering debate about the conclusiveness of the arguments
that Go¨del offers in his 1953/9 paper “Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?”
against what he calls the ‘syntactical viewpoint’. This view of the nature of
mathematics, according to Go¨del, was held around 1930 by Morritz Schlick,
Hans Hahn, and Rudolf Carnap, and, “[. . . ] can be characterized as being a
combination of nominalism and conventionalism” with a strong commitment to
empiricism as well.1 Fundamentally, the debate centers on whether the attacks
that Go¨del launches reveal the incoherency of the syntactical view, or reveal a
deep misunderstanding of it. As will emerge in our investigations, an issue that
is central to this debate is the extent to which, if at all, Carnap appreciated the
effects that Go¨del’s incompleteness results had for the view found in his book
LSL, which we have discussed in section 4.2 above. In this chapter we will give
an account of Go¨del’s arguments, and the ensuing debate surrounding it.
This chapter will be divided into two sections. In the first, I will give a
brief account of Go¨del’s time in Vienna and his relationship with the Circle in
general, and to Carnap in particular, while he was there. We will then move
on to a sustained examination of his argument, paying special attention to the
first section of the third version of Go¨del’s 1953/9 paper, wherein he gives the
most complete version of the critique. We will finish this section with a slight
1[Go¨del, 1995a], p 334. That Go¨del does not attribute this view to the Circle at large is
an interesting feature of the critique. We set it aside for now, but will take it up again below.
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sharpening of the problem by casting it in the light of the issue of the appli-
cability of mathematics in the sciences. The second section will be concerned
with versions of this critique that have been made by other philosophers. There
are four other versions that we will examine. The first of these is due to Hi-
lary Putnam, and is found in his 1983 Herbert Spencer lecture “Philosophers
and Human Understanding”. The second version, which is the most recent, is
due to Patricia Blanchette. She raises a problem based the applicability of our
mathematical language and the supposedly content-free nature of mathematical
statements on Carnap’s view. The third is a more sustained attack that comes
from Michael Potter’s book Reason’s Nearest Kin in his final chapter which is
devoted to Carnap. The fourth is due to Gabriella Crocco in her article “Go¨del,
Carnap and the Fregean Heritage”. This article takes a more neutral tone in
the debate, but, as we will see, ultimately sides with Go¨del.
5.1 Go¨del, Incompeteness, and Logical Syntax
In this section we examine the work of Kurt Go¨del and its relation to Carnap’s
view of logic and mathematics. The section will be split into two parts, one
that reviews Go¨del’s life in Vienna, and his association with the Vienna Circle
and with Carnap in particular. These details of his life are now well known, and
so this section will be brief. In the second part, we move on to detail Go¨del’s
posthumously published paper that critiques the view of logic and mathematics
which was common in the Circle around 1930, entitled “Is Mathematics Syntax
of Language?”. Because this paper is chronologically the first, albeit not the first
published, version of the general critique with which this thesis is concerned,
the analysis of it will be substantial.2 However, an evaluation of it, and indeed
of the others examined in this chapter, will have to wait for chapter 6 below.
5.1.1 Go¨del and Carnap: Two Gentlemen of Vienna
Go¨del was born at Brno, Moravia, which at that time was known as Bru¨nn
and in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in 1906. His family was relatively well
to do, and as a result his upbringing was comfortable, though perhaps made
slightly more difficult by his notorious propensity for illness.3 In 1924 he went
to the University of Vienna to study theoretical physics. However, he switched
his area of study to mathematics around 1925 or 1926, after attending a lec-
2There is a small worry that, although this version is the first, it is nonetheless not the
best. In part, I take this on board, and examine several other versions of the criticism in this
chapter. However, because Go¨del’s version is a reference for nearly every subsequent version,
I still think it warranted to give it pride of place.
3See [Wang, 1987], section §1.2 for Go¨del’s assessment of his family status. An anecdote
that demonstrates their circumstances, however, is the difference between his study of Russell
and Whitehead’s Principia and Carnap’s. In section 2.2.2 above, we remarked on the letter
that Carnap sent to Russell asking for help in obtaining a copy of the book since he could
not afford it. By contrast, when Go¨del wanted to study it, he simply placed an order with
the publisher ([Dawson Jr., 1997], p 53). With regards to his health issues, references to them
can be found throughout the literature on his life. See [Wang, 1987], p 15 for a paradigmatic
example.
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ture series by Schlick on philosophy of mathematics, as well as a course by
Friedrich Furtwa¨ngler on number theory, a course which he later said was the
most wonderful he ever heard.4 His decision to attend the lectures by Schlick
was fortuitous, as there he made the acquaintence of Feigl and another student
of Schlick’s, Marcel Natikin. In late 1925 or early ’26, he received an invitation
to start attending the Vienna Circle’s meetings, presumably at least in part
because of his friendships with two of the younger members.
By his own account, Go¨del’s involvement with the Circle was always a bit
uneasy. Though he was friends with some of the younger members, especially
Feigl and Natkin, he also reports that he did not hold many of the mainstream
Circle views. In a letter to Herbert Bohnert, written in 1974, Go¨del says,
I owe a great deal to the Vienna Circle. But it is solely the intro-
duction to the problems and their literature.5
This comment goes to show the extent to which Go¨del wanted to distance
himself from the Circle later in life. Indeed, he claimed that he was a committed
realist about mathematical entities as early as 1925.6 He is also at pains to
mention that, unlike most of the members of the Circle, Wittgenstein never had
much influence on him. Despite this unease with their way of thinking, his name
nonetheless appears in the list of members of the Circle in the 1929 manifesto.
His relationship with the Circle grew more distant after 1930, however, and he
reports that he stopped attending the meetings altogether in 1933.
From the perspective of our present inquiry, however, more interesting is
his introduction to logic. In the winter semester of 1928/29, Go¨del attended
a lecture course offered by Carnap entitled ‘The Philosophical Foundations of
Arithmetic’. The two were friendly with each other, and there are 50 pages of
records that Carnap kept of occasional conversations with Go¨del beginning in
1928 and running through until 1948.7 In the aforementioned letter to Bohnert,
Go¨del says that his conversations with Carnap were not very numerous, and
that they were not likely very influential on Carnap’s work in LSL.8 As I argued
in chapter 4 above, however, I think that Go¨del is significantly understating his
effect on Carnap’s thinking. Additionally, this might be a further attempt on
Go¨del’s part to make clear the differences between his own views and those of
the Vienna Circle members. In his [Feigl, 1969], Feigl recalls that the younger
members used to meet with Carnap to discuss matters of logic and mathemat-
ics very frequently, and that Go¨del participated in these meetings.9 Whatever
the case may be about how influential these meetings were on Carnap, it is
nonetheless true that Carnap was also a major early influence on Go¨del. In a
questionnaire that Go¨del completed sometime around 1975, he notes that Car-
nap’s lecture course was one of the most important influences in his becoming
4[Dawson Jr., 1997], p 24.
5[Go¨del, 2003a], p 323.
6[Wang, 1987], p 22. Wang speculates that Go¨del became convinced of his lifelong platon-
ism by reading Plato as an undergraduate.
7[Wang, 1987], p 49.
8[Go¨del, 2003a], p 322.
9[Feigl, 1969], p 640. See also [Dawson Jr., 1997], p 27.
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interested in the questions of completeness and incompleteness.10 The material
covered in the course is almost certainly that taken from Carnap’s textbook
Abriss der Logistik (Construction of a Logical System), published just after the
course finished in 1929, as well as some taken from Hilbert and Ackermann’s
Grundzu¨ge Der Theoretischen Logik (Principles of Mathematical Logic), also
published in 1929. This lecture course came at a critical time for Go¨del as
he was just about to begin writing his PhD on a highly related topic, namely
the completeness of the first order fragment of the system from Russell and
Whitehead’s PM. Just how Go¨del decided to write on this topic for his thesis
is not clear, but perhaps a clue comes in a footnote in the introduction to it
where he cites an unpublished manuscript of Carnap’s on the subject.11 In any
event, it seems safe to say that the content of the lecture course, its timing, and
the subsequent series of discussions between Go¨del and Carnap make it highly
plausible that the direction of influence was not only one way. Give their close
association, Go¨del would have been one of the people who knew Carnap’s views
best, other than Carnap himself. We turn now to the critique he wrote of those
views.
5.1.2 Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?
Two versions of Kurt Go¨del’s 1953/9 paper, “Is Mathematics Syntax of Lan-
guage?”, are published in the CW, though it is known that at least six versions
were drafted.12 This paper was originally written as a contribution to the
Library of Living Philosophers volume on The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap.
Go¨del and Paul Schlipp, the volume’s editor, had a long correspondence re-
garding whether or not the paper would be published, and if so, when it would
be available for Carnap to read and respond to it.13 Finally, in a letter dated
February 3, 1959, Go¨del sent word that he had decided not to publish the paper,
saying,
[. . . ] I am extremely sorry that I cannot give an affermative answer
to your inquiry of Jan. 24. In view of the fact that my article would
be severely criticize some of Carnap’s statements, it does not seem
10The questionnaire can be found in [Wang, 1987], pp 16 – 21. There, Go¨del oddly charac-
terizes the content of the lectures as ‘metalogic’ (p 17), but Wang notes that the title of the
course in the university of Vienna’s catalog is “The Philosophical Foundations of Arithmetic”
(p 22), as noted above.
11[Go¨del, 1987a], p 63. The claim that Carnap is the source which directed Go¨del to this as a
thesis topic is contentious; see [Dawson Jr., 1997], p 54 for a discussion. The cited manuscript
is almost certainly Untersuchungen zur Allgemeinen Axiomatik (Investigations in General Ax-
iomatics), where Carnap sets out to prove a theorem he called the “Gabelbarkeitssatz” which
says, in effect, that a theory is complete just in case it is categorical. Awodey and Carus trans-
late the name of this theorem as the “forkability” theorem in their [Awodey and Carus, 2003].
The theorem is, of course, easily seen to be at least problematic: there are complete theories
in first-order logic with infinite models (not all of which will be isomorphic), as Awodey and
Carus point out (p 159). They go on to argue that it is not actually false as stated because
its formulation is not precise enough to evaluate (see pp 158 – 161).
12[Go¨del, 1995a], p 324.
13[Go¨del, 1995a], p 324. The correspondence between Schilpp and Go¨del regarding his
contribution to this volume is substantially published in [Go¨del, 2003b], pp 238 – 245.
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fair to publish it without a reply by Carnap.... The fact is that I
have completed several different versions, but none of them satisfies
me. It is easy to allege very weighty and striking arguments in favor
of my views, but a complete elucidation of the situation turned out
to be more difficult than I had anticipated, doubtless in consequence
of the fact that the subject matter is closely related to, and in part
identical with, one of the basic problems of philosophy, namely the
question of the objective reality of concepts and their relations. On
the other hand, in view because of widely held prejudices, it may
do more harm than good to publish half done work.14
The volume was finally published in 1963, and Go¨del’s paper did not appear
in it. However, he did keep six versions of the paper in his files. Two of these
versions are reprinted in the Collected Works Volume 3, and two more are
reprinted in Kurt Go¨del: Unpublished Philosophical Essays.15 To my knowledge,
versions one and four have not appeared anywhere in print. In the remainder of
this section, I will primarily focus on a close reading of the third version of the
paper, with an eye towards presenting Go¨del’s criticisms of the conventionalist
position and attempting to make clear the underlying assumptions of these
criticisms. The third version is by far the most complete, and so restricting
our attention to it serves to present the argument in the form closest to what
might have appeared in the published version, were there to have ever been
one. Roughly speaking, this third version is split into two sections. In the first,
a critique of the syntactical viewpoint is offered while in the second, Go¨del
gives some positive arguments in favor of his own position. Since the current
debate is centered on the extent to which the critique of the syntactical view is
successful, I will be focusing on the first section of his paper.
Go¨del begins the third version of his paper with a brieft characterization of
the syntactical viewpoint. It reads:
Its main objective, according to Hahn and Schlick, was to concil-
iate strict empiricism with the a priori certainty of mathematics.
According to this conception (which, in the sequel, I shall call the
syntactical viewpoint) mathematics can be completely reduced to
(and in fact is nothing but) syntax of language. I.e., the validity of
mathematical theorems consists solely in their being consequences
of certain syntactical conventions about the use of symbols, not in
their describing states of affairs in some realm of things. Or, as Car-
nap puts it: Mathematics is a system of auxiliary sentences without
content or object.16
One might wonder who, exactly, Go¨del takes himself to be characterizing here.
In footnote nine he admits that it is likely that Carnap would not subscribe
to this view at the time this paper was written in the 1950’s.17 There is a
14[Go¨del, 2003b], p 244. Go¨del’s edits.
15Versions three and five appear in [Go¨del, 1995a], while versions two and six are published
in [Rodr´ıguez-Consuegra, 1995].
16[Go¨del, 1995a], p 335. Original emphasis. By ‘sequel’ Go¨del means the rest of his essay.
17[Go¨del, 1995a], pp 335 – 336.
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substantive question as to whether or not Carnap or the other Logical Positivists
mentioned at the beginning of the paper would have ever subscribed to it,
and I will return to this subject in greater detail in the third section of the
present chapter. At present, we grant Go¨del that the Logical Positivists would
have subscribed to this view for the sake of understanding his argument. In
any case, according to Go¨del the view is interesting for the technical advances
that its adherents have made, and specifically mentions Carnap’s LSL and a
paper by F. P. Ramsey.18 However, he also thinks that certain terms must be
understood in a particular way in order for the view to be carried through. So,
before he passes judgment about whether or not the view is a coherent way
of understanding mathematics, he engages in a lengthy exploration of what he
takes the view to be saying, and specifically explores the meanings of three key
terms: ‘mathematics’, ‘language’, and ‘syntax’.19 We will now examine what is
said about each of these in turn.
With regard to the meaning of ‘mathematics’ in the syntactical view, Go¨del
says that the main desideratum must be to maintain mathematics in as much
as it can be used in natural science. That is, the Logical Positivist never wants
it to be the case that some purely mathematical (or logical) statement implies
the truth or falsity of some empirical statement, but they do want to be able to
apply mathematics to the natural sciences so that they can derive consequences
of the laws of nature which can later be verified.20 So, Go¨del says that what
will have to be meant by ‘mathematics’ is the totality of classical mathematics.
That is, the sort of mathematics needed to do science, as for example analysis
or various sorts of algebra, and not more abstract branches of mathematics like
set theory. The converse is also true, and so it can not be the case that some
parts of mathematics are actually parts of the natural sciences. As Go¨del puts
it,
Nor can certain parts of classical mathematics, such as the theory of
the continuum, be discarded as belonging to physics. For they imply
number-theoretical propositions without existential quantifiers, i.e.,
propositions whose purely mathematical character cannot be con-
tested [. . . ]. Therefore “mathematics” will have to mean classical
mathematics.21
In other words, if some portion of mathematics was grounded empirically, then
the separation between the purely formal sciences, mathematics and logic, and
the factual or empirical ones would be lost. Putting things another way, if
there were some empirical facts that ground certain mathematical ones, then
that portion of mathematics would lose its character as free stipulations because
they are entailed by the way the world is.
18[Go¨del, 1995a], p 336. The Ramsey paper is [Ramsey, 1926].
19[Go¨del, 1995a], p 337.
20[Go¨del, 1995a], p 337.
21[Go¨del, 1995a], p 337. He further claims that, though it is classical mathematics that
must be understood here, nothing would be changed if one took the Positivist to be speaking
about intuitionistic mathematics.
87
Another problem that Go¨del points out for the syntactical viewpoint is that
in order for mathematics to be applicable to natural science, then the theorems
need to be known to be true. But, what does ‘known to be true’ mean in this
context? He says that it is not the theorems themselves that are constitutive
of mathematical truth, but rather their dervivability from certain axioms.22
However, all that one gets from equating mathematical truth with derivability
is an ‘implicationistic’ view of mathematics; Go¨del cites the paper by Menger
([Menger, 1979c]), which we examined in section 4.2.2, as the inspiration for
this view. That is, these theorems will be ‘true’ only in as much as they follow
from the (assumed to be true) axioms. But, this kind of conditional truth will
raise at least the question of whether the axioms are consistent. If they are,
then the relationship between natural science and mathematics is safe. But, of
course, if they are not, the syntactical view is in trouble, because all proposi-
tions will follow from contradictory axioms.23 If every proposition follows, then
mathematics loses its applicability in the sciences, because it will be impossible
to know if the derivations of the consequences of the laws of nature that we
do yield true results (because both the truth of the consequent and its falsity
will follow from the axioms). Though he thinks it a very strong critique of
the syntactical viewpoint, Go¨del does not belabor the point in this part of the
essay, and instead confines it to a footnote. However, we will return frequently
to this thought, as it forms the core of what Go¨del took himself to be doing.
To sum up then, in the syntactical view ‘mathematics’ should be understood
as classical mathematics and it must also be understood to be implicationistic.
The next of the terms that should be discussed is ‘language’. Recall that the
syntactical viewpoint, as Go¨del characterized it above, is committed to a very
‘strict empiricism’. In order that we are able to properly address ‘language’,
we should say a bit about what a strict empiricism is in this context. Go¨del
says in footnote four to version three of the paper, “The tenet of empiricism in
question evidently is that, in the last analysis, all knowledge is based on (internal
or external) sense perceptions and that we do not possess an intuition into some
realm of abstract mathematical objects”.24 In other words, the syntactical view
is committed to a very traditional empiricism in the vein of Locke and Hume
where all knowledge is from sense impressions or relations of ideas, and where
we have no recourse whatever to anything but the five senses as a means of
generating knowledge about the world.25
22[Go¨del, 1995a], p 338, footnote 13.
23This is on the assumption that the underlying framework is not paraconsistent, which
seems a safe assumption given the historical context. However, there are reasons to suspect
that Carnap was more open to investigations along paraconsistent lines (see [Carnap, 1937], p
xv and section 6.1.1 below), though I acknowledge that phrasing things this way is somewhat
anachronistic.
24[Go¨del, 1995a], p 335.
25This characterization is remarkably unfair to the Vienna Circle. While it is true that they
were empiricists of some stripe, and even positivistic at some points, by the time of the debate
over the form of the protocol sentences, at least Carnap and others had completely abandoned
the kind of traditional empiricism that Go¨del paints them with here. However, the footnote
continues, “Since, moreover, because of the a priori certainty of mathematics, such a realm
cannot be known empirically, it must not be assumed to exist at all. Therefore the objective
of the syntactical program can also be stated thus: To build up mathematics as a system of
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So, given this kind of empiricism, what can possibly be meant by ‘lan-
guage’? According to Go¨del, it will have to be some kind of symbolic language,
and moreover it must be a finite one.26 It must be symbolic because all aspects
of the language must be available to sensory perception. If it is infinite in any
fashion, either in the quantity of symbols in the language or in the length of
the sentences, then there will be (at least possible) sentences in the language
that can not be completely produced in empirical sensation.27 In the case of
an infinitistic language, there will have to be some appeal either to a mathe-
matical or linguistic ‘intuition’ in order to grasp the whole of the sentences of
infinite length. But, this appeal to intuitions is problematic for the syntactical
viewpoint in two ways. Firstly, it is not clear what this intuition might be. It is
possible that it could be an alternative sense that functions roughly analogously
to our normal sensory perception, but takes abstract objects as its target, or
it could be something else entirely – that is, something that does not function
in any way analogously to the five senses. However, positing a sense over and
above the generally accepted five seems at odds with the strict empiricism dis-
cussed above. In either case it is the second way that this account of language
is troublesome that is more damaging. If one can not perceive infinite sentences
directly, since they can not be completely written down, but still takes these
sentences to be meaningful and part of the language, then according to Go¨del
they must be a kind of abstract entity.28 But this is exactly the sort of object
that the syntactical viewpoint begins by rejecting! Indeed, if it is necessary
to posit abstract entities to understand some of the sentences of mathematics,
then it could certainly never be the case that these sentences were pure syntax
without content or object as the view claims.
Go¨del’s discussion of ‘syntax’ closely follows the one on language. He says
that in order to have an notion of syntax that will be acceptable to the Logical
Positivist, there will have to be two constraints on it. Firstly, it must be the
case, just as it was for language, that the syntactical rules are finitary. For just
as we saw before, if they are not, then we are implicitly making use of a kind
of mathematical intuition.29 At first glance, this may not look like much of a
worry, either for the way in which we understand language, or for the way in
which we understand syntax. But part of the problem is that the syntactical
viewpoint is not intended to be a revisionist stance about mathematics.30 That
is, the view is not that mathematical practice has been somehow in error and
must be changed, but rather that it is our interpretation of what it is that
sentences valid independently of experience, without using mathematical intuition or referring
to any mathematical objects or facts” ([Go¨del, 1995a], p 335 fn 4). This latter description is
more accurate, I think.
26There could be a worry here about ignoring other types of empirical intuition in favor of
vision only. Go¨del does not engage with this objection, and there is every reason to suspect that
very similar objections to the ones Go¨del makes would go through for other sense modalities.
27[Go¨del, 1995a], p 338.
28[Go¨del, 1995a], p 338.
29[Go¨del, 1995a], p 338.
30At any rate, it is not revisionist as Go¨del presents it in this paper. Whether or not his
characterization of the position is completely accurate or not is an issue that must wait until
chapter 6.
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mathematical statements are and how they are to be understood that has been
problematic. However, one consequence of this is that the view must be able
to account for mathematical statements of the form, “There exists an infinite
set of expressions with a certain property” because these kinds of statements
already occur in the corpus of mathematics, which the view is not trying to
change.31 But, as we saw above, it will be impossible to produce such a set of
expressions in empirical intuition, and therefore impossible to claim knowledge
about what properties its members do or do not have. If we can not account
for our knowledge of all of the kinds of statements found in the mathematical
corpus, then it seems like the account is lacking.
The second constraint that must be placed on our understanding of syn-
tax is that all the syntactical rules must be known to be independent of any
empirical observations purely on the basis of their formulation.32 If it was not
clear from their formulation then the rules would have some kind of content,
namely that some extralinguistic considerations would confirm or disconfirm
their applicability, both to the objects of mathematics, should there be any
such, or to our calculations about the empirical world. One might think that
those committed to strict empiricism in the manner of the syntactical viewpoint
might welcome subjecting mathematics to a test of this kind to ensure that it
is completely free of ‘metaphysical’ notions. But, we must bear in mind that,
just as we noted above, the task that this view has set itself is not to revise
mathematical practice, but to explain it. One of the features of mathematics
as we know it is the necessary truth of its statements. If it were the case that
some empirical observations or other extralinguistic considerations could dis-
confirm the supposed true theorems of mathematics, the necessary character of
the truths would be gone. Instead the test for truth would be some contingent
features of the empirical world as opposed to derivability from, or consistency
with, a set of conventionally selected axioms. Given this, and making use of the
same reasoning as he did in the section on the way in which mathematics must
be understood, Go¨del says that the requirement to maintain independence from
any empirical claims is equivalent to a requirement for consistency.
Go¨del says that there is another possibility for what could be meant by syn-
tax. Up until this point in the present chapter, we have been gesturing towards
this alternative understanding when we say that the syntactical viewpoint is not
revisionist about the practice of mathematics, but it is necessary to get clearer
about what exactly the consequences of these two features of the syntactical
view are. If one does not want to revise the practice of mathematics, then one
accepts all the theorems and methods that mathematicians have been using.33
However, Go¨del says that these are “[. . . ] usually presented as a science of cer-
tain objects, about which certain propositions are asserted to be demonstrably
31This example is due to Go¨del. See [Go¨del, 1995a], p 338.
32The sense in which I mean ‘formulation’ to be interpreted is simply the order and kind of
symbols used in writing the rule down.
33Though Go¨del is not explicit on this point in [Go¨del, 1995a], by ‘methods’ I understand
him to mean the use of both infinitary inference rules as well as the full power of classical
mathematics, as for example second order quantification.
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true [. . . ]”.34 So, since reducing mathematics to syntax is problematic, as we
have just seen, perhaps it is possible to interpret mathematics as syntax of lan-
guage instead. Go¨del goes on to say that if one wants to interpret mathematics
this way, then it,
[. . . ] will have to mean: (1) that the formal axioms and the proce-
dures of proof of mathematics can be deduced from suitably chosen
rules of syntax, and (2) that the conclusions as to ascertainable facts
which are obtained by applying mathematical theorems and which
formerly were based on the intuitive truth of the mathematical ax-
ioms can be justified by syntactical considerations.35
The main argumentative force here is on the second condition that the cor-
rectness of the syntactical rules can be itself known by the form of the rules.
On Go¨del’s view, mathematical intuitions could ground the conviction that the
axioms and methods of proof, as for example mathematical induction, used in
mathematical practice are correct.36 However, if one is committed to getting
rid of all talk of intuitions, as the syntactical viewpoint and the Logical Posi-
tivists are, then of course one will have to look elsewhere for the guarantor of
the acceptability of the syntactical rules. As ever, this acceptability consists in
the rules not implying the truth or falsity of any empirical statements, which
as we have seen before in the sections on how to understand mathematics and
the section on how to understand syntax, is equivalent to the demand for a
proof of the rules’ consistency. However, Go¨del also claims that interpreting
mathematics as the syntax of language forces the Logical Positivist to make
an even stronger claim, namely that, “only procedures of proof which cannot
be rejected by anyone who knows how to apply these concepts at all” can be
used in the derivation of mathematics.37 As we saw earlier, the syntactical
rules cannot have any content, and so if someone who knew how to apply these
rules could find a reason to reject them, then the rules would would not be
self-evident in virtue of their form. If they were not self-evident in virtue of
their form, then they must have some kind of content which could serve as the
basis of a principled rejection of the rules, and which will cause the rule to be
unacceptable to the logical positivist.
At this juncture, it is worthwhile to take stock and review what exactly the
syntactical view is, now that Go¨del has filled in some of the ways in which key
terms need to be understood. As we said above, it is a mixture of empiricism,
nominalism, and conventionalism wherein mathematical statements are inter-
preted as the syntax of language. It is also a non–revisionist position that does
not think that our mathematical practice has been in error, just our interpre-
tation of what it is we are doing when we do mathematics. This mathematics
34[Go¨del, 1995a], p 335, fn 6.
35[Go¨del, 1995a], p 339.
36[Go¨del, 1995a], p 340. In this case, by ‘correctness’, Go¨del must mean something like
‘when used in a mathematical context, are known not to take us from true premisses to false
conclusions’, or ‘known to be consistent’, or ‘known to be true’. What he does not mean,
however, is something like empirical adequacy. C.f. [Go¨del, 1995a], p 341 fn 19.
37[Go¨del, 1995a], p 341.
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is taken to be classical, in that it will be required that all of the mathematics
used in the sciences is covered by the syntactical account.38 Because of the
syntactical view’s strong commitment to empiricism, both language and syntax
are taken to be strings of symbols of finite length, as infinite strings cannot
be produced in empirical perception. Some of these strings are specified as
‘syntactic rules’ which are the rules for determining which other strings follow
from a given string. The syntactic rules are content-less but must be known
to be correct. This knowledge can only come from examining the form of the
rule, as it has no content wherein its correctness could be located. Another
consequence of having no content is that the syntactical rules can not imply
the truth or falsity of any empirical observations. This has the added benefit of
preserving the traditional a priori certainty of mathematics. The similarly tra-
ditional applicability of mathematics to natural science is also preserved by the
content–free nature of the rules. That is, because they have no content, they
can be applied to any kinds of statements whatever, including the statements of
the natural sciences. But, as we have seen, Go¨del thinks that if this view is to
be seriously entertained, then its adherents must produce a proof of the rules’
consistency, and moreover, one that does not make use of any methods that
would be rejected elsewhere in the view (e.g. no use can be made of infinitary
methods in mathematics because they have elsewhere rejected the acceptability
of constructions employing infinitely many occurrences of symbols (for exam-
ple, in an ω-rule) because they can not be completely produced in empirical
sensation).
What, then, can be said about the possibility of giving such a consistency
proof? It would seem that if a proponent of the syntactical view could pro-
duce the required proof, then quite a few of the supposed problems would be
resolved. With regard to this question, Go¨del first observes that some very fa-
miliar restrictions are going to have to be in place to make sure that the proof is
acceptable to the Logical Positivists. Namely, the proof must be finitary, both
in the syntactical rules themselves, and also in the derivation of the axioms
of mathematics from those rules.39 There can be no reference made to any
extralinguistic facts, to any sentences of infinite length or sentences whose ref-
erents it is not possible to produce in sensory intuition, and certainly not to any
‘abstract’ concepts.40 Indeed, if any abstract concepts or infinitary methods are
used, Go¨del says that the program will be turned upside down,
[. . . ] instead of clarifying the meanings of the non–finitary math-
38The mathematics can be said to be classical (as opposed to intuitionsitic) as well, though
Go¨del suspects that his argument in the paper would go through even in it was understood
as intuititionistic ([Go¨del, 1995a], p 337.
39[Go¨del, 1995a], p 341.
40In footnote 20, Go¨del give some examples of what he means by abstract and transfinite
concepts. Those he lists as abstract are ‘proof’ and ‘function’, but says that they have to
be understood a particular way, “[specifically in their] original “contensive” meaning, i.e., if
“proof” does not mean a sequence of expressions satisfying certain formal conditions, but a se-
quence of thoughts convincing to a sound mind, and if “function” does not mean an expression
of the formalism, but an understandable and precise rule associating mathematical objects
with mathematical objects (in the simplest case integers with integers)” ([Go¨del, 1995a], p
341 fn 20).
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ematical terms by explaining them in terms of syntactical rules,
non–finitary terms are [used] in order to formulate the syntactical
rules; and, instead of justifying the mathematical axioms by re-
ducing them to syntactical rules, these axioms (or at least some
of them) are necessary in order to justify the syntactical rules (as
consistent).41
Put simply, the syntactical view must avoid infinitary methods and abstract
objects on pain of circularity. It should be noted here, however, that the aim
of Go¨del’s argument has shifted in this passage. He began by trying to explain
the constraints that must be placed on any attempt at a consistency proof that
would be acceptable to the syntactical view. But, in the passage quoted above,
the focus has shifted to the possibility of justifying the syntactical rules. The
issue of justification seems to be tightly connected with the possibility of a
consistency proof in Go¨del’s mind. This is an important difference with at least
some of the adherents of the syntactical view, and I will return to it in chapter
6 below.
With this limitation on consistency proofs established, Go¨del then consid-
ers whether one could base such a proof on empirical induction. The procedure
would have to be like this: first, one would establish some syntactical conven-
tions from which once can derive mathematics. Having accomplished such a
derivation, one starts using the mathematics so produced and, if no contra-
dictions arise, then on this basis one concludes that the conventions one has
chosen are consistent. Go¨del suggests that this works roughly analogously to
the determination of empirical laws of nature.42 Indeed, he goes so far as to call
it empirical induction because of the way in which the syntactical view must
construe what is going in this procedure. That is, since the language must be
finite strings of symbols, and the rules for the manipulation of these symbols
must be known solely on the basis of their form in empirical perception, then it
might be thought that this view had been dispatched earlier on in the section
on syntax, though admittedly in a hasty fashion. However, Go¨del is at great
pains to spell out exactly why this strategy results in undesirable consequences
for someone who is committed to the syntactical view in a much more detailed
way this time by saying,
Similarly, if on the basis of its empirically known consistency C,
some mathematical convention R is added to some system S of
mathematics and empirical science, then, though not C itself, still
the empirical consistency C ′ of some slightly weaker convention will,
in general, be demonstrable in S + R. This refutes the argument
that the mathematical “conventions”, although factual knowledge
41[Go¨del, 1995a], p 342.
42[Go¨del, 1995a], p 342. For example, we know that objects accelerate due to gravity at a
rate of 9.8 meters per second squared. However, we know this (at least partially) on the basis
of repeated observations. The suggestion here is similar – we know that the conventions we
have chosen are consistent on the basis of repeated observations that no contradictions have
thus far arisen from using the mathematics we derive from them.
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about symbols may be necessary for setting them up, do not express
or imply any facts.43
That is, if one attempts to justify some set of conventions on the basis of em-
pirical induction, then one will be unable to claim that those conventions are
contentless.44 As we have noted above, if the conventions have some content
then they will lose their a priori character, and so anything that is derived from
them will be a posteriori as well. However, this is exactly what Go¨del thinks
must be the case for the conventionalist – any attempt to produce acceptable
conventions will depend on the foreknowledge of some empirical facts (for ex-
ample, at a minimum it must be known how to write down the symbols of the
language). So, if the acceptable conventions must be based on some empirical
knowledge, then they can only be taken to be a priori in that they add nothing
new to this body of knowledge.45 This in turn implies that any conventions that
a Logical Positivist might make will only be conventional relative to a certain
language or other body of knowledge. If they are only conventions relative to
some body of knowledge, Go¨del then notes that, considered apart from that
body of knowledge the conventions will likely have some kind of content.
Having laboriously laid out what exactly the syntactical view must hold –
namely that mathematics can be interpreted as the syntax of language only if
language means a formal language composed from strings of symbols of finite
length producible in empirical sensation and manipulated according to content–
less syntactical rules that are self–evidently correct in that they imply neither
the truth or falsity of any empirical statements – Go¨del closes the first section
of his paper with a discussion of why this position is untenable. He begins this
final evaluation in footnote 19, where he says,
I believe that what must be understood by “syntax”, if the syntacti-
cal program is to serve its purpose, is exactly equivalent to Hilbert’s
“finitism”, i.e., it consists of those concepts and reasoning, which are
contained within the limits of “that which is directly given in sensual
intuition” (“das unmittelbar anschaulich Gegebene”). Cf. Hilbert
1926, pp 171 – 173. The section of our knowledge thus defined is
equivalent (by a one-to-one correspondence of its objects) with re-
cursive number theory (cf. Hilbert and Bernays 1934, pp 20 – 34
and pp 307 – 346), except that it may rightly be argued (cf. Bernays
1935, p 61) that combinatorial objects with an exorbitant number
of elements or an exorbitant number of operations to be performed
must not occur in finitary considerations.46
This is to say that syntax, as it must be understood by the syntactical view, is
finitary number theory. But, if we take it this way, and put this understanding
43[Go¨del, 1995a], p 342. It is quite hard to determine precisely what Go¨del has in mind
with this argument. One plausible reading is that by adding R to S we are able to derive new
empirical consequences, in particular the empirical evidence for the consistency of C′.
44We will return to the issue of justifying the linguistic conventions on the basis of empirical
induction in sections 5.2.3 and 6.2 below.
45[Go¨del, 1995a], p 342.
46[Go¨del, 1995a], p 341.
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together with the other considerations mentioned above, then we arrive at a
position that looks worryingly like Hilbert’s Program, as Go¨del claims. This
equivalence between the finitist program and the syntactical view forms the
sharp point of his criticism of the view. There are, however, two prongs to this
critique. The first is what we have seen up until now – namely that the whole
view rests on the possibility of giving a finitistically acceptable consistency
proof. The argument can be summed in five steps:
1. If one wants to maintain the syntactical view, then one is in need of a
consistency proof.
2. In order to give a consistency proof, one must use mathematics.
3. The mathematics that one must use must be derived from stipulated
syntactical rules.
4. But, in order to derive mathematics for the consistency proof, the syn-
tactical rules must be assumed to be consistent.47
5. However, this – now assumed – consistency is exactly what was set out
to prove.
This is to say that attempts at an acceptable consistency proof will, according
to Go¨del, be viciously circular.
An aspect of this circularity argument that we have not yet explored is
the impact of the second incompleteness result. Put very simply, the second in-
completeness theorem shows that without appealing to a theory that is stronger
than the theory for which we are trying to show consistency, it is impossible
to finitistically prove the consistency of a theory that is rich enough to include
primitive recursive arithmetic.48 Since this is the case, then it will also be the
case that we must make use of either (a) stronger axioms, or (b) make use of
some infinitary methods in our consistency proof. Neither of these options will
be acceptable for a logical positivist. Option (b) has been discussed at some
length above. If one were to allow infinitary methods to be used, we will be
making use of the content of the expression, which runs counter to the require-
ment that the syntactical conventions and the mathematical rules derived from
them must be free of any content. In the case of (a), one will simply be begging
the question. That is, if one uses stronger axioms to guarantee the consistency
of the syntactical conventions, then one must also give an acceptable consis-
tency proof for the new axioms. But, this second consistency proof will be
subject to the same issues as the first was, and some appeal will have to be
made to some even more powerful axioms to show that the second group of
axioms is consistent. The picture one is left with is a kind of infinite hierarchy
47Since, as has been mentioned at several places above, if they are not consistent then every
proposition follows, including the statement of the rules’ consistency and its explicit negation.
48Go¨del mentions that it is possible to be quite precise about what ‘powerful’ means with
regard to a formal language, and offers “[. . . ] It must be possible, by means of the concepts
and axioms used in the consistency proof, to construct a ‘model’ for those proved consistent,
i.e. to define the concepts demonstrably satisfying the given axioms and not satisfying any
proposition disprovable from them” ([Go¨del, 1995a], p 345) as an example.
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of progressively more expressive languages where, as the hierarchy is generated
by inventing new languages to give consistency proofs for less expressive ones,
it will always be an open question whether the most expressive and most re-
cently created language is consistent. With this picture in mind, it is easy to
see that the best that can hoped for is a kind of conditional consistency where
the starting conventions are consistent just in case some set of stronger axioms
are. Moreover, this regress is vicious – at every level the same problem will
reoccur. As we observed above, a kind of conditional certainty is not what the
syntactical view is aiming at. This is finally the critique that Go¨del has been
aiming at: if one accepts the syntactical view then one can only have a kind of
conditional certainty that one has a consistent system of mathematics, which
is no certainty at all.
5.1.3 Who is Go¨del’s Target?
At a couple of places above we have noted that there is some ambiguity in pre-
cisely who Go¨del takes his argument to target. If we are to evaluate its effective-
ness, however, we must have a clear idea of what it is supposed to be effective
against. There are two obvious candidates: (1) Carnap, and (2) an amalga-
mation of various members of the Vienna Circle that includes at least Carnap,
Schlick, Hahn, Menger, and possibly others. It will be the aim of this short
section to determine which of these options is most likely to have been Go¨del’s
interlocutor. We will proceed primarily by examining the evidence from the var-
ious draft versions of the paper ([Go¨del, 1995a], and [Go¨del, 1995b]), though we
also look at his comments in his 1951 Gibbs Lectures ([Go¨del, 1995c]), written
around the same time and on a similar theme as the draft papers.
At the very outset of the paper, as we noted above, Go¨del says that the
target of his critique is something he calls the ‘syntactical view’, and says that
it was held by Schlick, Hahn, and Carnap. He says they held this view around
1930 under the influence of Wittgenstein.49 Given this, it seems like the obvious
answer to our question is option (2). Moreover, in an early footnote, Go¨del says,
I would like to say right here that Carnap today [i.e. in the 1950’s]
would hardly uphold the formulations I have quoted (cf. §45). More-
over some of them were only given by Hahn or Schlick, and probably
would never have been subscribed to by Carnap. However, I am not
concerned in this paper with a detailed evaluation of what Carnap
has said about the subject, but rather my purpose is to discuss the
relationship between syntax and mathematics from an angle which,
I believe, has been neglected in the publications of the subject.50
It is clear from this passage that he intends his paper to address a general posi-
tion, and that he is aware that it is possible that no individual ever subscribed
to it. Indeed, he is at pains to point out that it is possible that Carnap in par-
ticular never did. True to his word, as we have seen above, he does not engage
in any sustained exegesis of any of the philosophers who might have been the
49[Go¨del, 1995a], p 334.
50[Go¨del, 1995a], pp 335 – 336 fn 9.
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subject of his critique. However, if we examine the second half of that paper,
or the fifth draft, or even his Gibbs lectures, I argue that we find his true target
becomes plain.
Through the first 43 sections of the paper, Go¨del treats the syntactical
viewpoint as if it is one that might have been held by any number of people.
To wit, he cites several examples from various philosophers that seem to be in
sympathy with it.51 But, starting in §44, right at the end of the essay where
Go¨del is driving his point home, the focus turns exclusively to Carnap. To
wit, though Carnap is not supposed to be the single target of the paper, he is
nonetheless cited more than any other single author – in the third version of
the paper Carnap has 13 citations, the next highest is a tie between Schlick
and Hahn with 7 each. In the final sections of that version of the paper, from
section §44 to the end, Carnap is referenced five times, and none of the other
philosophers mentioned in the paper are referenced at all. In the fifth version,
the situation is even more stark; there Carnap is the only philosopher that Go¨del
mentions, either by name or by citation. Additionally, Go¨del explicitly asserts
in both versions that LSL is the most developed exposition of the syntactical
view. As he puts things in version three:
In his Logical Syntax of Language ([Carnap, 1937], pages 102 – 129)
Carnap has carried this program out.52
Version five is even more direct, as the very first sentence reads:
It is well known that Carnap has carried through, in great detail, the
conception that mathematics is syntax (or semantics) of language.53
It is only in version three that these statements are qualified somewhat, and
that Go¨del notes that there are other authors whose work falls under the syn-
tactic viewpoint as well.54 This could have gone some way towards softening
the attack, but, as we see from the number of references, Carnap is still the real
target: Ramsey is mentioned twice, Hilbert and his school three times, while
Carnap, as noted above, is mentioned or cited 13 times. From these considera-
tions, then, it seems safe to say that, despite his protestations to the contrary,
Go¨del is actually targeting Carnap, at least insofar as Go¨del perceived his work
to be the most complete version of the syntactical view.
5.2 Variations of Go¨del’s Critique
Since the publication of the third volume of the CW, a small cottage industry
has sprung up attempting to sort out to what extent, if at all, the criticism
51For example, on page 335 there is a discussion of Hahn in footnote 8, on page 338 there is
one of Menger in footnote 13, and on page 341 some of Hilberts views are treated in footnote
19. Of course, Carnap is discussed repeatedly throughout the paper; footnotes 9 and 14 are
characteristic examples.
52[Go¨del, 1995a], p 336.
53[Go¨del, 1995b], p 356.
54[Go¨del, 1995a], p 336. There he cites Ramsey as well as “much of the work of the Hilbert
school”.
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that we examined in the first section of this chapter succeed in showing that
the syntactical view of mathematics cannot be carried out as advertised. As we
observed in the introduction there are, broadly speaking, two camps: (1) those
who think that Go¨del’s critique is successful (at least in some respects), and (2)
those who do not. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to exploring
the variations of Go¨del’s attack that have been put forward by members of
the former group. We will look at four different versions. The first, due to
Michael Potter, is very similar to Go¨del’s, though he argues that considerations
around the usability of language militate against Carnap’s view. The second
comes from Gabriella Crocco, who argues that if mathematics is understood
in the way that Carnap wants, it will not be possible to give an account of
applied mathematics. The third criticism that we will examine is that due to
Patricia Blanchette, who argues in a very similar fashion to Crocco that there is
no possibility of applied mathematics on Carnap’s view. The final variation we
will examine is made by Hilary Putnam. He argues in a slightly different fashion
from the others, and claims that Carnap’s Tolerance is self-undermining.
5.2.1 Crocco’s “Go¨del, Carnap and the Fregean Heritage”
Gabriella Crocco’s paper “Go¨del, Carnap and the Fregean Heritage” is divided
into two sections. The first, which will not otherwise concern us here, is a
discussion of the extent to which both Go¨del and Carnap can be located in
the Fregean tradition. It is the second portion of Crocco’s paper that we will
spend some time examining. She begins by laying out the attitudes of both
Carnap and Go¨del with regard to foundationalism. For our current purposes,
a foundationalist project with regards to mathematics will be one in which an
attempt is made to give the basis for our belief in the theorems of mathematics.
Crocco says that Go¨del and Carnap have, “antithetical conceptions of the task
of logical analysis”.55 That is, Go¨del is, at least some of the time, engaged in a
foundationalist type project, and Carnap is very explicit that he is not.56 The
problem then, as Crocco sees it, is to analyze whether or not Go¨del is being
uncharitable in his reading of Carnap or not; if Go¨del is attempting to criticize
Carnap by saying that he fails to give a foundation for mathematics when, in
fact, he is not trying to give one, then the criticism is a kind of non sequitur.57
In order to answer this new question, Crocco again divides her discussion into
two parts. The first regards the form of Go¨del’s argument. For the sake of
brevity, I will not engage very much with her considerations here, as we have
seen the structure of the argument in some detail above. The only thing that
might be added is to note that, in Crocco’s view, Go¨del divides his argument
such that it can handle three formulations of the syntactical view. Roughly
they are: (1) the position that Go¨del claims that Schlick and Hahn held in the
early 1930’s – that mathematics could be reduced to language; (2) the view
that Go¨del attributes to Carnap in LSL – that the theorems of mathematics
can be replaced by syntactic truths; and (3) the position that Go¨del thinks
55[Crocco, 2003], p 31.
56See for example [Carnap, 1963], p 18.
57[Crocco, 2003], p 32.
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Carnap held after his turn to semantics where the truths of mathematics are
true in virtue of the semantic rules of the metalanguage.58 This analysis of the
form of the argument is likely correct, however the strategy that Go¨del adopts
with regards to each of the three formulations is essentially the same. Crocco
herself does not see significant differences between them and addresses them all
together.59
I will now turn to an examination of the more substantive second part of
Crocco’s analysis of whether or not Go¨del’s critique works. Crocco notes that,
as we saw in the first section, Go¨del set the conditions of coherence and finitism
for any satisfactory explication of language and syntax the Logical Positivist
might give.60 She then moves on to discuss six more criteria that Go¨del wants to
add to the original two. Fundamentally, as Crocco sees it, the critique revolves
around the perceived inability of a Logical Positivist to hold all eight criteria
simultaneously,
The six conditions which are listed and that could be subscribed to
by a member of the Vienna Circle cannot be satisfied simultaneously
and that suffices to refute linguistic reductionism because: “[. . . ]
only in that case [of the satisfaction of the six conditions] could a
satisfactory foundation of mathematics be given independently of
experience and without using mathematical intuition [. . . ]”.61
To be sure, such a demonstration that the Logical Positivist cannot hold all the
necessary conditions for her position at one time would be very harmful for the
viability of the view. But, it seems that one may legitimately wonder whether
or not the inability to give a foundation is actually relevant, considering that
the task that Crocco has set herself is to show that, “Go¨del does not confine
himself to repeating [. . . ] the foundationalist dogma on the necessity of giv-
ing a foundation of justification of mathematics”.62 In order for the argument
to be truly convincing, it should be the case that Go¨del points out where the
syntactical view fails on its own terms, that is not while trying to give a justifi-
cation for mathematical knowledge and the applicability of that knowledge to
the world. However, given the passage that Crocco pulls out to state Go¨del’s
goal for the paper, it appears that he is not actually able to divorce himself
from his own foundational concerns. Bluntly stated, it is a strange criticism
of a view to say that it is deficient in some way because it did not give an
58[Crocco, 2003], p 33.
59[Crocco, 2003], p 35 – 37. She does not say this explicitly, but rather simply addresses
the content of the arguments all together in section 2.4 of her paper.
60[Crocco, 2003], p 33. It should also be noted that Crocco takes it for granted that the op-
ponent for Go¨del’s essay is Carnap, where I have cast him as speaking about Logical Positivists
more generally. For clarity, Go¨del begins version 3 of his paper by speaking about Logical
Positivists generally, and later (from §43 onwards) switches to addressing Carnap specifically.
Version 5, by contrast, begins addressing Carnap and LSL directly in the first sentence.
61[Crocco, 2003], p 33. The emphasis is Crocco’s. The embedded quotation is from
[Go¨del, 1995a], p 343 (though Crocco inaccurately cites this as in volume II of the CW ).
For whatever reason, neither Go¨del nor Crocco see fit to add the original two conditions of
coherence and finitism in their sum of the supposedly mutually incompatible conditions, so
the total that they give is six.
62[Crocco, 2003], p 22.
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account it was not trying to give. However, this is not what Crocco claims is
happening in the paper. According to her, as the argument progresses, Go¨del
eliminates two of his conditions from consideration – the fourth, which is the
condition that all syntactical sentence can be known to be consistent by their
form only, and the fifth, which says that it should be the case that mathematics
can be derived from specially chosen rules of syntax.63 The effect of discarding
these two conditions, according to Crocco, is to allow Go¨del to engage with the
syntactical view on its own terms. However, I think it will become clear as we
move through her argument, that Crocco’s account does not do enough to help
Go¨del.
So, if Crocco thinks that Go¨del is not giving a foundationalist critique, what,
according to her, is he doing? First, she claims that Go¨del readily concedes that
Carnap has managed to construct a system of rules whereby we can describe
the practice of mathematics linguistically. But, she says, this replacement, if
it is really going to be an accurate description or replacement of our previous
practice, it must give the same predictive results as the old ‘intuitive’ mathe-
matics would have, especially in the area of applied mathematics.64 Otherwise
we have not faithfully replaced the old intuitions with syntactical rules, but
rather constructed a separate mathematical practice. Moreover, if we are going
to use our newly constructed conventional mathematics to, for example, build
bridges, we need to be able to trust its predictions. As Crocco puts it,
In other words the linguistic explication of mathematics should not
destroy our trust in the predictive power of mathematics. [. . . ] Us-
ing the physical theory of elastic body [sic], which can be formulated
only using a certain portion of mathematics, we can predict whether
a certain bridge, constructed according to these laws, falls down or
not. Any trust in these predictions would be unjustified if the rules
which allow us to formulate these prediction were simple conventions
without content.65
What she thinks that Go¨del is after, then, is an account of how mathematics
can be applied to the empirical world, and it is precisely this sort of account
that the syntactical view is unable to provide. She goes on to say, “We have
to justify the consistency of our rules just because we want to use them to
make predictions. An explication which will not explain this trust will just
be pragmatically inefficient because it would not explain the fruitfulness of our
mathematics and its usefulness for us”.66 But, once again, we must ask whether
this critique meets the syntactical view on its own ground. However, we will
not answer this question now, but will take up the issue in chapter 6 below.
Now, we turn our attention to a version of the problem developed by Michael
Potter.
63[Crocco, 2003], p 34.
64[Crocco, 2003], p 35.
65[Crocco, 2003], p 35.
66[Crocco, 2003], p 35 – 36. My emphasis.
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5.2.2 Potter’s Reason’s Nearest Kin
In his book Reason’s Nereast Kin, Michael Potter addresses the position that
Carnap takes in LSL in the next to last chapter. There he notes that Go¨del’s
argument depends on a “language–independent notion of empirical fact” which
Carnap would hardly accept, and so says that the argument appears to be a
non–starter.67 However, he goes on to argue that there is a way in which the
critique can come back if we consider what is required if one is to be a speaker
(or at least a competent user) of a Carnapian language.
The situation that Carnap found himself in after Go¨del’s incompleteness
proofs, as we have seen, led him to abandon the use of an effective consequence
relation in the languages he presents in LSL.68 However, a non–effective con-
sequence relation cannot be specified by a finite set of rules. So, in order for
someone to be a competent user of a language with such a consequence rela-
tion, they must be able to grasp, and apply, an infinite set of rules. Against
this, Potter first complains that any competence should be describable in finite
terms, which will be impossible in the case of a language with an infinite set of
rules. Moreover, he argues that even an appeal to an implicit grasp of the rules
will not help a Carnapian account. As he puts it,
The competence we ascribe to someone whom we credit with an im-
plicit grasp of a finite set of rules is nonetheless a finite competence:
it should be describable in finite terms. To say that the grasp is
implicit is only to recognize that someone can be unaware of the
exact limits of their own competence. If the competence in question
cannot be finitely described at all, on the other hand, it is hard to
see why it should be thought explanatory to describe it as a grasp
of a set of rules at all.69
This is all to say that languages with an noneffective consequence relation ap-
pear to be impossible for finite beings – like humans – to use. However, this is
not the deepest problem as Potter sees matters. The fundamental issue for him
is whether Carnap’s view permits an account of our grasp of linguistic meaning
at all.
As he has set things up so far, Potter thinks Carnap has a fairly stark choice
on the matter of his account of linguistic competence: either his languages have
an noneffective consequence relation, in which case just how we come to grasp
the rules of our language is unclear, or his languages have an effective conse-
quence relation, in which case speakers’ ability to say anything about the world
67See [Potter, 2002], p 270. This point was originally made by Thomas Ricketts and War-
ren Goldfarb in their [Goldfarb and Ricketts, 1992] and again in Ricketts’ [Ricketts, 1994]
(Potter notes only the latter). That such a notion helps Carnap, or that rejecting a language–
transcendent notion of empirical facts is a good reading of Carnap’s work has recently been
challenged by Matti Eklund in his [Eklund, 2010].
68Potter characterizes this maneuver by Carnap as a constraint on the types of languages
he is willing to consider ([Potter, 2002], p 274). As I will argue in chapter 6 below, this is not
an absolute constraint, but is only true if the task one sets for one’s language is to capture
all of mathematics (obviously so, since otherwise incompleteness would not pose a threat). In
this way, then, Carnap has not truly retreated from Tolernace.
69[Potter, 2002], pp 274 – 275.
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becomes a matter of experimental fact. We have already discussed the first of
these alternatives, and so will leave it aside; instead, we will focus on the second
alternative here. First, we must remember that Carnap defines the content of
a sentence to be the class of its non-analytic consequences. Next, we observe
that, at least in the case of languages which have the principle of explosion, if a
theory is inconsistent, then every sentence is an analytic consequence of every
other sentence in the theory. This means that none of the sentences refer to the
world at all, though they might have been expected to. It would seem, then,
that what is needed, if we are to be sure that the theory has synthetic sentences
in it, is a proof of its consistency. But, as we know, by Go¨del’s theorems we
cannot have this proof (in languages strong enough to be interesting). This of
course does not rule out the possibility that the theory is, in fact, consistent.
What it does rule our, according to Potter, is that we can have anything over
inductive certainty that it is. In other words, we can note that we have not yet
encountered a paradox in our theory, and on that basis we can continue to act
as if it is consistent, but this in no way tells us that we will never discover some
inconsistency.70 Potter puts the point this way,
According to Carnap there must always remain a lurking doubt that
my language might turn out inconsistent and hence not refer to the
world, a doubt which on his view I have no more than inductive
evidence to dispel. [. . . ] Even if I am capable of concieving of things
non-linguistically, I do not have any non-linguistic conception of the
empirical distinct from and set against my linguistic conception of
it. So Carnap’s view makes it an experimental fact that I have a
conception of an empirical world at all.71
To summarize, then, Potter thinks Carnap is trapped either way he goes. On the
one hand, he could select a language with a non-effective consequence relation,
which according to Tolerance he is perfectly entitled to do. However, if he does,
then he cannot give an account of our grasp of languages. If, on the other hand,
he selects a language with an effective consequence relation, again perfectly in
line with Tolerance, he gives up the possibility of (1) giving a complete account
of mathematics, and more than that also the possibility of ever having more
than empirical evidence that the language is able to refer to the world. These
consequences, Potter thinks, are devastating.
5.2.3 Blanchette and the Applicability of Carnapian Mathe-
matics
In a recent manuscript, Patricia Blanchette has offered a similar problem for
the Carnapian account of mathematics to that given by Go¨del.72 Blanchette
notes that in Go¨del’s essay, there are three grades of consistency requirements
for a framework in which to do mathematics:
70[Potter, 2002], pp 276 – 277.
71[Potter, 2002], p 277.
72Unfortunately, the manuscript itself was not available at the time of this writing. However,
Blanchette’s view was made clear in her talk [Blanchette, 2013], and she has generously given
permission for using that as a basis for my discussion of her objection.
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• The rules of the framework must be consistent, though we need not have
a proof of this fact.
• We must have good reason to believe that the rules are consistent.
• We must have a proof of the rules’ consistency.
We have already seen, in section 5.1 above, that it is impossible to satisfy
the third requirement; this much just is the critique due to Go¨del and so we
leave it aside here.73 But, what can be said of the prospects for the other two
requirements? Answering this question is the focus of her manuscript. What
Blanchette aims to show is that, by considering the applications of mathematics
in making empirical predictions, the syntactical view cannot meet either of the
other two consistency requirements either.74 On that basis, she finally concludes
that Go¨del’s arguments have shown a serious flaw in Carnap’s position.
Before discussion Blanchette’s view of the prospects of Carnap’s position
with respect to the two consistency requirements, we first pause to discuss the
role of applied mathematics in the syntactical standpoint. In section §84 of
LSL, Carnap says,
But the task [of giving a foundation for mathematics] which is thus
outlined is certainly not fulfilled by the construction of a logico-
mathematical calculus alone. For this calculus does not contain all
the sentences which contain mathematical symbols and which are
relevant for science, namely those sentences which are concerned
with the application of mathematics, i.e. synthetic descriptive sen-
tences with mathematical symbols. [. . . ] A logical foundation of
mathematics is only given when a system is built up which enables
derivations of this [applied] kind to be made.75
Here, Carnap makes it plain that the applications of mathematics in the sciences
are central to his view. As he formulates it here, a foundation for mathematics is
not given at all unless the system allows for this kind of application. For the time
being, we leave aside the details of how Carnap envisions the linkage between the
pure and applied mathematics to be made in his frameworks. Instead, we focus,
73In her talk, Blanchette notes that there could be a question as to what sort of proof
we must give. In his paper, Go¨del argues that, by Carnap’s own lights, the only acceptable
proofs will be finitary ones, which are ruled out by the incompleteness theorems. Blanchette
agrees, but notes that others in the literature, particularly Ricketts in his [Ricketts, 1994],
and Awodey and Carus in their [Awodey and Carus, 2003], are not so willing to go along on
this point. We return to this issue in chapter 6 below.
74The problematic nature of Carnap’s views about mathematics and logic on the one hand,
and his desire to apply mathematics in the sciences on the other has similarly been remarked on
by Torsten Wilholt in his [Wilholt, 2006]. Unlike Blanchette, or indeed the picture of Go¨del’s
critique that she presents in her paper, Wilholt claims that the problem of the applicability
of mathematics in the sciences was one of the motivating forces for the early logicists, and,
while Carnap claimed a kind of continuity with that tradition (as we argued in chapter 2) he
nonetheless lost sight of the problem of applications during this phase of his thinking. For
reasons that will become clear in chapter 6 below, I do not think this is correct.
75[Carnap, 1937], p 326. Original emphasis.
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as does Blanchette, on the relationship between this claim about applications
and the need for consistency.
We begin our discussion with the first possible consistency requirement,
namely that the rules of the framework be consistent. It is an appealing response
to the problem posed by the incompleteness theorems to say that there is no
need for a proof of consistency, only a need for consistency itself. However,
Blanchette notes that it is key to the possibility of applying one’s mathematics
in the sciences that one can use the mathematics to make empirical predictions.
That is, one must be able to say that a mathematical proof gives one a reason
to expect certain empirical results to occur in testing. If one does not know,
or at least have reason to believe, that one’s theory is consistent, she argues,
then one cannot take a mathematical result as a reason to expect any empirical
occurrences. That is, without the additional knowledge that the system we
are working in is consistent, why should we take the fact that a certain string
of symbols follows from some other string(s) of symbols as evidence that, to
take Go¨del’s example, a bridge will not fall down when put under a certain
load?76 Put bluntly, then, without at least evidence for believing that our
framework is consistent, there is no possibility of making use of mathematics in
the sciences. Blanchettte concludes, then, that if we are to take the applicability
of mathematics seriously, that the first consistency requirement is too weak.
Having now shown that according to Blanchette Carnap’s view cannot meet
either the first or the third possible consistency requirements, we move to the
last remaining one. The second potential requirement is that we have good
reason to believe that our framework is consistent, even though we do not have
a proof. But, absent a proof, Blanchette and Go¨del argue that the only kind of
reason we can have to believe that our framework is consistent is empirical in-
duction. But, this would mean that the claim of consistency would be grounded
in certain synthetic observations, as for example the fact that one has been us-
ing a system for some time and has not yet encountered a contradiction in it.
This, in turn, completely undermines the claim that logic and mathematics are
free stipulations. The freedom was supposed to be a result of the thought that
no empirical facts could bear on mathematical facts. Now, however, a purely
mathematical fact, namely the statement of the consistency of the framework,
is held to be true on the basis of purely empirical considerations, that is on our
experiences of working with a particular system. So, the second consistency
requirement can not be met by the Carnapian either.
Blanchette concludes that, since none of the three consistency requirements
can be satisfied by the syntactical viewpoint, that view has a serious defect. This
defect is made especially pressing given the emphasis Carnap himself places on
the applications of mathematics in resolving the apparent disagreement between
formalists and logicists.
76[Go¨del, 1995a], p 340.
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5.2.4 Putnam’s “Philosophers and Human Understanding”
The final variant of Go¨del’s critique that we will examine is due to Hilary Put-
nam. It is found in the text of his Herbert Spencer lecture entitled “Philosophers
and Human Understanding”. After some brief introductory remarks, Putnam
takes up the question of whether logical positivism is “self-refuting”.77 His pri-
mary line of attack is through trying to show that the VCM is self-refuting,
and that it is central to logical positivism. As we noted in chapter 3 above,
the Circle entertained several versions of the VCM, but in essence they all say
that a statement is meaningful just in case it is either analytic or empirically
verifiable. The version that Putnam gives in his lecture is as follows:
A statement must either be (a) analytic (logically true, or logically
false to be more precise) or (b) empirically testable, or (c) nonsense,
i.e., not a real statement at all, but only a pseudo-statement.78
Against this criterion of meaningfulness, Putnam offers a quick argument (he
calls it a “little gambit”).79 First, he invites us to wonder what the status of the
VCM is. We note that it is certainly not analytic in any obvious sense of the
word, and neither is it empirically verifiable. So, we conclude that by its own
lights it must be meaningless. But, this seems to be worse than a contradiction
– if it is meaningful then we can show that it is meaningless, and, on the other
hand, if it is meaningless then it is meaningless (obviously). Either way, then,
the VCM turns out meaningless.
The Vienna Circle was aware that there were problems with the VCM from
the very start, as we saw above. This, in part, accounts for the large number
of variations of the Criterion they considered. The version that will interest us
here – the one that Putnam calls the most interesting – is that due to Carnap.
Putnam’s comments on Carnap are contained in a footnote towards the end of
the section on the VCM. Since it is rather short, we quote it in full:
The most interesting view was that of Carnap. According to Car-
nap, all rational reconstructions are proposals. The only factual
questions concern the logical and empirical consequences of accept-
ing this or that rational reconstruction. (Carnap compared the
‘choice’ of a rational reconstruction to the choice of an engine for
an airplane.) The conclusion he drew was that in philosophy one
should be tolerant of divergent rational reconstructions. However,
this principle of tolerance, as Carnap called it, presupposes the ver-
ification principle. For the doctrine that no rational reconstruction
is uniquely correct or corresponds to the way things ‘really are’, the
doctrine that all ‘external questions’ are without cognitive sense, is
just the verification principle. To apply the principle of tolerance to
the verification principle itself would be circular.80
77[Putnam, 1983], pp 184 – 191.
78[Putnam, 1983], p 184.
79[Putnam, 1983], p 191.
80[Putnam, 1983], p 191.
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This gambit is rather densely presented, so it is worth pausing to spell out just
how it works.81 One way that Carnap might have responded, and perhaps did
in fact respond, to the argument that the VCM is meaningless presented above
is to say that requirements of this kind, i.e. those which appear to restrict which
languages are seen as legitimate, do not have the status of absolute restrictions
but are rather proposals. Since these requirements are mere proposals, Carnap
thought that we are free to adopt them or not, and it is this freedom, as
we have noted several times, that is presented in the Principle of Tolerance.
However, this freedom only makes sense, Putnam argues, if we can be certain
that there is no factual way to adjudicate between the proposals. If there
were some fact of the matter about which were correct, or tracked the way the
world actually is, then we ought choose those principles and people who chose
otherwise would simply be making wrong choices. Principles which restrict our
choice of languages must be, strictly speaking, nonsense, albeit nonsense of a
special kind. Put bluntly, then, if Carnap wants to maintain that the VCM
is a proposal via an appeal to Tolerance, his appeal is tightly circular since
Tolerance requires the VCM.
As Ricketts diagnoses matters, both Putnam’s gambit and Go¨del’s critique
rely on what Ricketts calls a “language-transcendent notion of empirical fact”.82
Part of the critical move in Go¨del’s arguments, as we saw above, is to note
that it should not be the case that a purely mathematical sentence (or set of
sentences) logically entails the truth or falsity of any empirical sentences. As
Rickett’s points out, this means that there must be some notion of what it is
to be empirical apart from whatever line between the analytic and synthetic
that is drawn by a particular language.83 Otherwise the requirement would
be trivially satisfied. Putnam argues that Carnap’s tolerance, and indeed his
whole view, is fundamentally an empiricist one. This empiricism must come
before any language, on Putnam’s reading, because otherwise there would be
no need to appeal to the VCM to justify Tolerance. In a recent paper, Matti
Eklund puts the point helpfully by saying,
What language is adopted would appear only to matter to which
propositions get expressed; the truth-values of propositions do not
change. [. . . ] What I can have is a sentence of my language, L1,
‘BLAH’, such that neither it nor its negation is true, and then I can
make changes to my language, such that ‘BLAH’ of the language
thus modified, L2, is true. 84
In other words, languages can differ on which propositions are expressible in
them. Whether a proposition has a truth-value at all, however, is not a matter
that is settled at the level of language. Indeed, both Eklund and Putnam find
it completely implausible that language has a role to play in assigning truth-
values to propositions. But this just is the insistence that there must be some
81Here, I follow the discussion of this argument given at [Ricketts, 1994], p 178.
82[Ricketts, 1994], p 180.
83[Ricketts, 1994], p 180. We will return to this point in chapter 6 below.
84[Eklund, 2010], p 8.
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fact of the matter beyond language about what truth-values propositions have,
or which way the world is.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined several interrelated criticisms of Carnap’s
view. Very broadly construed, our task has been divided into two parts: in the
first we directly examine the critique of Carnap, while in the second we analyze
the strategy of the critique and argue that they all proceed in a similar manner.
Most of the time was spent detailing the version due to Kurt Go¨del. We saw
how he played Carnap’s empiricism off against his view that there is no uniquely
correct logic (or mathematics) because these arose as the analytic portion of
a freely stipulated language. In order to maintain a separation between the
analytic and synthetic portions of the language, Go¨del argued that the rules
of the language must be known to be consistent; otherwise they would entail
every sentence and so there would be no synthetic sentences at all. In the second
version we examined, due to Patricia Blanchette, we examined a way to twist
the claim that mathematics is just the analytic portion of the language the other
way from Go¨del’s version. That is, we showed that on the assumption that one
could have a purely syntactical and content-less account of mathematics after
all, one could no longer give an account of the applications of mathematics in the
natural sciences or in any other synthetic discourse. In short, the problem was
that if mathematics is to be content-free, then it cannot refer to the world (or to
any other domain of objects). But, any sentence of applied mathematics must so
refer, otherwise it would not be applied! So, on the syntactical account, we are
either forced to say that those contentful sentences are either not mathematical,
which sounds very bad, or that there is no such thing as applied mathematics,
which sounds even worse. The third version we examined was Hilary Putnam’s.
His ‘gambit’ purported to show that Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance could not
be maintained without an appeal to the Verification Criteria for Meaning. The
VCM, he argued, was self undermining, and so Tolerance too is undermined.
In the second of the two projects from this chapter, we examined the vari-
ants of that critique. In the case of both Go¨del’s and Putnam’s critiques, we
argued that a notion of empirical fact that was independent of language was
required. This notion will play a critical role in our assessment of the success
of their attack on Carnap in chapter 6 below. In the case of Crocco, Potter,
and Blanchette’s versions, no such notion of extralinguistic fact is required.
Instead, they all rely on considerations of what it might be like to apply, or
to use, a Carnapian language to drive their worries. As I will argue at length
in the next, and final chapter, all four of these arguments misunderstand, and
fundamentally underestimate, the role that the Principle of Tolerance played
in Carnap’s thinking.
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Chapter 6
On Tolerance
We begin this final chapter with a short review of what has happened so far.
The first four chapters were concerned with spelling out Carnap’s account of
logic and mathematics in LSL, along with the historical background of how he
came to hold that view. To that end, we examined two strains of influences: the
Frege/Russell logicist tradition on the one hand, and the Wittgenstinnian early
Circle on the other. In chapter five, we began the second part of the thesis, and
examined a family of critiques of Carnap’s view. There we showed that, while
each had a slightly different focus, they nonetheless shared certain similarities.
This chapter is the second half of that project. In it, we show how this family of
critiques can be answered by Carnap. This answer will depend on a particular
reading of the Principle of Tolerance, which distinguishes between two potential
interpretations of the Principle – a ‘wide’ interpretation and a ‘narrow’ one –
and argues that the wide interpretation is the one closest to Carnap’s intent.
The chapter will proceed in two parts. In the first, I will set out my reading
of the Principle of Tolerance. I will argue that the ‘wide’ reading should be
interpreted as the correct one, and defend it from a revenge worry due to
Michael Friedman. The second part will be focused on how wide Tolerance
can answer the problems we posed in chapter 5 for Carnap’s overall picture of
logic and mathematics, with some time devoted to each of the critiques. Put
briefly, my argument will be that each of these criticisms underestimates just
how wide Carnap intended the Principle of Tolerance to be. At the end of the
chapter, I will pause to give some reflections on why settling this debate about
Carnap’s conventionalism matters from a larger perspective.
6.1 The Principle of Tolerance
In this section, we return to the question of the proper interpretation of the
Principle of Tolerance. In chapter 4 above we distinguished two versions of
the Principle which we labeled ‘wide’ and ‘narrow’. According to the narrow
version, languages can be constructed in any way we see fit, but they are sub-
ject to certain high level restrictions. These might include a commitment to
consistency, or to their being a meaningful distinction between the analytic and
synthetic sentences in the language (e.g. that the analytic sentences are “true
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in virtue of meaning”, or alternatively that neither of these categories can be
empty), or the requirement that there be an (at least possible) user of the pro-
posed language. As we will see below, this narrow interpretation of Carnap’s
Tolerance has been common, but is mistaken. The second, wider reading of
the Principle is one whereby there are no constraints whatsoever on the con-
struction of languages. One is just as free to propose inconsistent languages as
consistent ones, and correspondingly with any of the other high level restric-
tions that a proponent of the narrow version of tolerance might favor. This is,
obviously, an extremely radical thesis, and attributing it to Carnap will require
careful argumentation. We will proceed by marshaling textual evidence from
LSL to show that the wide interpretation of the Principle makes the best sense
of what he says in the book. I will then turn to addressing the various critiques
from chapter 5 above. We will show that, in each case, either wide Tolerance
solves the problem, or that there was no problem to begin with in virtue of the
wide reading of the Principle.
6.1.1 Tolerances: Wide and Narrow
In this section, we distinguish two readings of the Principle of Tolerance. The
first, which I will argue has been the more common of the two, I call the
‘narrow’ reading. According to it, when Carnap says that there are “no morals
in logic”, he does not mean that all bets are off, so to speak.1 Rather, he
means that anyone is free to propose a formal system for mathematics, which
is adequate for actually doing mathematics by the lights of certain very high
level restrictions.2 We will show that, despite the popularity of this reading, it
is nonetheless mistaken.3 Our strategy will focus on the textual evidence from
LSL, and I will conclude from this evidence that Carnap is committed to the
wide understanding of Tolerance.
As we have noted several times above, Carnap is often bold in his writing.
Nowhere is this tendency more apparent than in his discussions of the Principle
of Tolerance. While its formulation, given in section §17 of LSL, is dramatic, it
is eclipsed entirely by what he says in the introduction. For example, he says,
For language, in its mathematical form, can be constructed accord-
ing to the preferences of any one of the points of view represented; so
that no question of justification arises at all, but only the question
of the syntactical consequences to which one or other of the choices
leads, including the question of non-contradiction.4
1[Carnap, 1937], p 52.
2There is nothing special about taking mathematics as an example; in his introduction,
Carnap says “The standpoint we have suggested [. . . ] relates not only to mathematics, but
to all questions of logic”, and moreover, in the first section of the book proper, he says, “The
method of syntax which will be developed in the following pages will not only prove useful
in the logical analysis of scientific theories – it will also help in the logical analysis of the
word-languages” (See [Carnap, 1937], p xv and p 8, respectively. Original emphasis).
3Examples of philosophers who have maintained, albeit mostly implicitly, the narrow read-
ing include those mentioned with chapter 5 along with Michael Friedman, at least in his
[Friedman, 2001], as I will show below.
4[Carnap, 1937], p xv. The comment about “points of view represented” is in reference to
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Here, there is an explicit denial that there are any constraints on language con-
struction. It is a very strong statement indeed, as he even gives up consistency
as a necessary condition on a language in order for it to be considered. More-
over, there is a denial that one must justify one’s choices. The only thing that
Carnap says is relevant to the evaluation of languages, at least here, is the con-
sequences to which accepting various candidate languages leads. He is clearer
on the point about justification just before the above quotation. He says,
The fact that no attempts have been made to venture still further
from the classical forms is perhaps due to the widely held opinion
that any such deviations must be justified – that is, that the new
language-form must be proved to be ‘correct’ and to constitute a
faithful rendering of ‘the true logic’.
To eliminate this standpoint, together with the pseudo-problems
and wearisome controversies which arise as a result of it, is one of
the chief tasks of this book. In it, the view will be maintained that
we have in every respect complete liberty with regard to the forms
of language; that both the forms of the construction for sentences
and the rules of transformation (the latter are usually designated
as “postulates” and “rules of inference”) may be chosen quite arbi-
trarily.5
So, according to Carnap, there is no need for a proof of a proposed languages’
adequacy. That is, we can suggest any language we wish for a task – “we have
complete liberty in every respect” – and neither our proposed languages or our
eventual choice need be provably ‘correct’, whatever the salient standard of
correctness happens to be. The final bit of text we should look at to begin with
is part of the statement of the principle itself, namely the comment that,
In logic there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his
own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is
required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his
methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical
arguments.6
Though it comes a fair way into the book, at least in comparison to the quota-
tions from the introduction, it is nonetheless of a piece with the tone of those
early passages. What is key to our present task is again the emphasis on liberty
and freedom from restrictions on which languages get proposed. Even the last
clause – “all that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must
state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical
arguments” – is phrased in terms of a task. That is, it is only in the case that
one wants to discuss one’s form of logic that this condition applies; even the
need to give syntactical rules is not an absolute. However, we must be cautious
views in the foundations of mathematics. Later (in sections §16 and §16a) it becomes clear
that he has intuitionism and Wittgenstein’s views on identity in mathematics in mind.
5[Carnap, 1937], pp xiv – xv.
6[Carnap, 1937], p 52. Original emphasis.
110
against reading too much into the rhetoric of the introduction, and the early
parts of the book. As has been noted before, it was a tendency in the Circle for
their rhetoric to run ahead of their arguments or results. So, we now turn again
to the details of Carnap’s behavior in LSL. We will examine two episodes from
the book: his treatment of intuitionism, and his consistency proof for Language
II. These are all examples of the use that he makes of the Principle. In each
case, we will examine a slightly different aspect of Carnap putting Tolerance to
work.
The first example of Carnap’s use of the Principle that we will examine is
his discussion of intuitionism. This discussion comes in section §16 of the book,
and runs for only a few pages (from midway down p 46 to midway down p 49).
He begins by expressing frustration that no one has given a formal treatment
of the intuitionistic view, and indeed that some of the intuitionists see the task
of giving a formalism as unnecessary.7 About this state of affairs, Carnap says,
Once the fact is realized that all pros and cons of the Intuitionist
discussions are concerned with the forms of a calculus, questions
will no longer be put in the form: “What is this or that like?” but
instead we shall ask: “How do we wish to arrange this or that in the
language to be constructed?” or, from the theoretical standpoint:
“What consequences will ensue if we construct a language in this or
that way?”.8
Of course, this “realization” just is the Principle of Tolerance applied to the
debate between intuitionists and classical logicians. That is to say, since the
intuitionists have not yet produced a formal treatment of their view, or at least
not one that Carnap deems adequate for discussion, then for the purposes of
determining which language should form the basis of our mathematical reason-
ing, or which logical principles can be accepted in our mathematical practice,
we are free to make precise their claims in any way we think fit. Carnap puts
the point this way,:
It is in order to exclude [indirect proofs which lead] to an unlimited,
non-constructive existential sentence that Brouwer renounces the so-
called Law of the Excluded Middle. The language-form of I, however,
shows that the same result can be achieved by other methods –
namely, by means of the exclusion of the unlimited operators. [. . . ]
Thus Language I fulfills the fundamental conditions of Intuitionism
in a simpler way than the form of language suggested by Brouwer
(and partially carried out by Heyting).9
The way to adjudicate between the various proposals, just as the Principle says
it should be, is by comparing their pragmatic features. In this case Carnap
7Carnap does note Heyting’s book as an interesting first attempt, though does not have
more to say about it than that at this stage of the book ([Carnap, 1937], p 46). When he takes
the issue up again, however, he complains that Heyting’s formalization is inadequate because
the distinction between object-language and syntax-language is not drawn ([Carnap, 1937],
pp 249 – 250).
8[Carnap, 1937], pp 46 – 47. Original emphasis.
9[Carnap, 1937], p 48. Original emphasis.
111
thinks that Language I achieves the same aims as the language that Heyting
proposes as a formalization of Brouwer’s philosophical view, but it does so in
a simpler way. On that basis, and only on that basis, is it to be preferred.
Returning to the question of the proper interpretation of the Principle of Tol-
erance, what stands out about Carnap’s treatment of intuitionism in LSL is its
early placement in the book. Though it comes before the formal statement of
the Principle, it serves to set the stage for that statement.10 His discussion is,
in that way, a case study in how to act in accordance with Tolerance. That
is, instead of engaging with debates over the nature of negation, or of whether
quantification is restricted or not, instead he gives rules and argues for them
on the basis of the consequences of their adoption. Another part of LSL that
helps make clear the way in which Carnap understood the Principle is his pur-
ported consistency proof, which we examine next. However, before moving to
the question of consistency, we pause briefly to discuss what it is, exactly, that
Carnap is tolerant of.
As we saw above, Carnap’s reconstruction of the intuitionist position is a
drastic departure from anything that Brouwer would have accepted. In the
first instance, Carnap’s focus on formalizations in a language is antithetical
to Brouwer’s perspective.11 Moreover, Carnap shows no hesitation in ignoring
Brouwer’s view:
We hold that the problems dealt with by Intuitionism can be exactly
formulated only by means of the construction of a calculus, and that
all the non-formal discussions are to be regarded merely as more or
less vague preliminaries to such a construction.12
This dismissal of non-formal discussion before the construction of a linguistic
framework is at the heart of the Principle. It is what Carnap means when
he says that one must “[. . . ] give syntactical rules instead of philosophical ar-
guments” in his statement of Tolerance.13 In other words, what the Principle
enjoins us to be tolerant of is precisely formulated languages which are proposed
for adoption, and not any philosophical justifications for those proposals. As
we noted above, in the absence of a proposed formal language, these philosoph-
ical considerations will be completely superfluous on Carnap’s view, because it
will not be clear what position they support. Carnap shows this implicitly by
producing a linguistic framework, namely Language I, which he claims captures
the spirit of intuitionism, despite its obvious departures from the philosophical
claims that Brouwer makes.14 With this in mind, we now turn to Carnap’s
discussions of consistency.
Carnap addresses the question of consistency several times in LSL. The first
two times, as we have already seen, are in the introduction. There, he dismisses
10In the fist edition, the statement of the Principle comes in the very next section. For
the second edition, Carnap inserted a short part, section §16a, on Wittgenstein’s theory of
identity.
11See [Mancosu, 1998], p 2.
12[Carnap, 1937], p 46.
13[Carnap, 1937], p 52.
14For example, the Law of the Excluded middle is valid in I, while rejected by Brouwer. See
[Carnap, 1937], p 48 and p 34 Theorem 13.2.
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the worry that allowing a language to represent its own syntax will result in
contradiction as well as the demand that a proposed language be consistent
in order to be considered for adoption. Despite this early dismissal, Carnap
nonetheless offers a proof of the consistency of Language II (in §34i). Addi-
tionally, he remarks again on the issue in the section of the book on “General
Syntax” (§59). We will largely constrain our discussion to the earlier section
§34i because the two sections are very similar, though we will comment some-
what on §59 as well.
The proof that Carnap gives for Language II is somewhat laborious, and we
will not be particularly concerned to cover the details. For our purposes, it will
suffice to summarize the strategy. In broad strokes, what Carnap shows is that
every demonstrable (in his idiom, provable in ours) sentence of II is analytic.
Crucially, as we saw in chapter 4 above, the converse is not true, though he
does not give a proof of this fact at this stage of the book.15 Rather, at this
point he confines himself to showing that there is a single sentence, ¬(0 = 0),
that is not demonstrable in II.16 It then follows that no two sentences of the
forms S1 and ¬S1 are demonstrable in II, for if they were then so would ¬N.
What is more interesting than the details of this proof from our perspective is
Carnap’s comments after the proof on the relationship between the result he has
and Hilbert’s program. After a few remarks to the effect that his term ‘definite
syntactical concepts’ is approximately equivalent to Hilbert’s ‘proof with finite
means’, he says,
Whether with such a restriction [to the use of only definite syntac-
tical concepts in a consistency proof for classical mathematics], or
anything like it, Hilbert’s aim can be achieved at all, must be re-
garded as at best very doubtful in view of Go¨del’s researches on the
subject (see §36). [. . . ] The proof we have just given of the non-
contradictoriness of Language II, in which classical mathematics is
included, by no means represents a solution to Hilbert’s problem.
Our proof is essentially dependent upon the use of such syntactical
terms as ‘analytic’, which are indefinite to a high degree, and which,
in addition, go beyond the resources at the disposal of Language II.
[. . . ] Even if [our proof] contains no formal errors, it gives us no ab-
solute certainty that contradictions in the object-language II cannot
arise. For, since the proof is carried out in a syntax-language which
has richer resources than Language II, we are in no wise guaranteed
against the appearance of contradictions in this syntax-language, and
thus in our proof.17
15This becomes obvious only later in section §36, where he gives his version of Go¨del’s proof.
See [Carnap, 1937], pp 131 – 134.
16The sentences (0 = 0) and ¬(0 = 0) play a special role in LSL. To mark this special
status, Carnap gives them the special symbols N and ¬N respectively. Every sentence in II
can, by means of the rules of reduction, be transformed into one or the other of them (see
[Carnap, 1937], p 102.). There is a sense in which they are akin to the True and the False
in Frege’s thinking in that every true sentence (or analytic sentence in II since the terms will
coincide) is reduced to N, while every false sentence (or contradictory in II) is reduced to ¬N.
17[Carnap, 1937], p 129. My emphasis.
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Though he does not make the connection explicit here, the last sentence of
this quotation is critical to our understanding of Tolerance. One of the tasks
that Carnap set himself was to show that all of classical mathematics – that is
analysis – can be represented in Language II, and that it does not contain any
contradictions. This he has managed to do, as the proof shows. However, as he
comments in the quotation, in order to effect the proof he has had to make use of
resources that go beyond those available in II, namely the concepts ‘analytic-in-
II’ and ‘consequence-in-II’ which are both indefinite in II as we noted in chapter
4.18 In the proof, however, these concepts are used in the metalanguage where
they may very well be definite.19 What attracts our attention now, however,
is both his frank admission of this fact, as well as his total lack of apparent
concern over the effect that it has on the status of the proof. Were we to
have concerns about whether or not the proof is good, then we are free to
construct a third language which is capable of serving as a metalanguage for
the metalanguage for II, and then to carry out a similar proof of the consistency
of II’s metalanguage in it. This will have the same character as our original
consistency proof, namely that it does not guarantee us against paradox in the
theory in which we conduct the proof. What must lay behind Carnap’s rather
laissez faire attitude towards consistency proofs is, I claim, wide Tolerance.
The Principle of Tolerance, on either the wide or the narrow interpretation,
already licenses Carnap’s dismissal of foundational concerns. That is, the worry
that our proof does not guarantee absolute consistency, but only consistency
relative to some other theory, has no bite for him because leaving aside such de-
mands for absolutes is just what the Principle enjoins us to do. However, what
we see in the above quotation is not simply Carnap’s anti-foundationalism,
but the thorough going nature of his understanding of Tolerance. Were he to
intend the Principle to be construed narrowly, then instead of giving a consis-
tency proof in the straightforward manner that he does we would expect him
to abandon his efforts entirely, since the proof is, at best, question begging.
However, since he does not give up, we should conclude that the narrow read-
ing cannot be the intended one. Recall that, for Carnap, statements about
which language to choose can only be evaluated relative to a stated goal. So,
if our goal is to show that our object-language is consistent, then we need to
construct a syntax-language with the appropriate resources (as, for example,
being able to express the concept “analytic-in-I”). This point generalizes, and
choice of task will have consequences for the way in which we should construct
the syntax-language. Carnap puts the point directly himself in section §45:
Our attitude towards the question of indefinite terms conforms to
the principle of tolerance; in constructing a language we can either
exclude such terms (as we have done in Language I) or admit them
(as in Language II). It is a matter to be decided by convention.
18In fact, a result of Gentzen’s, proved a few years after the publication of LSL, showed that
talk of the ‘strength’ of a language is rather imprecise. See [Gentzen, 1936] where he gives a
strength measure by the least ordinal needed for induction in the language.
19Of course, the metalanguage for II (which we may as well call III) will have corresponding
concepts which are indefinite in it. We know, for example, that the concept ‘analytic-in-III’
will be indefinite in III for reasons analogous to those we gave for II in chapter 4.
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If we admit indefinite terms, then strict attention must be paid
to the distinction between them and the definite terms; especially
when it is a question of resolubility. Now this holds equally for
the terms of syntax. [. . . ] Some important terms of the syntax of
transformations are, however, indefinite (in general) [. . . ]. If we wish
to introduce these [indefinite] terms also, we must use an indefinite
syntax-language (such as Language II).20
So, as with the object-language, there are no morals at the meta-linguistic level
either. That is, we are free to construct our syntax-language in any way we
see fit, with the recognition that some ways of doing so will fare ‘better’ than
others for particular tasks.
So, as we have seen, Carnap not only intended for Tolerance to apply at
the object level, but at the level of syntax-languages as well. We conclude
our discussion of wide Tolerance by noting Carnap’s closing comments in the
introduction to LSL,
The first attempts to cast the ship of logic off from the terra firma of
the classical forms were certainly bold ones, considered from the his-
torical point of view. But they were hampered by the striving after
‘correctness’. Now, however, that impediment has been overcome,
and before us lies the boundless ocean of possibilities.21
Here, again, there is no mention of any constraints on Tolerance. Instead, there
is a bold declaration that the obstacle of correctness has been ‘overcome’.22 So,
we see that the ocean of possibilities is boundless in two ways: both at the level
of choices of object-language and at the level of the choice of syntax-language.
Before we can use this understanding of Tolerance, which I dubbed the wide
reading above, to resolve the criticisms discussed in chapter 5, however, we must
first address the worry that this very understanding itself undermines Carnap’s
view.
6.1.2 Metalevel Tolerance and Friedman’s Revenge
In his 1991 paper “Tolerance and Analyticty in Carnap’s Philosophy of Mathe-
matics”, Michael Friedman develops a reading of Tolerance that is in many ways
similar to the interpretation I gave in the previous section. On his interpretation
of the Principle, there are no constraints on the proposing of a language. We
are just as free to accept a language in which our background logic is construc-
tivist as we are to accept one with a classical logic in the background. However,
the difference between our interpretations becomes stark when one considers
how we might choose between proposed languages. Carnap tells us that, where
before we might have philosophical arguments that one language correctly cap-
tures the nature of a concept (as, for example, logical consequence), when we
20[Carnap, 1937], pp 165 – 166. My emphasis. Friedman makes a similar point in his
[Friedman, 2001], p 227
21[Carnap, 1937], p xv.
22This is the same word – ‘u¨berwindung’ in the German original – that Carnap uses with
regard to metaphysics in the title of “OM”.
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adopt the Tolerant standpoint we see that these debates are vexed, and that our
task really consists in determining the consequences of adopting the proposed
languages. Once we have determined what these consequences are, we are in a
position to make a purely pragmatic choice between the proposals.23 However,
things are not so easy when we get down to the details of what ‘determining the
consequences of adopting a proposed language’ amounts to. In this subsection,
we take up Friedman’s worry. We will show that it does not damage Carnap’s
position as long as he is understood in the way I have suggested.
Let us suppose that one wants to follow Carnap’s advice and determine
which of these two logico-mathematical systems are best for formalizing the
language of science, intuitionist or classical. Presumably, in order to establish
an answer to this question, we will have to construct a suitable syntax-language
which can express all the necessary concepts for both languages; that is, we will
need a neutral place to stand so that we can judge the consequences of each of
the proposals. However, as Friedman notes,
In giving a metatheoretical description of [the language of classi-
cal mathematics], we therefore need a metalanguage even stronger
than the language of classical mathematics itself (containing, in ef-
fect, classical mathematics plus a truth-definition for classical math-
ematics). And we need this strong metalanguage, not to prove the
consistency of the classical linguistic framework in question, but
to simply describe and define this framework in the first place so
that questions about the consequences of adopting it (including the
question of consistency) can then be systematically investigated.24
That is, for all the reasons we have noted above, and in chapter 3, the syntax-
language for the language of classical mathematics will have to include the
resources to define concepts like “analytic-in-L” and “consequence-in-L” (where
L is the language in question). This means, however, that the metalanguage
we construct to judge between the intuitionist proposal and the classical one
– to wit, the supposedly neutral syntax-language – is committed to resources
that the intuitionist would reject. So, the goal of stepping back from the first
order dispute over which logic to use into a metalanguage from which we can
investigate the consequences of adopting each proposal without prejudging the
issue appears doomed. In Friedman’s words,
In order to apply the principle of tolerance, we must view [the] choice
[between an intuitionist language and a classical one] as a purely
pragmatic decision about “linguistic forms” having no ontological
implications about “facts” or “objects” in the world. [. . . ] Ac-
cordingly, we must view the logico-mathematical rules in question,
in both linguistic frameworks, as sets of purely analytic sentences.
Given Carnap’s own explication of the distinctions between logical
and descriptive terms, analytic and synthetic sentences, however, we
must have already adopted the classical logico-mathematical rules in
23For a characteristic example, see [Carnap, 1937], pp 46 – 47.
24[Friedman, 2001], pp 242 – 243.
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the metalanguage. Thus, to understand the choice between classical
and intuitionistic logico-mathematical rules in accordance with the
principle of tolerance, we must have already built the former logico-
mathematical rules into our background syntactic metaframework.
We must have already biased the choice against the intuitionist in
the very way we set up the problem.25
Because of the inability to neutrally frame the decision between classical and
intuitionistic mathematics, Friedman concludes that the principle of tolerance
is self undermining in this case. There is an obvious route of escape for Carnap,
which we briefly consider next, before turning to my own solution.
A possibility that Friedman suggests might be available to Carnap is to
adopt a weaker, intuitionistically acceptable metalanguage, for example one
that excludes unlimited universal quantification, instead of the full-blooded
classical one we used above. A bit further on in his paper he considers this
option, but ultimately, and correctly in my view, finds it lacking as well. While
it will allow for the exploration of the consequences of adopting the two com-
peting frameworks without prejudice to one over the other, what he says it will
not do is allow for a “[. . . ] sharp contrast between merely pragmatic questions
of ‘linguistic form’ having no ontological import, on the one side, and genuine
theoretical claims, on the other”.26 To see why this is the case, it is helpful to
recall the reason we adopted the full strength of classical mathematics in the
metalanguage in the first place, namely to be able to make use of indefinite
notions like analyticity. These notions are what serve to mark the distinction
between the genuine theoretical questions, and those which are settled by con-
vention. So, if we adopt a metalanguage which is too weak to characterize such
notions, then while we might get the intuitionist back into the game, so to
speak, we lose the ability demarcate the boundaries of the field of play.
Friedman thinks that the tension his argument reveals in Carnap’s Tolerance
is ultimately fatal to the program in LSL.27 However, I contend that he has
not applied the Principle correctly in the argument we have just laid out. In
particular, he has neglected to note a shift in the salient task that is critical to
seeing that Tolerance is in no way undermined by the use of intuitionistically
unacceptable resources in the metalanguage. Recall that for Carnap languages
are evaluated relative to a particular task. So, in the paradigm case, if our
concern is to give a logical foundation for classical mathematics, then we ought
pick a language which embraces non-constructive proof techniques. Conversely,
if we are concerned to ensure that we can decide for each numerical predicate
25[Friedman, 2001], pp 242 – 243.
26[Friedman, 2001], p 244. Original emphasis.
27[Friedman, 2001], p 244. Additionally, Friedman notes that Carnap’s championing of
formal logical methodology in philosophy led, rather tragically, to the widespread opinion that
his overall philosophical project – the transformation of philosophical problems into purely
pragmatic choices in language planning – is a failure. Though we disagree over the effect that
(at least some of) the criticisms leveled at Carnap’s view have on it, about which more will be
said in section 6.2 below, I agree with Friedman that Carnap is widely dismissed in virtue of
them in contemporary analytic philosophy. This is an issue which I will return to in section
6.3 below.
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whether it applies to a given number or not, then we ought pick a language
which is constructed along the lines of Carnap’s Language I. Returning to the
case at hand, that is, to deciding between classical and intuitionist mathematics,
what we will need to do is to construct a language that allows us to investigate
the consequences of adopting each proposed language for mathematics without
prejudging the issue. The metalanguage so constructed need not be the same
one in which we might, for example, investigate whether the object-theories are
consistent. This is because the task at hand has changed. As we noted above,
Tolerance runs all the way up the linguistic hierarchy on the wide reading, and
therefore so does task relativity. Friedman’s argument assumes that there needs
to be a single metalanguage, chosen once and for all; for him, it not only serves
as a place to stand when considering questions about a particular language, it
is also supposed to simultaneously be a perspective from which we adjudicate
all disputes over the form that a language should take. But, this insistence on
a single metalanguage for these disparate tasks is a kind of absolutism that is
at odds with Tolerance.28
There is another way in which Friedman’s argument does not hit its mark.
As he points out, there must be a single metalanguage from which we prove facts
about our object-language(s), as for example their completeness or their con-
sistency. This metalanguage must have certain resources in order for the proofs
to go through, as we have noted several times. We then use the results of this
investigation of these languages in order to come to a determination of which
of the two to adopt as the language of our first-order mathematical theorizing.
Friedman claims that this prejudices the decision of which object-language to
adopt because we have made essential use of resources in the metalanguage
that the proponent of intuitionism must not accept as valid. It is this last step
that is problematic from Carnap’s perspective; it relies on a notion of validity
simpliciter which he rejects. On Carnap’s picture, inferences are only valid (or
invalid) relative to a particular language, and so the fact that one treats an
inference as valid in one language does not entail that one must treat it as valid
in every language. Though this point is obvious in the case of different object-
languages, as the case at hand of classical and intuitionistic logics illustrates, it
is somewhat more subtle when examining the case of an object-language and its
metalanguage. However, Carnap’s view is that metalanguages are constructed
in just the same way as object-languages are. This means, as we emphasized
above, that just as with object-languages, the validity of inferences in metalan-
guages are language relative. So, accepting certain inferences for the task of
investigating the consequences of adopting a language does not thereby commit
one to the unlimited validity of those inferences. That is, the intuitionistically
inclined Carnapian can still entertain the notion that inferences like double
negation elimination and unrestricted universal quantification are invalid in our
mathematical reasoning quite independently of accepting them for investigating
the consequences of rejecting those inferences on our mathematical practice.
In this section, we have developed a reading of Carnap’s Tolerance which we
dubbed the ‘wide’ reading. According to it, as I argued, there are no constraints
28Creath makes a similar point in his [Creath, 1991].
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whatsoever on the construction of languages, and therefore no constraints on
what languages we can consider as potential languages to adopt for formalizing
some practice. We showed that this wide reading is the most plausible way to
understand Carnap’s intended meaning for the Principle of Tolerance. Finally,
we turned our attention to a worry raised by Michael Friedman, namely that
Tolerance is self-undermining due to the prejudicial nature of the metalinguistic
considerations necessary to assess proposed linguistic frameworks. However, I
argued that this worry misses its mark because it fails to appreciate just how
through going Carnap’s Tolerance really is, to wit, in precisely the way that
the wide reading makes clear.29 It was essential to detail the failure of this
line of criticism of my reading of Carnap before moving to the main critiques
because otherwise my answer would have simply reintroduced the problem,
albeit slightly farther up the linguistic hierarchy. With this problem out of the
way, however, we return our attention in the remainder of this chapter to the
other criticisms of Tolerance which were raised in chapter 5 above.
6.2 Arguments from Incompleteness Revisited
Throughout this thesis, up until the previous section, I have claimed that a
particular reading of the Principle of Tolerance can help Carnap avoid certain
criticisms of his view. In the section just above, I developed the ‘wide’ reading
of Tolerance, and argued that it is the most faithful to Carnap’s intent. In this
section, I make good on the other half of the promise, and it will be our task to
make clear, in the case of each of the criticisms considered in chapter 5 above,
how the wide reading of Tolerance does the work of forestalling the apparent
problems. There will be, broadly speaking, two strategies employed. The first
strategy will be to show that in virtue of the way the Principle is written, the
objection is simply based in a misunderstanding of Carnap. The second will
mirror the approach I took above with Friedman’s revenge-style objection, that
is, I will point out that the objector has failed to read the Principle of Tolerance
in the wide way, and detail the way in which reading it in that fashion prevents
the objection from hitting its target. We will conclude, then, that Carnap’s
position is safe from worries centered on the Principle.
6.2.1 Potter, Crocco, Blanchette, and the Applicability Objec-
tion
In their two critiques of Carnap, which we examined in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.3,
we saw that Crocco and Blanchette both think that considerations which run
along the lines that Go¨del advanced show that mathematics, if conceived of in
Carnap’s fashion, cannot be applied. Before we move to addressing this problem
head on, we will first give a brief reminder of Carnap’s view of mathematics.
Then, we will note why the failure of applications of mathematics would be a
problem for Carnap’s view. Finally, we will argue that this problem is based
29A similar response to an earlier work of Friedman’s ([Friedman, 1988]) was made by Devidi
and Solomon in their [Devidi and Solomon, 1995].
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in a misunderstanding of Carnap’s view, which will be brought out by some of
his comments on the supposed opposition between logicism and formalism.
As Carnap casts matters in the IA, one of the principles he took from his
study of Frege is that both logic and mathematics (or, logic in the narrower and
in the wider senses, respectively) are analytic.30 It arises as a kind of ‘formal
auxiliary’ of the rules we lay down for the language in question. As Carnap
puts the point in his essay “Formal and Factual Science”,
All of logic including mathematics, considered from the point of view
of the total language [of science], is thus no more than an auxiliary
calculus for dealing with synthetic statements. Formal science has
no independent significance, but is an auxiliary component [of the
total language] introduced for technical reasons in order to facilitate
linguistic transformations in the factual sciences.31
What Carnap means by saying that logic is merely a ‘formal auxiliary’ is simply
that it arises as a kind of byproduct of the rules of a language. But, as we saw,
the problem with this view arises when we consider just how the transformation
of factual sentences is supposed to happen. The worry, put bluntly, is that if
all of mathematics is supposed to be analytic, then there cannot be any applied
mathematics, since, at least on the view that Crocco and Blanchette offer, what
it is to be applied is to have some synthetic component. By Carnap’s lights, if
there is a synthetic component to a sentence, then the whole of the sentence is
synthetic, and would therefore not be mathematical, properly speaking.32 But
if, as we have just seen, the purpose of including the formal sciences in the total
language is to facilitate our factual sciences, as Carnap claims in the quotation
above, then it seems that his position is untenable. The solution to this worry
is found in the way he treats the relationship between the purely logical portion
of the language, and the total language.
In section §84 of LSL, entitled “The Problem of the Foundation of Mathe-
matics”, Carnap discusses the debate between logicists and formalists. As he
diagnoses it, the disagreement centers on whether or not the mathematical foun-
dation needs to give an account of the meaning of mathematical talk in every
context, including applied ones.33 From the point of view of our present inquiry,
that is into whether or not there can be such a thing as applied mathematics
on the Carnapian account, this debate appears especially pressing. Carnap’s
30For the distinction between the two senses of logic, see [Carnap, 1953a], pp 124 – 125.
It is worth reiterating that, while Frege thought that it was only logic and arithmetic that
were analytic, Carnap followed Russell in thinking it was all of mathematics – i.e. including
geometry – that could be reduced to logic and so were analytic.
31[Carnap, 1953a], p 127.
32This follows almost directly from Carnap’s definition of content, and from his Theorem
34g.5 in LSL. See [Carnap, 1937], p 120.
33Oddly, the example of the applied inference that Carnap uses, which is to conclude that
“In this room now there are two people present” on the basis of the sentence “Charles and
Peter are in the room now and no one else”, is invalid; we would additionally need to know
that Charles and Peter are distinct people ([Carnap, 1937], p 326. This example is particularly
amusing in Carnap’s case since his good friend Hempel was known as both Carl and Peter).
While this is an odd oversight, I do not think that it diminishes his point.
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solution is typically tolerant. He claims that the logicists and the formalists are
simply talking past each other, and that when their claims are suitably clarified
they are seen to be compatible:
The logicist requirement only appears to be in contradiction with
the formalist one; this apparent antithesis arises as a result of the
ordinary formulation in the material mode of speech, namely, “an
interpretation for mathematics must be given in order that it may
be applied to reality”. [. . . ] The requirement of logicism is then
formulated [in the formal mode of speech] in this way: the task of
the logical foundation of mathematics is not fulfilled by a metamath-
ematics (that is, by a syntax of mathematics) alone, but only by a
syntax of the total language, which contains both logico-mathematical
and synthetic sentences.34
This is Carnap’s overall strategy for overcoming the problem of applications,
but it does not yet tell us just how this strategy is to be put into practice. On
the previous page, however, there is a hint of what he has in mind. There he
says that some of the rules of formation for a language must, if we are to have
the possibility of applying our mathematics, set out how to use mathematical
symbols in synthetic sentences.35 Of course, it is possible on Carnap’s view
to have a language where one cannot do any applied mathematics because it
lacks this type of rule. Their inclusion or exclusion is just one more choice
we must make when setting out a language. To sum up then, the objection
is based in a misunderstanding of the view, namely one whereby it is that
thought that it is constitutive of what it is to be mathematics at all to have no
content. But this is just a misreading combined with a kind of dogma about
absolute definitions. Once the dogma is removed, however, we see that the
objection is essentially terminological. The question is just whether to include
synthetic sentences which contain mathematical symbols in ‘mathematics’ or
not. But this is precisely the kind of decision which Carnap thinks has to be
made by conventional agreement, and does not constitute a flaw in the view.
However, there is a further problem that arises when considering the possibility
of applying the Carnapian picture which we now turn to, namely that due to
Michael Potter.
As we saw in section 5.2.2, Potter has argued that given the way that
Carnap sets up his linguistic frameworks, he runs into dire consequences in two
ways. In chapter 4 we detailed the route that Carnap took to get around the
issues that the discovery of the incompleteness phenomenon might have had
for his view, namely abandoning the use of a recursive consequence relation in
his languages. Potter argues that if one does this, then while one can regain
provable completeness, it is done at the cost of its graspability by speakers. That
is, in cases where the consequence relation is not effective, it appears mysterious
how any finite beings could ever come to use such a language. If, instead,
Carnap uses a recursive consequence relation, he lands squarely on the other
34[Carnap, 1937], p 327. Original emphasis.
35[Carnap, 1937], p 326.
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horn of Potter’s dilemma. There, as we saw, the fact that a particular linguistic
framework has any synthetic sentences at all becomes a matter of experimental
fact, about which we could be mistaken. This is due to the absence, and indeed
impossibility of a consistency proof, without which we have nothing better than
inductive assurance that the linguistic framework we use is consistent. If it is
inconsistent, then every sentence of the language will be analytic, as we saw,
because they will all follow from the rules of the framework alone. Moreover,
if a sentence is analytic, then it does not refer to the world. So, if we can
have only inductive certainty, at best, as to whether or not every sentence in
a particular language is analytic, then we can have only inductive certainty
that the sentences in that language refer to the world. In the remainder of this
subsection, we tackle the two horns of this dilemma, each in turn.
While it is certainly true that Carnap gives up using a recursive consequence
relation, it is far from obvious that this has the dire consequences that Potter
claims it does for speakers’ grasp of a language. In order to see precisely why,
it will be instructive to remind ourselves of the claims in the central passage of
this portion of his critique. He says,
The competence we ascribe to someone whom we credit with an im-
plicit grasp of a finite set of rules is nonetheless a finite competence:
it should be describable in finite terms. To say that the grasp is
implicit is only to recognize that someone can be unaware of the
exact limits of their own competence. If the competence in question
cannot be finitely described at all, on the other hand, it is hard to
see why it should be thought explanatory to describe it as a grasp
of a set of rules at all.36
However, this description of Carnap’s position misstates it badly. What Carnap
gives us by characterizing a consequence relation for a linguistic framework is
not an account of what it is that speakers of that language grasp, which would
be an exercise for psychology, but rather a theoretical description of meaning
in the language at hand. That is, it would be just confused to characterize
Carnap’s position as giving a list of rules that one must grasp in order to
cognize a particular language. Rather, what he is doing is giving a theoretical
reconstruction of meaning (in this case understood as synthetic consequences)
in that language in terms of rules, some of which are infinitary. So much, then,
for the first horn of the dilemma; what can be said about the other?
On the second horn of Potter’s dilemma, we see that in the absence of
a consistency proof we can have no more than inductive confidence that our
language refers to the world. That is, in the case where a language turns out
to be inconsistent, every sentence is analytic, and so has no content. So, Potter
concludes, we must always be suspicious that our language fails to refer, no
matter how successful we think we have been in the past.37 However, this
representation of how reference is supposed to work on Carnap’s account is
not accurate. Recall, as we presented it in chapter 4, Carnap’s view is that
36[Potter, 2002], pp 274 – 275.
37See the passage quoted in section 5.2.2 above, or at [Potter, 2002], p 277.
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certain sentences called ‘protocol sentences’ are the ones which refer to the
world, and they do so in virtue of their testability. However, a sentence is
deemed a protocol sentence because of the logical form it has, not because of
its content. In Carnap’s words,
Syntactical rules will have to be stated concerning the forms which
the protocol-sentences, by means of which the results of observation
are expressed, may take.38
So, we see clearly that content plays no role whatsoever in determining whether
a given sentence is a protocol sentence or not. The rules for determining the
form of the protocol sentences are just as freely chosen as all the other rules of
the language. This means that whether a particular sentence is accepted by a
community of speakers or not – that is, whether they agree to the rules of a
particular language or not – is what determines whether that sentence refers.
As Carnap puts the point,
There is in the strict sense no refutation (falsification) of an hy-
pothesis; for even when it proves to be L-incompatible with certain
protocol-sentences, there always exists the possibility of maintain-
ing the hypothesis and renouncing acknowledgment of the protocol-
sentences.39
So, let us return the case that Potter is worried about, namely where we are
unable to give a consistency proof for our language. In the case where the
language is consistent, then reference to the world is safe and unproblematic.
If the language is inconsistent, and the speakers of the language know it, then
they know that, while it might have appeared otherwise in the past, every
sentence of the language has the same (empty) content, and so they are unable
to say anything. Nonetheless, there can still be ‘contact with the world’, as
Potter puts it, because what that amounts to is simply acceptance or rejection
of protocol sentences by a linguistic community. Since sentences are protocol
sentences because of the particular form they have, then even if the language
is inconsistent there will still be sentences with the right form, and so there is
still at least the possibility of acceptance.40 In the case where the language is
inconsistent, and where the speakers of this language are unaware of this fact,
and so every sentence is analytic, there can still be reference. Some sentences
of the language will have the form of protocol sentences, and even though
they are analytic, they can still be either accepted or rejected by speakers of
the language.41 In this way, then, the lack of a consistency proof need not
38[Carnap, 1937], p 317. Original emphasis.
39[Carnap, 1937], p 318.
40Rejection, however, is a more difficult problem because every sentence of the language will
be provably L-true, and so there will be some difficulty in giving a rationale for ever rejecting
a proposed protocol sentence.
41This is still a somewhat strange picture. For example, it entails that in this latter case,
speakers of a language are confused about the meaning of their words. To them, it appears
as if the sentences they utter have some content, when in fact they do not since they are all
analytic. While this state of affairs is odd, it is nonetheless the view, and the worry that
Potter has raised does not affect it in the way that he claims.
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undermine our confidence in our ability to refer to the world on Carnap’s view.
Before moving on to consider the final two criticisms of Carnap’s position, what
remains to be done in this subsection is to spell out the way in which Tolerance,
and in particular the wide reading of the Principle, underlies the answers I have
given on Carnap’s behalf so far.
The applications of Tolerance in the reply I gave to Potter’s critique are rela-
tively straightforward, and so we will not belabor them overly much. In the first
horn of his dilemma, and even granting that languages with non-recursive con-
sequence relations are not cognizable by finite beings like us, we noted that Car-
nap’s project was not to give a psychologically adequate description of speakers’
grasp of languages. Rather, we said it was to provide a theoretical account of
meaning, namely as sets of non-analytic consequences. Because the account is
purely theoretical, it need not be constrained in the ways that Potter claims it
should. Indeed, the lack of antecedent constraints is precisely the wide reading
of Tolerance. The story is similar with the other horn of the supposed dilemma:
it is precisely Tolerance that underlies Carnap’s view on protocol sentences, as
we saw in chapter 3. What is distinctively wide about the use made of the
Principle in the response to Potter is somewhat removed from the discussion
of applications and content, however. It is the move made at the beginning
to a consequence relation that is non-effective. As I argued above, in section
6.1.1, the freedom to use whichever consequence relation seems best is part and
parcel of the wide reading. So, summing up, the wide reading of Tolerance,
along with some reflection on the role of protocol sentences, allows Carnap to
sidestep the worries over applicability, and over reference. We turn now to the
critiques based in either circularity, or self-refutation.
6.2.2 Go¨del and Putnam, Verificationism and Incompleteness
In this section, our goal will be to answer the remaining two criticisms of Car-
nap’s view that we discussed in chapter 5. The response will have four parts.
In the first, we will give a brief overview of the two arguments. The second
part will argue that, while these two arguments might look quite different, they
rely on the same faulty assumption, and we will show how this assumption is
undermined by wide Tolerance. In the third section, we will consider a rejoin-
der, due to Matti Eklund, to the solution offered in section two. In the final
part, we will argue that Eklund’s position not only has not made any progress
in showing a weakness in Carnap’s view, but also runs roughshod over the very
heart of that view. We will conclude, as we did in the previous section, that
if we understand Carnap as having employed the wide reading of Tolerance,
then his view is unaffected by the various arguments that have been deployed
against it.
In section 5.2.4, we set out the first of the criticisms we will examine in
this section, namely that made by Hilary Putnam in a footnote to his lecture
“Philosophers and Human Understanding”. There he argued that if Carnap
was to maintain the Principle of Tolerance, then he had to assume the VCM
in the background. If not, then it was possible for there to be facts of the
matter concerning which language we should adopt. However, the VCM was
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supposedly a free postulation made on the basis of Tolerance; that is, it was a
stipulation that, according to Putnam, Carnap laid down as a preference, not
as an absolute requirement. So, if Putnam is right, then the justifications for
both the VCM and the Principle are viciously circular. The second critique of
Carnap’s view that we will take up in this section is Go¨del’s. In his 1953 draft
paper, he argued that if the truths of logic and mathematics are supposed to be
analytic and content-less, then they cannot entail any synthetic sentences (as
that is what it is to have content on Carnap’s picture). This demand amounts,
however, to the demand for the truths of logic to be consistent, for if they
were not then they would entail everything, and in particular they would entail
some synthetic sentences. But, by the incompleteness theorems, there is no
possibility of giving a proof of a language’s consistency in that very language
in the case of languages strong enough to be interesting.
On the surface, these two criticisms are rather different. One appears to
concern the justification for the Principle of Tolerance, while the other seems
to regard the claim that mathematics, and logic, are analytic and content-less.
However, an assumption that is common to both of these arguments is that
there is a notion of an empirical fact that stands apart from any linguistic
framework. In his paper “Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance, Empiricism, and
Conventionalism”, Ricketts makes this point quite clearly, at least insofar as
concerns Go¨del’s argument:
Go¨del observes that the conventionalist will not be justified in tak-
ing the mathematics formalizable in some language to be a con-
tentless auxiliary for science, unless the rules of the language can
be shown to be admissible. Go¨del’s definition of admissibility em-
ploys a language-transcendent notion of empirical fact or empirical
truth [. . . ] He urges that we are not justified in taking the ana-
lytic sentences of a Carnapian language to be conventionally stipu-
lated truths only if the premises needed to establish admissibility are
available in advance of the stipulation. This explanatory task arises
only in the context of a language-transcendent notion of empirical
fact.42
To see that Putnam’s argument uses the same (unstated) premise takes some
work. As Ricketts goes on to argue in his paper, however, the central issue is
the way in which Putnam frames the problem. Recall the essential bit of the
footnote:
For the doctrine that no rational reconstruction is uniquely correct
or corresponds to the way things ‘really are’, the doctrine that all
‘external questions’ are without cognitive sense, is just the verifica-
tion principle.43
The problematic phrase is “the way things really are”. If Putnam’s argument
is to have any bite against Carnap, then the meaning of this phrase must be
42[Ricketts, 1994], p 180.
43[Putnam, 1983], p 191. Original emphasis.
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clear. But, this is precisely what Carnap will deny; instead, he argues that it
is exactly terms of this sort that are in need of precisification, and moreover
that this precisification can only occur by means of a precisely specified lin-
guistic framework. In other words, the claim that Putnam is committed to,
namely that there is an unproblematic notion of the way things are apart from
a linguistic framework is exactly that language-transcendent notion of empir-
ical fact that Ricketts pointed to. It would seem, then, that both Go¨del and
Putnam have failed to engage with Carnap on his own terms. However, in a
recent paper, which we gestured at in section 5.2.4 above, Matti Eklund has
argued that Ricketts’ solution is too quick, and it is to this rejoinder that we
now turn.
In his paper “Multitude, Tolerance and Language-Transcendence”, Eklund
argues that Ricketts own notion of language-transcendence is itself in need
clarification. Moreover, he argues that there is no way to spell it out such that
it at once satisfies a Carnapian view at the same time as being consistent with
the way we conceptualize the relationship between languages and the world in
contemporary philosophical theorizing. As Eklund puts it,
If it is a [thesis to the effect that “there is no fact of the matter as
to ”] that Goldfarb and Ricketts have in mind [. . . ] [then] their talk
of “language-transcendence” obscures matters. Saying that there is
no language-transcendent fact of the matter, as opposed to saying
merely that there is no fact of the matter, suggests that although
there is no fact of the matter as to what is an empirical fact, relative
to a given language there is a fact of the matter. But that seems just
confused. What language is adopted would appear only to matter
to which propositions get expressed; the truth-values of propositions
do not change.44
Eklund has in mind an interpretation of Carnap like this. Some propositions
are true and some false given the way the world is. There is no proposition,
however, which says which language should be adopted. This means that we
are free to adopt whichever language we see fit. What is different between these
languages is what expressive resources they have. So, some languages will have
the resources to express more propositions than others will. So, correspondingly,
if we adopt a different language, we may have the capacity to express more (or
fewer) propositions than we could previously. What will not change, however, is
the truth-value of these propositions. On Eklund’s interpretation, they do not
depend on language for their truth, but rather on the world. However, while
this would certainly be a strange reading of Carnap, or possibly itself confused,
what it certainly is not is a rejoinder to Ricketts, or, for that matter, to Carnap.
All that Eklund has apparently said is that propositions, or sentences, are true
or false depending on how the world is. But this is precisely what Carnap, and
Ricketts on his behalf, have denied! That is, in order to ensure that a change in
44[Eklund, 2010], p 8. Original emphasis. He goes on to say that if we should feel squeamish
about propositions-talk, then the entire argument can be reformulated to only use sentence-
talk. However, I do not think this small point should bother us insofar as the present inquiry
is concerned.
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language did not effect a chance in the truth-values of propositions, their truth
(or falsity) must be determined by factors that go beyond a particular linguistic
framework – to put matters bluntly, there must be a language-transcendent
notion of empirical fact in play. So, just as with Putnam and Go¨del, Eklund
has failed to engage with Carnap, and with Ricketts, on their own terms.
In this chapter, we have examined the criticisms of Carnap’s view that were
developed in chapter 5. Key to our examination was a particular understanding
of the Principle of Tolerance which we called the ‘wide’ interpretation. This
reading of the Principle holds that there are absolutely no constraints on which
linguistic frameworks may be proposed, and that there is no fact of the matter
about which one must be chosen. There are, of course, pragmatic considera-
tions, as for example consistency or completeness, but these can only be weighed
relative to a particular goal. We then showed how each of the criticisms we had
previously laid out failed to take adequate account of the freedom this read-
ing of Tolerance ensures. In the case of the worries about the applicability of
mathematics, we showed that the objections boiled down to a terminological
problem, namely whether synthetic sentences with mathematical symbols were
to be counted as mathematical or not. The solution, as we argued, is precisely
in Tolerance. That is, it is a matter of decision whether to include sentences like
this or not, and the matter is to be decided by investigating the consequences of
each approach. We moved from considering worries based in the applications of
mathematics, to those whose aim was to show that the Principle is self-refuting,
or incoherent. Following Ricketts, we diagnosed these criticisms as relying on
a notion of empirical fact that was independent of a linguistic framework, or a
“language-transcendent” notion in Ricketts’ phrase. However, this notion is not
only incompatible with the Carnapian picture, it demonstrates a certain kind of
failure to engage properly with that picture. With that, the main philosophical
portion of this thesis comes to a close. In what remains, we return to certain
reflections begun in the introduction.
6.3 Conclusion
This thesis, broadly speaking, was divided into two parts. In the first, we exam-
ined the development of Carnap’s philosophical views on logic and mathematics
until the publication of LSL, or shortly thereafter. We began with the influ-
ence of the logicist tradition on his thinking. This came primarily through his
interactions with both Frege, from whom Carnap first learned formal logic, and
Russell, of whom Carnap made an extended study in the period just after his
PhD. Carnap’s conviction that the logicist thesis was true was still strong at the
time he wrote LSL, as we noted. We moved on from discussing this early phase
of his thinking to an examination of his time as a member of the Vienna Circle,
and in conversation with Wittgenstein. We showed how his logicism combined
with Wittgenstein’s linguistic conception of logic to form a view which we called
‘tautologicism’, following some recent literature. We also detailed the way in
which his views on science and meaning interacted with his view on logic and
mathematics during the debate over the nature of protocol sentences in the
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late 1920s and early 1930s. There, I showed how Carnap’s view, though ‘left
wing’ inside the Circle, was nonetheless still encumbered by a requirement that
there be a single language for science along with mathematics and logic. In
the following chapter, I argued that a major shift in his position came in the
wake of Go¨del’s discovery of incompleteness, namely the abandonment of the
single language approach in favor of one where there could be many languages.
The final chapter of the first portion of the thesis was a focused examination
of the view that Carnap put forward in LSL. As I argued there, the view is the
result of the considerations from the previous years of his thinking about how
to implement a tautologicist view in a ‘many languages’ format, combined with
a rediscovery of his tolerant attitude. I showed that it was this attitude, which
was given its first expression in his writing during the protocol sentence debate
but memorably phrased in LSL as the Principle of Tolerance, underwrote many
of the technical results of the book. I examined a claim by Karl Menger to the
effect that the Principle was originally his, but concluded that this did not take
adequate account of either Carnap’s personal history – in particular the atti-
tude he inherited from his mother – or his use of Tolerance. Most importantly,
in that chapter I examined the content of the book, and argued that, broadly
speaking it could be viewed as split into two projects, that of developing the
many languages method of investigating proposed linguistic frameworks for sci-
ence, and that of showing, via the construction of two languages (Language I
and Language II), that the debates over the foundations of mathematics can be
answered by the construction of languages. The central aim of these first three
chapters was to track the development of Carnap’s view, and to set it out so
that the target of the critiques that I examined in the second part of this thesis
was clearly visible.
The project in the second part of the thesis, as mentioned above, was some-
what of a departure from the project in the first part. We began by giving a
short history of the relationship between Go¨del and Carnap in the 1920s and
1930s. We noted that because of the closeness of their association, Go¨del would
have been one of a very few people who knew Carnap’s views on logic and
mathematics at that time, and indeed would have been in a better position
than almost anyone else to critique those views. With that in mind, we moved
on to setting out the critique that Go¨del eventually gave in the third version of
his draft 1953/59 essay “Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?”. We addition-
ally set out four other criticisms due to Gabriella Crocco, Patricia Blanchette,
Michael Potter, and Hilary Putnam. In the final chapter, we initially returned
to Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. We argued that it should be understood in
a particular way, which we dubbed the ‘wide’ reading of the Principle. Accord-
ing to this reading, we should understand Tolerance to say that there are no
antecedent constraints of which languages can be proposed for potential adop-
tion. We then turned our attention back to the criticisms of Carnap’s view.
We argued that they fell into two camps: those that critiqued the position by
arguing that it somehow had difficulties with applied mathematics, and those
which critiqued it by arguing that it was either viciously circular or somehow
incoherent. However, we went on to diagnose all of these criticisms to rest on
a failure to read Tolerance in the wide way. I argued that if we do understand
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Tolerance in the wide way, then these criticisms fail to hit their targets. What
I have not yet done, is to draw a moral from this failure, and it is this task
which we take up in the remainder of our conclusion.
This thesis has in some ways been a conservative one. The story I have been
telling in it is, in large part, one that squares with the way we usually under-
stand the history of analytic philosophy, the Vienna Circle, and in particular
Carnap’s thinking about logic and mathematics in this period. One reason is
that, in general, I think our understanding of Carnap’s views is correct. There
is another sense, however, in which this thesis has been quite radical. This is
most easily seen in my discussion in the final chapter of the ‘wide’ interpre-
tation of Tolerance. There, as I argued above, I presented a reading of the
Principle whereby there are no constraints on which languages can be proposed
for adoption to accomplish a task. Even those features which might at first ap-
pear to be requirements, for example the need for the language to be precisely
specified, I showed were not requirements simpliciter, but only relative to the
task of putting a linguistic framework forward for discussion. That is, even the
need for “syntactical rules”, in Carnap’s phrase, is not an absolute; it is only
required if one wants to discuss one’s view. This is the point, then, where my
interpretation departs from the orthodox account. With these considerations
in mind, we turn now to some lessons that can be drawn from the divergence,
and success, of my reading relative to the standard one.
The first point that should be made is that the success of the many reeval-
uations of the major figures in the analytic tradition shows us that there are
many details that have been glossed over by orthodox history.45 Arguing con-
clusively for the importance of these details is a subject far beyond the scope of
this thesis, but we should at least indicate what such an argument might consist
in. Broadly speaking, practitioners of history of philosophy can be separated
into two groups, though I do not presume that this separation is unproblem-
atic. The first group are those who work on ‘getting things right’. Their aim is
to correct lacunae in the common understanding of the history of philosophy,
and their major focus is on making sure that the understanding of historical
philosophers that we eventually come to is faithful to their thinking. The sec-
ond group are those whose primary goal in doing research into the thinking of
historical philosophers is finding inspiration for positions that might be taken
up in contemporary debates. Though I take it that either of these approaches
are worthwhile, this thesis has primarily been a project in the former camp.
That is, one of our goals has been to show certain ways in which the common
understanding of Carnap’s thinking has been confused. Indeed, the prolifera-
tion of criticisms based, in one way or another, on failing to read Tolerance in
the wide way shows this much.
However, I further hope that this thesis will serve as a call for a project
in the second camp as well. And so it is here, finally, with this call that our
story ends. We have shown that, understood properly, Carnap’s Principle of
Tolerance is not self-refuting, nor is it incoherent. With these impediments
removed, before us once again is the boundless ocean of possibilities.
45See section 1.1 for examples of the kind of scholarship I have in mind.
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